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Do the requirements of morality and those of rational
self-interest dictate performance of the same acts in every
particular situation? In this thesis I examine and
evaluate various proposed answers to this age-old
philosophical question. I focus on a particular kind of
situation in which the two sorts of requirement seem to be
at odds with one another. These are situations of
contract-keeping that are prisoner's dilemma-like. In such
situations, if you are moral, then it appears that you
should comply with an agreement to do the "cooperative
thing." If you are rational, then it seems that you will
do best for yourself if you refrain from cooperating.
Reformulating the central question of this essay, is it
rational in some sense of 'rational' to do the cooperative
thing in, and so to "escape" a prisoner's dilemma?
I begin with Hobbes and submit he would answer in the
negative. In analysing Hobbes' position, I critically
discuss Jean Hampton's and Gregory Kavka's views on Hobbes
v
on state-of-nature cooperation. I then consider more
recent replies paying particular attention to David
Gauthier's . I argue that his defense of an affirmative
reply - the desirable reply - is flawed. I arrive at a
similar verdict about Edward McClennen's opinion. Finally,
I advance my own conclusion - there may be situations in
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1 . 1 Two Problems
Clarifying the nature of the relationship between
morality and rational self-interest is a perennial
philosophical issue, one that has been debated by
philosophers from Plato to the present. Of the numerous
problems that arise in its discussion, there are two that I
find especially intriguing. The gist of the first is
captured by the question of Hobbes' Fool and the ethical
sceptic: Do morality and rational self-interest require
performance of the same acts in every situation? Of
course, the sophisticated sceptic might readily concede
that morality is superior to immorality, as a general
policy , from the viewpoint of rational self-interest. But
what about those special cases where an immoral act seems
advantageous and where duty fails to have "the visage of a
sweetie or a cutie?"
1 Does it not, in these situations,
pay to be immoral? If reason construed as the maximization
of one's self-interest is accepted as unproblematic, an
affirmative response to this question, the sceptic may
initially insist, has the consequence that a rational
morality is a chimmera - that morality, as Thrasymacus
seems to have believed, is simply a fool's game. But here,
perhaps, the sceptic has spoken too quickly. That his
1
judgment might be rash becomes somewhat more evident if we
turn to the second problem:
While accepting reason, the sceptic shuns the
constraints imposed by morality on the pursuit of
individual interest. Morality, he believes, lacks a
"validation, " or a "justification," or a "rational
foundation." The issue of what we mean when we say that a
moral principle is justified is highly contentious.
According to one prominent tradition - the contractarian
one - noteworthy patrons of which are Hobbes and the
Hobbesian contemporary, David Gauthier, moral principles
are "generated" as a result of agreement among rational
persons. They are justified for us because they impose
demands which are, or would be, rational for each of us to
accept. In other words, the validation of a morality, as
the contractarian sees it, is to proceed by demonstrating
that rational self-interested individuals, the moral
sceptic included, would voluntarily choose to be moral.
Assume this conception of moral justification sound and
assume a set of moral principles so justified. Then the
sceptic cannot relegate morality to the refuse heaps
comprised of such dubious principles as those of astrology
and voodoo. These assumptions, however, would do little if
anything, I think, to alleviate the first problem - whether
the dictates of duty are coincident in all circumstances
2
with those of rational self-interest. Indeed, assuming the
contractarian project a success - assuming a set of moral
principles justified for everyone, may lead to an even more
formidable third problem: if the prescriptions of morality
and those of rationality are not concurrent under all
conditions, and if both duty and interest provide us with
reasonable grounds for action, then in cases of conflict
does duty take precedence over, or give way to, rational
self-interest?
In this thesis I focus primarily on the first problem,
secondarily on the second, and not at all on the third. In
discussing the first, I chiefly confine attention to
situations of contract-keeping that are prisoner's dilemma-
like. In these situations the requirements of morality and
those of rationality often seem at loggerheads. In
relation to them the focal question is this: Is the
appearance of conflict between duty and interest merely
that - sheer appearance, or is the conflict real? I'm
inclined to side with Hobbes' Fool. Others are more
optimistic. Before I can assess their positions and defend
mine, the terms in which the problem is formulated must be
clarified. In particular, I must explain the conception of
rationality as "straightforward maximization." I must then
say something about prisoner's dilemmas. The next two
sections deal with these issues. I will then be in a
position to show that while it appears morality requires
3
that one keep one's contract to do the "cooperative thing"
in a prisoner's dilemma, rationality seems to sanction
violation.
1.2 Straightforward Maximization (SM)
Assume that at each moment of choice a person has
several alternatives among which to choose. Assume,
further, that for each alternative there is an outcome.
The outcome is what would occur if the alternative were
2performed. Assume that each outcome has a value for the
agent. Her choice among her "timewise identical"
alternatives is to be dictated by the value-for-her of the
outcomes that would result if they were performed.
There are different conceptions about the value of
. . . . 3outcomes for agents. I will distinguish two: Let the
utility of an outcome . o, of some action, a, for some
agent, s, be the value of o for s. On one view, the value
of an outcome is an objective measure of how beneficial or
harmful that outcome would be for the agent. One and the
same outcome may be objectively beneficial to a certain
degree, and objectively harmful to a certain degree, for an
agent. Assume that the net objective value of an outcome
for an agent can be ascertained. On this approach, the
agent-util itv (or s-utilitv ) of an action , a, for agent, s,
4
is simply the net objective value of the outcome that would
result were s to do a.
On a second approach, an outcome that has value has it
relative to a person purely in virtue of the fact that the
person has a preference for the outcome. Some theorists
believe that only a certain class of preferences is
relevant to a determination of an agent's values.
Gauthier, for example, supposes that only considered
preferences are germane. Considered preferences, he tells
us, are those "that would pass the test of reflection and
experience." (M by A, 31, 21-46) On this second view, the
s-utility of action, a, for agent, s, can be conceptualized
as a measure of s's preference for the outcome that would
result if s were to do a.
Assume either one of these axiological approaches.
Then on one variant, SM is the theory that for any act, a,
and any agent, s, a is rational for s if and only if none
of its alternatives has a higher s-utility than it has.
There is a more complicated variant of SM: Assume
that for each alternative there is a set of outcomes that
could result if it were performed. The complex variant
requires that an agent weigh not only the utilities of
outcomes realizable in action but also the probabilities on
her evidence that they will occur. It requires that a
rational agent endeavor to maximize the expected aqent-
5
utility of her actions. This parameter is to be understood
in the following way: Take some course of action, a, to be
performed by some agent, s. Consider all the posible
outcomes of a that could result if it were performed. Of
these, restrict attention to the subset of outcomes that
would affect the welfare of s. For each of these, take the
agent-utility of the outcome, U(oi), and the probability of
the outcome given the action, P(oi,a), and multiply U(oi)
and P(oi,a). Find the sum of the products. The sum is the
expected agent-utility of a. On this variant, SM permits
an agent to perform an action if and only if none of its
alternatives has a higher expected agent-utility (or
"expected utility" as I shall abridge) than it has.
1 . 3 Prisoner's Dilemmas (PDs)
The prisoner's dilemma is named after a story about
two prisoners. Here's an illustrative tale: Suppose Butch
and Sundance have been arrested for voyeurism. There is
enough evidence to convict them on the charge for this
felony, but the DA is after bigger game. He suspects they
have robbed a bank together, and he believes he can get
them to confess to it. Assume both felons are interested
solely in spending the least time in prison and that the DA
knows this. The felons are held in different cells and
cannot communicate with one another. The DA approaches
each with this proposition: "I'm going to offer your
6
partner the same deal, so listen carefully. If one of you
confesses to the bank robbery but the other does not,
Confessor gets one year, and Sealed Lips gets thirty. If
you both confess, I'll see to it that each of you lugs a
ball and a chain around for a decade. If neither of you
confesses, then each of you will enjoy the hospitality of
the slammer for two years - Sam Maquerrie's wife has sworn
under oath that you Peeping Toms violated the rights of
Betty Loo Hot Lips. I'll be back in a while - for your
confession .
"






Remains silent 30,1 2,2
Figure 1.1 The Prisoner's Dilemma
Each "box" depicts an outcome of a pair of actions, one
performed by each prisoner. The numbers indicate years-in-
prison with Sundance's jail terms listed first.
7
If each is to act as a straightforward maximizer
(SFM)
, confessing is the best policy - no matter what the
other does each does best if he confesses. In the
terminology of game theory, the act of confessing dominates
for each player. The outcome of mutual confession,
however, is not optimal . an outcome being optimal if and
only if there is no alternative outcome that both gives
some person a greater payoff and no person a lesser payoff.
Each prefers mutual silence, an optimal outcome, to mutual
confession. But this mutually preferred outcome lies
beyond the reach of the SM-rational felons.
It is difficult to state precisely just what
conditions must be satisfied in order for this situation to
count as a PD. Following Professor Feldman, let's assume a
. . . . 4minimal set of conditions:
(i) The actions of the interacting agents must be
independent in the sense that "no matter what choice either
makes, he would still make that choice no matter what
5
choice the other makes." This "counterfactual
independence condition " rules out, for instance, the
possibility that Butch can somehow force Sundance to remain
silent and then confess himself. Were the actions of the
two literally interdependent in this way, it would not be
true as it is in an authentic PD, that although confessing
is individually rational, it is collectively irrational.
8
(ii) There are no hidden choices. Each can either
confess or remain silent. It is not open for either, for
example, to bribe the DA or to break out of prison.
(iii) There are no hidden payoffs. We assume that
the payoffs shown exhaust what each felon stands to gain or
to loose from each of the four possible outcomes. We
assume, then, that each cares solely to minimize his
prison-term. It isn't the case, for example, that Butch
swayed by feelings of comradeship, is willing to sacrifice
himself by remaining silent if Sundance confesses. If he
were to be so moved, the payoff '1,30' in the upper right
would be misleading.
The matrix representing the preferences of each felon







Remains silent 4,1 2,2
Figure 1.2 The Prisoner's Dilemma Preference Matrix
9
(iv) The last condition is simply that the relevant
persons' preferences for outcomes, resulting from sets of
combined possible actions, one performed by each person,
are ordered as in the above matrix.
Let's stipulate, perhaps redundantly, that a
prisoner's dilemma is any two- or more-person situation
that satisfies conditions (i), (ii)
,
(iii), and (iv ).
6
Butch and Sundance, in a PD, both end up confessing as
the DA correctly predicted. If only somehow they could
curtail the pursuit of their own advantage and refuse to
confess, each would be better off. It might be thought
they could do this by cooperation: Suppose prior to the
bank robbery the two make an agreement with each other to
the effect that should they be captured each would not
confess, since each is aware of the DA's tactic to get
felons to confess, and is aware that the outcome of mutual
silence is better for each than the outcome of mutual
confession. But this pre-crime compact will not help
matters. Merely having made such an agreement on
prudential grounds does not provide any reason for a SFM to
comply with it when the time comes for doing so: Although
optimal, the "agreement outcome" is not in eguilibrium. An
equilibrium outcome is the product of a set of actions, one
for each interacting person, such that for each such
person, there is no alternative action that this person
would prefer, the actions of all the others being fixed.
10
If Butch does his part - if he complies with the agreement
- Sundance can do better by defecting. Since both are SFMs
and since positions are symmetric, it seems that compliance
with the pre-crime agreement would be rationally
unjustified.
1.4 A Possible Conflict Between Duty and Interest
The inability of SFMs to adhere to mutually
advantageous agreements requiring self-sacrifice in
situations like the PD can be used to illustrate what seems
to be a conflict between morality and SM: Assume morality
requires that one adhere to a prudentially undertaken
agreement even if adherence compromises one's own
interests. Morality, we assume with Gauthier, imposes
constraints on the direct pursuit of self-interest. If
Butch and Sundance were moral, they would adhere to their
pre-crime agreement if caught, but as SM-rational agents,
they could not. It seems that whereas in such a situation
morality constrains behavior in the direction of
optimality, rational self-interest leads to a suboptimal
outcome. Morality and SM, it appears, are therefore
incompatible
.
Call the outcome that would result if Butch and
Sundance were each to keep silent the "cooperative
outcome." To do the "cooperative thing" is for each felon
11
to remain silent. The focal problem of this thesis can now
be formulated in this way: Is it rational, in some sense
of rational
,
' for each party in a PD to do the cooperative
thing? Do the prescriptions of morality and those of
rationality coincide in PDs? Yet alternatively, can
rational agents "escape" the PD by doing the cooperative
thing? If not, does the dilemma vindicate the charge of
Hobbes' Fool?
The rest of this chapter is synoptic. I summarize
what I undertake to show in each of the ensuing chapters.
1.5 Hobbes on Rational Cooperation
Hobbes seems to have been among the first to recognize
the significance of PDs to the issues of whether there is
harmony between the dictates of morality and those of self-
interest, and to whether morality can be conceptualized as
a "product" of rational agreement. Thus Professor Kavka
writes
:
Hobbes's very point about the state of nature is
that it has this multiparty prisoner's dilemma
structure and hence must be abandoned. For so long
as individuals remain in that state and act
rationally, they will inevitably produce worse
outcomes for themselves than they could obtain
under other conditions. (K,113)
Gauthier traces the roots of his response to the
Fool's contention that injustice may sometimes pay to
Hobbes. (M by A, Chapter VI, section 1.3)
12
In consequence, it is only proper to begin with a
consideration of what this venerable English philosopher
had to say on state-of-nature cooperation. I devote
Chapters 2 and 3 to this task.
In Chapter 2 I do two things. (a) First, I show that
a careful examination of his views on state-of-nature
cooperation reveals that it is controversial, contrary to
popular assumption, whether Hobbes himself believed that
natural-state individuals really are in a multiparty
prisoner's dilemma.
Suppose, in light of this uncertainty, we overlook -
in a judicious manner - certain passages in Leviathan and
in other relevant Hobbesian texts. Then it is possible to
interpret Hobbes as arguing for the point not infrequently
attributed to him: The state of nature is one big PD.
Hobbesian individuals in that multiparty dilemmatic
situation would there reap suboptimal outcomes. Their very
rationality prevents them from adhering to the interest-
constraining dictates of morality - in particular, to the
third law of nature, a moral principle requiring compliance
with covenants rationally made - and so prevents them from
escaping the dilemma. Hobbes may then be taken to be
advocating a "political" solution to their predicament:
Institute a sovereign who sees to it by his might that it
13
is no longer advantageous for each in the state of nature
to violate the constraints of duty.
(b) Second, I suggest that this political solution
fails: Sovereign institution itself seems to involve PD-
like problems that Hobbesian individuals are unable to
overcome. It should be noted that even if this solution
did succeed, by invoking it Hobbes appears to abandon any
hope of reconciling duty and self-interest. The covenants
enforced by the sovereign that enable rational agents to
"escape" PDs are no longer interest-constraining.
"Cooperation" is straightforwardly rational.
In discussing (a) and (b)
,
I will comment on some of
. . 7Kavka's views on Hobbes on state-of-nature cooperation.
Jean Hampton takes issue with what I propose in
gChapter 2. She believes that although Hobbesian
individuals are psychologically incapable of instituting a
sovereign, the inauguration of the sovereign does not
involve any PD-like problems. In fact, she argues that it
is SM-rational for Hobbesian individuals in the state of
nature to subjugate themselves to a sovereign. I believe
she is mistaken on both counts. I show this in Chapter 3.
In doing so, I will explain why her views on Hobbes on
natural-state cooperation are not cogent.
14
1.6 Gauthier on Rational Cooperation
Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 are devoted to a critical
examination of Morals By Agreement . In this work, David
Gauthier launches a full scale defense of a contractarian
theory of ethics - his aim is none other than to show that
morality can be "derived" from rational agreement. If
successful, this ambitious undertaking would accomplish a
number of desirable goals: It would, for example, provide
a response to the moral sceptic's demand for a non-moral
justification for being moral: Moral principles, the
contractarian might volunteer, are a reguirement of
practical rationality. As Gauthier says, moral principles
are "a subset of rational principles for choice," so that
"To choose rationally, one must choose morally." (M by A,
4) It would, in addition, rise to Hobbes' Fool's challenge
that injustice may sometimes "stand with that reason which
dictateth to every man his own good." Gauthier's brand of
contractarianism attempts to defuse this challenge in a
particularly engaging fashion: Gauthier attempts to show
that SFMs can escape the PD without the brandishing sword
of the sovereign. He first argues that SFMs will bargain
with each other on the basis of the principle of minimax
relative concession (MMRC) . This principle, Gauthier tells
us, is a moral principle. It's a principle of distributive
justice. MMRC requires SFMs to do the interest-
15
constraining cooperative thing in a PD. He then argues
that it is rational for SFMs to change their very
conception of rationality. Given a choice between
straightforward maximization and constrained maximization
(CM)
, it is SM-rational for SFMs to become constrained
maximizers. CM, however, requires compliance with
agreements that it is SM-rational to make. Since it is SM-
rational to agree to cooperate in a PD, it is CM-rational
to comply with such an interest-constraining agreement as
well. The PD, Gauthier concludes, is escapable after all.
Professor Gauthier's contractarianism raises many
intriguing issues. I concentrate on these:
(1) The "Bargaining Problem." Assume cooperation
makes possible a surplus of goods that would not be
forthcoming if the prospective cooperators were to act
independently. The generation of such a surplus creates a
problem of distribution: how is the surplus to be alloted
among those who produce it? More specifically, on what
principle will SFMs agree to apportion the cooperative
surplus? Gauthier argues that there is a unique principle
that governs the relevant distribution, the principle of
minimax relative concession, or its twin principle, maximin
relative benefit. In Chapter 4, I question this claim. I
argue that SFMs will not necessarily minimax in many
bargaining situations. They may well reach agreement on
16
some other basis. So there is no unique solution to the
bargaining problem.
Bargaining theory presupposes that what one brings to
the bargaining table - one's prebargaining endowment - is
settled or fixed. A "Lockian Proviso," Gauthier argues,
defines a system of property rights that constrains one's
initial endowment. Since each agent is entitled to her
initial endowment as a matter of right, only the surplus,
if any, generated by cooperation is subject to
distribution. I mention this crucial aspect of Gauthier's
theory only to set it aside. The difficult and highly
interesting problems it raises will not be discussed in
this thesis.
(2) The "Compliance Problem." Suppose the bargaining
problem solved and solved in the direction Gauthier
recommends. It would then be rational according to the
principle of MMRC to agree to do the cooperative thing in a
PD. There is, however, still a problem of compliance:
Suppose Butch and Sundance have made a rational pre-crime
agreement to remain silent if captured and questioned. Why
should they comply when the time comes to perform? After
all, the outcome of mutual silence is not in equilibrium.
If one complies the other will do best by reneging.
Gauthier's answer is that it is rational for them to comply
- not SM-rational , of course, but "PR-rational." PR is the
theory that an act is rational if and only if it
17
expresses" a rational disposition of choice. "A
disposition is rational if and only if an actor holding it
can expect his choices to yield no less utility than the
choices he would make were he to hold any alternative
disposition." (M by A, 183) Gauthier limits choice to two
decision-making strategies, SM and CM. He argues that CM
and not SM is the rational disposition. Any SFM, he
claims, confronted with a choice between SM and CM will
(under specified conditions) choose the latter. CM
requires compliance with prudentially rational agreements.
Assuming PR is unproblematic the compliance problem,
Gauthier thinks, is solved.
I believe the "choice argument" is not sound: It is
false that SM is not utility maximizing. I endeavor to
show this in Chapter 5.
(3) Assessing Theories of Rationality. I do,
however, concede that it is CM-rational (under certain
conditions) to abide by agreements that it is SM-rational
to make. But this fact should not by itself impress a SFM.
With the failure of the choice argument, some rationale is
needed to establish the superiority and so the
preferability of CM to SM. In an earlier work, "Reason and
Maximization," Gauthier proposes a "self-support" criterion
of adequacy for theories of practical rationality. His
claim is that although CM is self-supporting, SM is not.
18
CM is therefore a better theory than SM. The criterion and
variants of it are developed, discussed, and rejected in
Chapter 6
.
(4) The Justification of Principles of Practical
Reason. I said earlier that the contractarian attempts to
answer the moral sceptic by showing that reason requires
acknowledgment of at least some moral constraints. This
way of answering the sceptic assumes that although there is
a problem about the justification of morality, there is no
anlaogous problem about a theory of practical rationality.
Gauthier's project is particularly attractive because of
its implicit rejection of this assumption. The project
offers a unified scheme for the justification of both a
morality and a theory of practical rationality. That
scheme I call "abstract choice theory." In Chapter 7 I
argue against the rational credentials of choice theory.
Gauthier's contractarianism, I conclude, cannot
deflate the Fool's challenge.
1.7 McClennen on Rational Cooperation
In the penultimate chapter, I examine Edward
McClennen 's view that "resolute" agents are rationally able
to secure cooperative outcomes that are optimal in PD-like
cases. ^ This view, I believe, is once again questionable:
resolute choosers fare no better than SFMs in the relevant
dilemmatic situations.
19
I conclude that there are cases in which persons must
act in a way
challenge of
that is either immoral or irrational.




In Morals By Agreement (1986), Oxford: Clarendon
Press, p. 1, Gauthier informs us:
The unphilosophical poet Ogden Nash grasped the
assumptions underlying our moral language more
clearly than the philosopher Hume when he wrote:
'0 Duty!
Why hast thou not the visage of a sweetie or
a cutie?'
We may lament duty's stern visage but we may not
deny it. For it is only as we believe that some
appeals do, alas, override interest or advantage
that morality becomes our concern.
2. In strategic contexts in which an outcome for an agent
depends in part on the actions chosen by other persons,
this assumption does not hold. The account of SM presented
in this section is standard for parametric contexts. But
it should, nevertheless, facilitate an understanding of the
reasoning of straightforward maximizers in the strategic
context of the prisoner's dilemma.
3. See Chapter 7, section 1.4 of this thesis, for an
elaboration of these two theories of value.
4. Fred Feldman, "On The Advantages of Cooperativeness,"
forthcoming in Midwest Studies in Philosophy . section 3.
5. Fred Feldman, "On The Advantages Of Cooperativeness,"
section 3.
6. Professor John Robison has indicated that whether or
not two individuals like Butch and Sundance in the real
world are in a PD partly seems to depend on how we
characterize their alternatives. If each has the choice of
either confessing or remaining silent, then (providing the
relevant conditions just adumbrated are satisfied) it seems
that the two felons are indeed in a PD. But after
consulting with Butch, the DA could egually well have
apprised Sundance that he, Sundance, could either match
whatever Butch did (Butch can either confess or remain
silent, Sundance is informed) , or he could fail to match
21
the action of his partner. With Sundance's alternatives
characterized in this way, the felons don't appear to be in





Remains silent 0, 10 10 ,
0
Figure 1.3 Robison's Matrix
that whereas confessing is a real action - it's something
Butch can do, matching isn't. But there's an easy reply
here: Why not suppose that to match Butch's actions,
Sundance must place a token in a basket. Placing a token
in a basket seems to be as real an action as confessing -
it's certainly something Butch can do.
What may be deep and interesting implications of
Professor Robison's point await further study.
7. Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory
(1986), Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Page references to this work are given in this way: (K,
page number)
.
8. Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition
(1986), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9. See Edward F. McClennen, "Constrained Maximization and
Resolute Choice," forthcoming in Social Philosophy and
Policy ; Edward F. McClennen, "Dynamic Choice and
Consistency," forthcoming; and Edward F. McClennen,
"Prisoner's Dilemma and Resolute Choice," in Paradoxes of;
Rationality and Cooperation (1985), eds., R. Campbell and





2 . 1 The Symmetry Problem
Are the requirements of morality and those of rational
self-interest coincident in every particular situation?
Hobbes confronted this question - the central question of
this work - amonqst other places, in Leviathan . 1 In
discussinq it he devoted serious attention to situations of
covenant-keepinq of an hiqhly interesting nature: The
situations, it appears, can be depicted by the game
theoretic matrix of the PD. Since we are concerned with
precisely these sorts of cases, it is well worth
considering what Hobbes has to say about them. More
specifically, my principal aim in this chapter is to
attempt a clarification of his views on the rationality and
morality of contract-keeping in these dilemmatic
situations. Having declared this ambitious aim, let me
immediately admonish the reader that the chapter will not
prove very illuminating in this respect. However, I will
have some things to say about what Hobbes' views on the
relevant issue could not have been, or perhaps, should not
have been.
I begin with a brief summary of the "logical form" of
Hobbes' laws of nature which constitute the moral
principles of his ethical system. This will help in
23
apprehending his third law "that men perform their
covenants made." (MW, 3 , 15 , 130) A covenant of mutual trust
is an agreement in which both parties are required to
discharge their covenantal obligation, in sequence, at some
time after the contract is made. (MW, 3 , 14 , 120-121 , 124
)
The brief explication of the third law should enable at
least a rudimentary understanding of Hobbes' views on the
morality of contract-keeping. I then present passages in
which Hobbes seems to affirm that it is not rational in the
state of nature for covenant-parties who have to perform
first - "first-party members" - to keep their agreements,
although it is rational for "second-party members" to do so
if first-parties have already performed. These views on
the rationality of agreement-keeping give rise to the
"symmetry" problem: precisely what is the asymmetry
between the situations of first-parties and second-parties
in the state of nature that brings it about that whereas it
is irrational for first-parties to cooperate, it is
rational for second-parties to do so?
The significance of the symmetry problem is striking:
On the one hand, assume as has often been done, that
persons in the state of nature are in a multiparty PD. If
we now also assume that these individuals are rational,
Hobbes can be read as undertaking the fascinating project
of demonstrating how such persons could escape their
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predicament. One might be sceptical of his prospects of
success. If Hobbes' rational egoists really are in an
authentic PD, it appears they would have to remain there:
cooperation on a voluntary basis seems impossible . 2 It
would take no less than an "extra-natural state" savior who
saw to it that state-of-nature denizens would in fact
maximize their advantage by "cooperating," if these persons
were to have any chance to leave the state of nature.
Hobbes' sovereign, not being an "extra-natural" being,
could not assume this role. For the sovereign, if he were
to be inaugurated, would be so by a social contract.
State-of-nature inhabitants would covenant to set up their
savior whom they would select from within their own ranks.
Matters are here further complicated in this respect: If
the social contract is "interest-constraining" and so
significant from the point of view of rational cooperation,
then it appears that it would be beyond the reach of
rational egoists. If, alternatively, it requires no
restraint whatsoever on maximizing activity, then it is
questionable whether effecting such a contract could in any
way further the ends of natural-state individuals, and also
questionable whether such individuals are in a real PD in
the first place.
Suppose on the other hand that state-of-nature
dwellers are in some sort of situation - possibly some
variety of iterated PD - in which cooperation is rational.
25
Then Hobbes' views on cooperation become, I think, far less
engaging. On this alternative, Hobbes could profitably be
interpreted as recommending how less-than-rational persons
like "real world" people could be brought to see, maybe
with the help of a benevolent sovereign, that it is in fact
in their long-term interests to cooperate, cooperation
being conducive to "commodious living."
I suggest that the correct interpretation of Hobbes'
project in Leviathan and the prospects of its success
depends on a resolution of the symmetry enigma. Are state-
of-nature habitants really in a PD as Hobbes' remarks on
first-parties suggest, or are they in a situation in which
cooperation is rational, as his comments on second-parties
intimate? I consider a view on this issue that has
recently been defended by Gregory Kavka. I argue that it
is not cogent.
2 . 2 Hobbes on the Morality of Contract-keeping
Persons in Hobbes' state of nature have as their
primary end their own self-preservation and their
individual well-being.
3 The ought-principles - the laws of
nature, Hobbes tells us, prescribe actions that these
persons must perform as means to the fulfilment of their
primary goal.
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A LAW OF NATURE,
, is a precept or general
rule, found out by reason, by which a man is
forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his
life, or taketh away the means of preserving the
same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may
be best preserved. (MW, 3 , 14 , 116-117
)
These precepts are, in fact,
conclusions or theorems [of correct reasoning]
concerning what conduceth to the conservation and
defence of [men]. (MW, 3 , 14 , 147)
What may be called the "logical form" of these laws,
4 5as both Kavka and Hampton indicate, is this:
LF: One ought to do some action, a, provided others are
doing so as well.
There is a question, of course, of how the qualifying
clause of these laws is to be construed. Who are the
relevant others? Is one freed from one's duty to do what
is prescribed by a law's principal clause just in case a
few of these others, or a substantial number of them, are
not conforming? Furthermore, is one so freed when the
appropriate number of relevant others are violating merely
the law in question or a number of other laws, or both?
For our purposes, we can safely ignore these complications.
Textual support for LF is provided, among other
things, by Hobbes' statement of the first three laws, in
particular the second, and a passage in which he
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distinguishes between laws holding "in foro interno " and
those holding " in foro externo .
"
The first law tells us that
every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he
has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain
it, that he may seek, and use all helps, and
advantages of war. (MW, 3 , 14 , 117
)
It would be to no avail to seek peace unilaterally. Hobbes
may consequently be taken to be advocating that persons
seek peace by putting an end to the state of war only on
condition that enough others are willing to do so as well.
The second law specifies what must be done if peace is
to be attained. Each person must
be willing, when others are so too, for peace,
and defence of himself to lay down [his] right
to all things; and to be contented with so much
liberty against other men, as he would allow other
men against himself. (MW, 3 , 14 . 118
)
The right in question is the "right of nature" or
the liberty [i.e. the moral permission] each man
hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for
the preservation of his own nature; that is to say,
of his own life; and consequently, of doing any
thing, which in his own judgment and reason, he
shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
(MW, 3 , 14 , 116)
So the second law avers that the moral permission
attributed by Hobbes to each person in the state of nature
to do whatever he believes is necessary to preserve and to
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enhance his life, is to be relinquished provided others are
willing to do so as well. Unilateral capitulation of this
right would simply result in the relevant person's making
"himself a prey to others."
But how is universal restraint to be attained? One
way is by agreement. Persons are to covenant to constrain
their pursuit of individual self-interest; they are to
agree, Hobbes might say, to be moral. Entering into this
sort of agreement, however, even if necessary for being
moral is clearly not sufficient: To be moral requires that
it not only be rational for persons to make the interest-
constraining agreement but that it also be rational for
them to keep that agreement. For these reasons, Hobbes
introduces what he needs - the third law which enjoins
compliance with one's valid covenants.
On the face of it, the two-part structure of the third
law is not obvious. That it has this logical form becomes
fairly evident on considering an important passage in
Leviathan . The passage strongly intimates that every law
of nature exemplifies the logical form in question. It
also suggests that each law requires concurrence with the
prescriptions of its principal clause, or binds "in foro
externo," if and only if others are concurring as well.
The laws of nature oblige in foro interno ; that is
to say, they bind to a desire they should take
place: but in foro externo ; that is, to the
putting them in act, not always. For he that
29
should be modest, and tractable, and perform all he
promises, in such time, and place, where no man
else should do so, should but make himself a prey
to others, and procure his own certain ruin,
contrary to the ground of all laws of nature, which
tend to nature ' s preservation. And again, he that
having sufficient security, that others shall
observe the same laws towards him, observes them
not himself, seeketh not peace but war; and
consequently the destruction of his nature by
violence. (MW, 3 , 15 , 145)
The third law, in light of this passage, is to be
understood as requiring that one adhere to one's rationally
made agreements if and only if the relevant others are
doing so as well. In the event that they are not, then
non-compliance is morally sanctioned.
It should be noted, although the issue is
controversial, that the third law holds even in the state
of nature. At least that's what I believe Hobbes believed.
Thus, for instance, he claims that the "laws of nature are
immutable and eternal," (MW, 3 , 15 , 145) implying that their
injunctions hold in every situation, the state of nature
included. Furthermore, there is a passage that seems to
lend unequivocal support to the view I am attributing to
Hobbes
:
Covenants entered into by fear, in the condition of
mere nature, are obligatory. For example, if I
covenant to pay a ransom, or service for my life,
to an enemy; I am bound by it: for it is a
contract, wherein one receiveth the benefit of
life; the other is to receive money, or service for
it; and consequently, where no other law, as in the
condition of mere nature, forbiddeth the
performance, the covenant is valid. (MW, 3 , 14 , 126-
127)
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Finally, in his reply to the Fool soon to be considered,
Hobbes again seems to embrace what is here being ascribed
to him.
6
2 . 3 Hobbesian Stooges in a Prisoner 7 s Dilemma
It has recently occurred to many that persons in
Hobbes ' state of nature are in a situation that can be
represented by a PD-like matrix. As I indicated earlier,
Kavka seems to think that this is so. Jean Hampton
believes that
in the state of nature people will tend to
mistakenly treat PD games as one-time occurrences
rather than as members of a series. (H, 80-81)
To support their views, such authors interpret Hobbes
as giving a description of the state of nature and its
inhabitants that makes it possible for us to understand the
situation in which the latter find themselves as a PD. One
7
such description is this:
"Hobbesian individuals," have four features that are
particularly important for our purposes: (i) They are
rational egoists, unrelentingly seeking to maximize the
8
satisfaction of their desires. ( i i ) As noted, they have
as their predominant desire their self-preservation and
their individual well-being. (iii) Each has desires that
conflict with the desires of others so that the
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satisfaction of one person's desires frequently interferes
with or precludes the satisfaction of another person's
desires. This results primarily from the short supply of
natural resources required to satisfy their needs and
9wants. (iv) They are roughly equal in their physical and
intellectual capacities so that no one individual is
advantaged over any other in his quest for resources
required to ensure his well-being. 10
In attempting to satisfy their needs, Hobbesian
individuals exert their power. An individual's power is
"his present means; to obtain some future apparent good."
(MW, 3, 10,74) In so doing they inevitably come into
conflict over the appropriation of the same goods as goods
are in limited supply. Since there is no common power to
adjudicate conflicts in the state of nature, Hobbesian
individuals are left to their own wits to retain the goods
already appropriated and to acquire more of the same to
ensure continuance of their well-being. Each person is
well-aware that every other is in the same competitive
situation. It is therefore probably in an individual's
interest to make a preemptive strike. In Hobbes' words;
[T]here is no way for any man to secure himself, so
reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force or
wiles, to master the persons of all men he can.
(MW, 3 , 13 , 111)
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If we now limit ourselves to any pair of such individuals,
the dilemmatic nature of the situation in which they are
becomes more-or-less evident. Each either attacks or fails
to do so. If both resist attack and lie low, neither gains
nor loses. If both attack, neither vanquishes the other
but both suffer small losses. If one attacks while the
other lies low, the aggressor makes large gains but the
other seriously jeopardizes her well-being. Assuming
symmetric payoffs, the game-theoretic matrix depicting





Lies low 0,10 9,9
Figure 2.1 Two Stooges in the State of Nature
The numbers in the matrix represent expected utilities with
Larry's utilities ranked first. (Numbers in forthcoming
matrices in this chapter, unless otherwise specified, are
to be similarly interpreted.) In such a situation, no
matter what the other does, an individual does best if she
attacks. Since positions are symmetric, the strategy of
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attack is dominant for either player. Consider, now, the
entire state-of-nature population. With respect to it,
universal restraint is better for all than universal
agression, but each does best by attacking no matter how
many others are lying low or doing otherwise. So persons
in Hobbes ' state of nature are in a multiparty PD, or so
some have supposed.
I emphasize that I do not claim this description of
the state of nature and its inhabitants is correct or even
complete. But it is helpful in providing a framework to
understand Hobbes' views on state-of-nature cooperation.
2.4 Hobbes on State-of-nature Cooperation
To attempt to clarify these views let's first suppose
that two characters in the natural state, Larry an Mo, have
made a defense covenant, which we assume is a covenant of
mutual trust, that each will come to the aid of the other
in case the person or property of that other is attacked by
some third party. Recall that a covenant of mutual trust
for Hobbes is an agreement calling for the parties to
perform one after the other at some time after the
11
agreement has been consummated. Is it rational for
either to keep his agreement? Hobbes first discusses
whether it is so for the party who has to perform first:
If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the
parties perform presently, but trust one another;
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in the condition of mere nature, which is a
condition of war of every man against every man,
upon any reasonable suspicion, it is void: but if
there be a common power set over them both, with
right and force sufficient to compel performance,
it is not void. For he that performeth first, has
no assurance the other will perform after; because
the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's
ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions,
without the fear of some coercive power; which in
the condition of mere nature, where all men are
equal, and judges of the justness of their own
fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore
he which performeth first, does but betray himself
to his enemy; contrary to the right, he can never
abandon, of defending his life, and means of
living. (MW, 3 , 14 , 124-125)
Hobbes seems to be claiming that with no power to enforce
agreements, and so with no assurance that the other party
will comply, it would not be rational for first-party
members in the state of nature to comply.
Assume, plausibly, that Larry and Mo each ranks his
preferences for outcomes from most preferred to least in
this way: (1) Unilateral violation; (2) mutual compliance;
(3) mutual violation; (4) unilateral compliance. Then
Larry and Mo are in a PD that can be represented by matrix
1. (See page 36 below. Numbers in parentheses depict
preference strengths, higher numbers indicating stronger
preferences. Numbers not enclosed within parentheses
portray absolute values of outcomes for agents.) Call
situations representable by a matrix of this kind in which
outcomes are valued by either party in the manner shown,




















Figure 2.2 Matrix 1
either party in a matrix 1 situation, if Larry and Mo are
in fact in this sort of situation in the state of nature,
then Hobbes' conclusion about first-party's noncompliance
makes eminent sense.
Hobbes enunciates his views on compliance with respect
to second-parties in responding to the objection of the
atheistic Fool.
The fool hath said in his heart, there is no
such thing as justice; and sometimes also with his
tongue; seriously alleging, that every man's
conservation, and contentment, being committed to
his own care, there could be no reason, why every
man might not do what he thought conduced
thereunto: and therefore also to make, or not
make; keep, or not keep covenants, was not against
reason, when it conduced to one's benefit. He does
not therein deny, that there be covenants; and that
they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that
such breach of them may be called injustice, and
the observance of them justice: but he
quest ioneth, whether injustice, may not
sometimes stand with that reason, which dictateth
to every man his own good; (MW, 3 , 15 , 132
)
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I take the Fool to be objecting to a thesis about the third
law he ascribes to Hobbes, that it is sometimes rational to
keep one's covenants even when the expected costs of doing
so exceed the expected gains, as in a matrix 1 situation.
Hobbes replies in this fashion:
For the question is not of promises mutual,
where there is no security of performance on either
side; as when there is no civil power erected over
the parties promising; for such promises are no
covenants: but either where one of the parties has
performed already; or where there is a power to
make him perform; there is the question whether it
be against reason, that is, against the benefit of
the other to perform, or not. And I say it is not
against reason. For the manifestation whereof, we
are to consider; first, that when a man doth a
thing, which notwithstanding any thing can be
foreseen, and reckoned on, tendeth to his own
destruction, howsoever some accident which he could
not expect, arriving may turn it to his benefit;
yet such events do not make it reasonably or wisely
done. Secondly, that in a condition of war,
wherein every man to every man, for want of a
common power to keep them all in awe, is an enemy,
there is no man who can hope by his own strength,
or wit, to defend himself from destruction, without
the help of confederates; where every one expects
the same defence by the confederation, that any one
else does: and therefore he which declares he
thinks it reason to deceive those that help him,
can in reason expect no other means of safety, than
what can be had from his own single power. He
therefore that breaketh his covenant, and
consequently declareth that he thinks he may with
reason do so, cannot be received into any society,
that unite themselves for peace and defence, but by
the error of them that receive him; nor when he is
received, be retained in it, without seeing the
danger of their error; which errors a man cannot
reasonably reckon upon as the means of his
security: and therefore if he be left, or cast out
of society, he perisheth; and if he live in
society, it is by the errors of other men, which he
could not foresee, nor reckon upon; and
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consequently against the reason of his
preservation; and so, as all men that contribute
not to his destruction, forbear him only out of
ignorance of what is good for themselves.
(MW, 3 , 15,133-134)
Hobbes' idea seems to be this: A second-party could
not expect violation of the agreement to be advantageous.
He could not because a consequence of violation that is
both highly probable and substantially costly is exclusion
from civil society - a cooperative enterprise of great
potential benefit. Since the alternative to entering civil
society - remaining in a perpetual war of each against each
- is so bleak, a second-party could ill afford to cultivate
a reputation of untrustworthiness by breaking a state-of-
nature covenant. For founders of the society to come, the
passage suggests, would exclude from their joint enterprise
12such untrustworthy others.
If this is a correct construal of Hobbes' reply to the
Fool, then it seems that persons in the state of nature
couldn't be in a matrix 1 situation. Matrix 1 fails to
take into account the serious consequence of violation just
described. When the expected costs of this consequence are
tallied, perhaps the correct matrix representing the
situation in which individuals in the state of nature
really are is the one illustrated in Figure 2.3 on the next
page. In a "matrix 2" situation, compliance is dominant.
















Figure 2.3 Matrix 2
rationality of second-party compliance.
Hobbes' reply to the Fool is curious. It's so because
as construed it isn't really a reply: Cooperation in a
matrix 2 situation is rational. The Fool needn't deny
this. But surely we may charitably interpret him as
demanding to know why cooperation is not against reason in
matrix 1 sorts of cases. Perhaps Hobbes introduces the
Fool as an expedient to clarify his views on cooperation:
He introduces the Fool, has the Fool attribute to him a
thesis about cooperation, and then gives a response which
shows he does not ultimately endorse the thesis in
question. Reason cannot prescribe keeping the kinds of
agreement that would enable persons to escape a PD.
Hobbes, I believe, clearly saw this.
Be that as it may, we now have a vexing problem. If
state-of-nature individuals really are in a matrix 2
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situation, cooperation is rational for either party, and it
is rational for each no matter what the other is doing.
The rationality of the second-party's cooperating does not,
as Hobbes seems to believe, depend on whether the first
party has performed. Hobbes might well be right, given the
views of morality he endorses, to hold that it would be
morally permissible for a second-party not to perform if,
for some reason, the relevant first-party did not. In such
a case, the requirement of the qualifying clause of the
third law would presumably not be satisfied, thus freeing
the second member from her duty. But it could not be
rational for a second-party to fail to cooperate, any more
than it could be for a first-party to do so. Notice,
further, another potential worry if Hobbesian individuals
are in a matrix 2 situation. Suppose the explanation of
warfare in the state of nature requires that it not be
rational for Hobbesian individuals to cooperate in that
situation. If cooperation is rational why war with one
another? Then once again it would seem that Hobbesian
individuals couldn't be in a matrix 2 situation. Hobbes,
though, is pretty emphatic that cooperation is rational for
second-party members in cases where first-party members
have already performed, even though it is not rational for
first-party members to have performed.
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2 . 5 Unsuccessful Attempts to Avoid Symmetry
What's to be done? Are we required to ascribe to
Hobbes the position that sometimes parties in the state of
nature are in matrix 1 situations whereas at other times
they are in matrix 2 situations? This would only engender
further problems. For one thing, suppose we accept what I
think is Hobbes' explanation of the irrationality of
second-parties failing to cooperate - they risk
nonadmittance into the society to come. If nonadmittance
is really a cost, and a substantial one at that, then it is
difficult to see how persons in the state of nature could
be in a matrix 1 situation. Such a matrix incorrectly
reflects the alleged costs and benefits. For another
thing, even if there were matrix 1 situations in the state
of nature, Hobbes would have to maintain that it would be
rational for second-parties in these situations to fail to
cooperate, despite irrational first-parties having done the
cooperative thing. He does not say so.
A second, and perhaps more promising possibility, is
this: It's clear, or so it may be thought, that you cannot
represent the costs and benefits for each party as being
the same as those of each other. It should, in
consequence, be pretty obvious that one symmetrical matrix
will not suffice to depict the payoffs that first-party and
second-party players may reasonably expect. Rather, there
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are two decision problems and so two matrices that need to
be considered separately: One matrix is required to focus
on the choice question: qoing first/violating first; a
second different matrix is required to focus on the choice
question: going second when someone has gone
first/violating at this stage. Maybe the first matrix will
be a PD, and the second won't be. In this way, it might be
possible to account for Hobbes' views on state-of-nature
cooperation
.
Let's explore this possibility more closely, beginning
with the choice problem: going first/violating first.
Larry rears horses and his neighbor, Mo, farms cattle.
Suppose they have made a defense pact agreement; each has
pledged to aid the other in case that other is attacked by
a third party. One fine morning, as each is brewing coffee
on his porch, each spots a band of notorious cattle bandits
fast approaching Mo's ranch. Their intention is clear - a
raid on Mo's establishment is imminent. What should Larry
do? Should he come to the aid of Mo as called upon by the
defense pact? Let's distinguish a few possible scenarios.
First, assume each knows that the other is rational.
Assume, in addition, that each is transparent to the other:
each is aware not only of the rational disposition of the
other but also of how that other will act on each occasion
of choice. Assume, also, that "the force of transparency
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extends through time:" Suppose Larry is first-party
player. Each is so transparent to the other that prior to
performing, Larry then knows, or at least has very good
reason to believe, that having performed, Mo will keep his
part of the agreement. If he performs, he now has
assurance that Mo will perform in the future. Each
player's true colors reveal themselves across time.
Assume, further, that transparency is irreversible. Under
these conditions Mo can count on Larry coming to his aid -
it's straightforwardly rational for Larry to do so: Since
each is transparent, neither can dissemble. Larry, for
example, cannot enter the agreement with the intention of
not later performing: Mo would know of Larry's intention,
and would refuse to negotiate the agreement in the first
place. Larry, in turn, would know this. Under conditions
of transparency it seems that each would come to the aid of
the other if and only if the other were to do the same. If
Larry were to aid Mo, he could expect Mo to reciprocate.
If he were to stay put, he could expect Mo to do the same.
Transparency, it appears, forges a link between the actions
of the two players. What each does seems at least partly
to "determine" what the other does. With their actions
interdependent in this way, it would be forthrightly
rational for each to honor the terms of the defense pact.
If all this is correct, then Larry's decision matrix in
this case does not seem to be a PD.
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The assumption of transparency is unrealistic. So
let's next assume that Larry and Mo are "opaque." What
should Larry do? If he adheres to the agreement, he can
expect Mo to renege: It seems Mo would do better to renege
than to reciprocate in the event that Larry's farm were
raided. If Larry reneges, he can once again expect Mo to
renege. It would be foolish for Mo to comply unilaterally.
Whatever he does, Larry can expect Mo to renege. Knowing
this, it seems it would be rational for Larry to renege as
well. Perhaps in this second case, Larry is in a genuine
PD, and that the game in which the two find themselves, a
game that can only be completed in two consecutive moves -
first player plays first/second player plays second, is
itself PD-like, as diagram 1 on the next page illustrates.
Finally, consider a third case. Again, assume opaque
agents. But this time assume also that forays of the kind
described are commonplace in the state of nature, so that
both can expect to find themselves in a similar situation
many times over. Assume neither knows how many times over.
Opacity, as the second case suggests, lends credence to the
view that Larry is in a PD, and that each game consisting
of two consecutive moves, is itself PD-like. The third
case differs from the first two in that each game is only
one in a series of such games. We're dealing, in other
words, with some variety of iterated PD. Assume (as both
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Keeps the pact 5 5
Keeps the
defense pact
Breaks the pact 0 10
Keeps the pact 10 0
Breaks the
defense pact







Figure 2.4 Diagram 1
Kavka and Hampton do) that in these kinds of situation, the
rational thing to do is to abide by the defense pact
agreement. Then Larry will help Mo fight the bandits.
These results are not very encouraging, at least not
from the perspective of the defender of Hobbes: First, it
is only in the second case that it is rational for first-
party Larry to renege. In the other two cases, the
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rational thing for Larry to do is to abide by the defense
pact. Second, and more importantly, symmetry is all
pervasive: Consider the second choice question. Assuming
Larry has abided by the agreement, should Mo come to his
aid, this time let's suppose, to fight off some horse
thieves? In a one-shot transparent situation, the answer
seems to be that he should, for reasons analogous to those
already considered: Rational Larry would not have abided
had he known or had he had good reason to believe that Mo
would fail to abide in the future. Since, by assumption,
Larry did abide he must have had good reason to believe
that Mo would also abide. We can therefore conclude that
Mo will abide as well.
Now consider an opaque, one-shot situation analogous
to the situation in which players' preferences are
represented by diagram 1. As the diagram clearly
indicates, second-party Mo, just like first-party Larry,
would do best for himself if he were to renege. Of course,
if Larry did for some reason or other abide in this
situation, then he failed to act rationally.
Finally, assume players are in an iterated dilemma,
each game of which terminates only after two consecutive
moves - Larry going first, Mo going second. In this case,
I think, it would also be rational for second-party Mo to
adhere to the defense pact.
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The twin matrix manoeuvre won't save Hobbes.
A third possibility is to take Hobbes to be
distinguishing between two states of nature, an ideal state
with all agents fully rational, and a "real world" state
with an admixture of agents, some rational, others
irrational. If all agents in the ideal state are in a PD,
then rational cooperation remains a dream. With respect to
the real world state, the question is whether cooperation
is rational given the presence of the two sorts of agents.
If rational Spock were transported from rational man's
heaven (hell, perhaps?) to the real world state, what
should he do? I will shortly consider a real world
. . . 13situation of this type. For now it suffices to note that
if first-parties in a real world natural state are in a
matrix 1 situation, and second-parties in a matrix 2
situation, then the presence of irrational parties makes no
difference whatsoever to the rationality of cooperation in
these situations. Suppose irrational first-party Larry
complies. Hobbes advises second-party Mo to reciprocate on
pain of being excluded from civil society. The old problem
simply recurs: If founding members of the society to come
don't take kindly to second-party violators, shouldn't they
also frown upon first-party violators, thereby calling into
question whether first-parties really are in a matrix 1
situation? Aren't untrustworthy first-parties just as bad
as second party exploiters?
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As I see it, then, an interpreter of Hobbes is forced
to come to terms with the "symmetry" enigma: If persons in
the state of nature are in some sort of PD, then Hobbes'
views on first-party covenant-keeping seem reasonable.
These persons, if in a PD, would do best for themselves by
reneging. If, on the other hand, they are in a situation
in which doing the "agreement required thing" is dominant,
then his remarks on second-party covenant-keeping also seem
well-founded. The trouble is that first-parties and second
parties seem to be in the same sort of situation. Each
seems to stand to gain or to loose whatever each other
seems to stand to gain or to loose by cooperating. The
payoffs to each appear to be symmetric. Yet, their
positions in the state of nature must not be symmetric if
Hobbes' views on the rationality of natural-state
cooperation are to be believed. In light of the symmetry
problem, how are these views of Hobbes' to be accounted
for? Let's consider Professor Kavka's reply.
2.6 Kavka on Symmetry
Kavka commences his chapter on cooperation by
introducing the notion of a defensive cooperative. A
defensive cooperative
consists of an explicit agreement, among some group
of individuals in the state of nature, that each
will come to the aid of any other in the group
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whose person or property is attacked or threatened.
(K, 127
)
Each individual member of such a group must grapple with a
problem of compliance. Is it rational to act in accord
with the terms of the agreement when called upon to do so?
In discussing this problem, Kavka tells us that we can
represent a typical state-of-nature agreement by a PD
matrix analogous to matrix 1. (K,138) Since in such a
situation violation is dominant, it would not be rational
for first-party members to comply. Indeed, he claims
Hobbes apparently accepts this reasoning, agreeing
(with the Fool) that the first party should not
perform. We may say that Hobbes approves of
defensive violations of state-of-nature agreements,
that is, violations motivated by the desire to
avoid being taken advantage of, to avoid becoming a
unilateral compiler. (K,139)
What about compliance on the part of second-party members
given that "some naive first party" (K,139) has performed?
Should he " offensively violate," thereby securing his
maximum payoff? The Fool, Kavka tells us, thinks so, but
Hobbes refuses to endorse offensive violations. (K,139)
He refuses, according to Kavka, for reasons similar to
those I suggested earlier:
The Fool, looking only at the immediate payoffs
available, sees the situation depicted in [matrix
1]. He therefore proclaims breach as the most
reasonable response Hobbes, however, views the
second party's response as having long-term effects
on that party's prospects of future cooperation
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with others. Specifically, that a particularly
vital sort of cooperation, inclusion in defense
confederations will be denied known offensive
violators of agreements, since other members will
not trust them to keep their promises of
a id The danger of being excluded from future
cooperative defense arrangements
here transforms a situation in which
noncooperation is a dominant strategy into one in
which cooperation is dominant. (K,140)
If this is the correct explanation of Hobbes' views, Kavka
plainly faces the symmetry problem:
A[n] objection to Hobbes's reply to the Fool,
raised by Jean Hampton, is more serious [ I ]
f
Hobbes is right that it is rational for second
parties to keep state-of-nature agreements, then it
must be rational for first parties to keep them as
well. The argument is that the latter, following
the logic of Hobbes's argument, will not expect
rational second parties to cheat them, and that
even if they are cheated, first parties can expect
to gain more than compensating advantages by
proving themselves trustworthy partners in future
. 14defense cooperatives or commonwealths. (K,147-
148)
Although the problem to which this passage alerts us is not
quite the symmetry problem, it's very close. Let's
consider what Kavka has to say about this objection.
First, he proposes that
The clear response to the first part of
Hampton's objection, suggested by passages in
chapter 14 of Leviathan , is that first parties to
state-of-nature contracts cannot count on second
parties acting rationally. It is in the long-term
interest of second parties to comply with state-of-
nature agreements, as the reply to the Fool shows,
but their short-term interests (and strong
passions, like greed) dictate a different course.
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Given the frequent tendency for people to be
carried away by short-term interests, it is not
safe to be a first-party complier with a state-of-
nature agreement because of the substantial risk of
irrational noncompliance by the second party.
(K, 148,153)
Hampton objects that if it is rational for second-
parties to perform, first-parties would know this, and
would therefore expect compliance from these parties. But
since each does better if everyone complies, first-parties
would themselves do best by complying. Hampton should
insist that mutual compliance has the result that there is
probably no conflict in the state of nature. Kavka rejoins
that although it is rational for a second-party to comply
if a first-party has done so, most second-parties because
of shortsightedness will not comply. First-parties,
cognizant of the irrationality of many or perhaps even most
second-parties cannot, in consequence, expect second-
parties to comply. So first-parties will refrain from
complying as well.
Kavka 's response, it seems to me, is not very
compelling: Suppose most Hobbesian individuals in the
state of nature are shortsighted. Then I think we can
assume this of both first-parties and second-parties. It
would be arbitrary to suppose that only second-parties are
shortsighted and that only firsts are rationally perfect.
Now let's distinguish two cases. (i) Suppose Hobbesians
can identify who's rational and who isn't. Kavka admits,
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or would admit, that it is rational for a rational second-
party to perform if a first-party has done so. A rational
first-party, knowing this, would expect a rational second-
party to perform. So if he is interacting with a rational
second, he would comply. in this instance, both would
comply. There would then probably be no conflict between
these two. But a rational first cannot expect an
irrational second to comply. So when interacting with such
an agent, a rational first would fail to comply. The
irrational second-party would probably not comply either.
So neither would comply and neither would get out of the
state of nature.
(ii) Consider the second case. Again, assume a "real
world" natural state, with an admixture of agents, some
rational, others irrational. Suppose Hobbesians cannot
tell who's rational and who isn't. Suppose it is generally
known that in this natural state there is a "frequent
tendency for people to be carried away by short-term
interests and immediate passions." So even if such
irrational parties were in an iterated PD in which
cooperation is rational, they would be swayed by their
short-term interests and would fail to cooperate in each
round. Suppose, since there are many irrational people in
this real world state, that the probability that one's
prospective interactive partners are irrational is high.
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Suppose, finally, that if a person abides by a defense pact
agreement while the others do not, the outcome for the
person is bleak. Call such a state of nature an
"adventurous" one. In an adventurous state compliance is
irrational - I think - for a first-party. Now suppose an
irrational first has performed. What should the relevant
second-party do? It would be rational for a second-party
to comply if Kavka's claim that a high cost of violation on
the part of second-parties, exclusion from defense
confederations, is correct. But would such confederations
exist in an adventurous state of nature? That's a moot
issue: Kavka informs us that many such confederacies are
formed by tacit agreement or explicit agreement. (K, 126)
If such confederacies exist, then, it must be rational to
make and honor "defense confederacy agreements." (See
pages 55 and 56 below.) But even if it were rational to do
these things, since many in an adventurous state of nature
are irrational, these irrational persons would fail to
appreciate the advantages to be had by upholding such
defense covenants. So it's likely that few, if any,
defense confederacies would exist. Exclusion from such
confederacies could then not be a substantial cost second-
parties in an adventurous natural state could anticipate
15
were they to renege. So in this second case, even
rational second-parties would not comply.
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Kavka's second response is far more engaging because
it meets the symmetry problem head-on. He suggests that
first-party and second-party members suffer differential
costs when they violate their covenants.
[D]efense group members are likely to react
differently to first-party and second-party
violators of state-of-nature agreements. In
particular, the defender of Hobbes's view must
believe that defense-group members will regard
first-party violators as more reliable and
desirable partners than second-party violators.
(K, 149-150)
Kavka then adduces what he takes to be some "plausible
grounds for this belief." Assume he is right about this.
It is still not quite clear what matrix (or matrices)
correctly depicts the situation he has in mind. It













Figure 2.5 Matrix 3
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In a matrix 3 situation neither party, if each is a
rational egoist, could decide on the rational course of
action without further information. Supply the required
information and the matrix no longer remains the same. If
no such information is available, each might elect to
maximin - to do whatever will result in the best worst
outcome. If they did maximin, both in this situation would
do the noncooperative thing. None of this, though, shows
that Kavka's "differential cost" reply is problematic. But
I think it is:
The term 'defense group,' Kavka tells us, is "intended
to encompass both commonwealths and state-of-nature
defensive groupings." (K,149) In the present context, the
term presumably refers to the latter. He further informs
us that defense groups in the state of nature may originate
in sundry ways - "by family ties, conquest and submission,
tacit agreement, explicit agreement, or some combination
thereof." (K,126) Defense alliances formed by conquest
and submission, we are told, are probably unreliable,
unstable (K, 108-119-120) and arguably their existence in
the state of nature is not "even highly likely." (K,141)
Family ties may prove tenous, and even if they are not, we
may simply treat each family as an individual and inquire
whether cooperation amongst such individuals is rational.
Ignoring the last category, this leaves the two of interest
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to us - defense groups formed by tacit or explicit
agreement. Among rational individuals, however, no such
"defensive cooperative groups" could exist unless it were
rational both to enter into and keep a "defensive
cooperative group agreement." After all, that's how such
groups are formed.
Now reconsider Kavka's differential cost reply. As
Kavka is himself aware, an objection to this kind of reply
is that it assumes the viability of defensive cooperative
groups in the state of nature. (K,141) What has not been
stressed enough, if at all, is this: If the reply assumes
the existence of such defensive cooperative groups, it must
also assume, as has just been explained, the rationality of
keeping defensive cooperative group agreements: If it is
irrational to keep such defense covenants, rational agents
could not expect rational parties to keep them; no such
covenants would be rationally honored, so no defense
confederacies that depend upon the rationality of keeping
such covenants would exist. Clearly, however, the reply is
not entitled to this assumption since one of its objectives
is to show that agreement-keeping, at least by second-
parties, is rational in the state of nature. In addition,
in a real world adventurous natural state as we saw, it
seems irrational - irrational for any party - to make and
to keep a defense pact agreement.
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In the interests of accuracy, let me add that Kavka
considers this kind of objection - the objection concerning
the viability of defensive cooperative groups - in a
slightly different context, namely, in his exposition that
second-party violators are really in a matrix 2 rather than
in a matrix 1 sort of situation. Recall that he there
appealed to the idea that a serious cost of violation is
exclusion from defense confederations in the state of
nature. (See pages 49 and 50 above.) However, the same
kind of objection, as we have seen, can be directed against
the differential cost reply.
Kavka has a response. Again the response is meant to
parry the objection raised in connection with accounting
for the rationality of second-party adherences to state-of-
nature agreements. But presumably, Kavka would offer a
similar response as far as present matters are concerned.
So let me first cite the passage containing Kavka 's
response to the former objection and then indicate how it
might be adapted to explain the differential costs incurred
by first-party and second-party violators of state-of-
nature agreements. The relevant passage is this:
[S]uppose one doubts that state-of-nature
defense pacts are viable and can provide
substantial security benefits. In that case one
may simply read 'society' in the reply to the
Fool as standing for civil society, or the
commonwealth. Then Hobbes may be viewed as
pointing out that founders, or preserving members,
of a commonwealth will not accept unreliable
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parties, such as offensive violators of agreements,
as members. Second-party state-of-nature agreement
violators are thus not simply risking future
membership in shaky state-of-nature defense
cooperatives, they are risking their chances of
permanent escape from the state of nature via the
only effective mechanism thereof, membership in a
commonwealth. (K,141)
Adapted to present concerns, rather than claim "defense
group members are likely to react differently to first-
party and second-party violators of state-of-nature
agreements," Kavka might claim "founding members of the
society to come are likely to react differently to first-
party and second party violators."
But once again the response, I believe, is
questionable. Assume all persons in the state of nature
are rational. It appears that even these fully rational
agents should be sceptical about their prospects of
entering civil society. If this is true - if Hobbesians
are unable to leave the state of nature, then these natives
cannot really be "founders, or preserving members, of a
commonwealth" to come. Exclusion by any state-of-nature
founder from any future commonwealth could not then be any
threat to anyone: Suppose escaping the state of nature, as
Hobbes believes, does require the instituiton of a
sovereign. Doing this, in turn, minimally seems to require
that it be rational for each party both to make and to keep
an agreement to surrender his right of nature to the
sovereign and to obey the sovereign's commands. But the
58
sort of agreement (or agreements) in guestion here seems
analogous to defensive cooperative group agreements. Both
kinds of agreement are mutually advantageous though
reguiring self-sacrifice. Although it is collectively
rational to keep such agreements, it is not individually
rational to do so. Such agreements are "interest-
constraining." So just as a defensive cooperative group
couldn't exist unless it were rational for Hobbesian
individuals to make and keep a defensive cooperative group
agreement, so it seems a sovereign could not be instituted
and, in consequence, a commonwealth couldn't come into
existence, unless it were rational for Hobbesian




2 . 7 More Kavka on Symmetry
It's worth, I think, briefly diverting at this point
to note the following: Ignoring certain passages in
Leviathan . suppose Hobbesian individuals really are in a
matrix 1 PD in the state of nature. Then we can further
suppose that these individuals, being rational, realize
that the goods they require to satisfy their needs are in
short supply in the absence of cooperation, but would be in
plentiful supply if they could only restrain their pursuit
of self-interest and enter into fruitful cooperative
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ventures. A a possible way to attain universal restraint
is by the making and the keeping of an "interest-
constraining" agreement. But if the requisite sort of
agreement really is interest-constraining, then the very
rationality of these rational egoists would inhibit them
from keeping such an agreement. Perhaps Hobbes saw this,
and in light of seeing this, sought a "political" solution:
Institute a sovereign that penalizes breaches of agreements
so that it is no longer advantageous to violate one's
covenants. The sovereign's job, in effect, would be to
"transform" the original matrix 1 situation into something
like a matrix 2 situation. This is one way of
understanding what Hobbes is up to in Leviathan . On this
understanding, the symmetry problem vanishes: Each state-
of-nature individual is in the same matrix 1 PD.
The discussion in the paragraph preceeding this
diversion, however, seems to cast doubt on the tenability
of even this political solution: If the very institution
of a sovereign necessitates the making and the keeping of
an interest-constraining agreement, then rational egoists
will be unable to do what is required by the "solution" to
escape the natural state.
Not to be defeated yet, Kavka anticipates and responds
to this sort of worry.
A final problem for Hobbesian social contract
theory centers on the question of why the
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parties should comply with the social contract once
it is made, why they should obey the orders of the
government created by it. After all, the social
contract is a state-of-nature agreement, and Hobbes
says you should not keep these (as a first party)
since the other party or parties may not follow
suit
The general nature of our solution to the
first party compliance problem [is this:] The
social contract is different from other state-of-
nature agreements in that it promises, if
successful, to remove the parties from the state of
nature. Thus, each has a tremendous amount to gain
by its success. This means that the risk of being
a unilateral compiler is worth running if it
attaches to a reasonable chance of mutual
compliance. Further, since others also obviously
have much to gain by the effectiveness of
government, one runs little risk of being a lone
compiler - others will be only too glad to make the
arrangement work once you have set the
example [Y]ou are almost certainly better off
under [the government's] protection than you would
be returning to the state of nature by refusing to
comply. (K, 243-244)
With respect to the sovereign-instituting agreement or
the social contract, either first-parties are in a matrix 1
PD, or they are not. The passage suggests that it is
individually rational for first-parties to comply with such
an agreement if there is a "reasonable chance of mutual
compliance." But in a matrix 1 situation even if each has
a "tremendous amount to gain by its success," keeping an
interest-constraining agreement is not rational. It would
seem that in connection with the social contract, first-
parties are not in a matrix 1 PD. The situation of these
first-parties is not analogous to the situation in which
f irst —part ies of other state—of—nature covenants
find
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themselves. So let's suppose that in relation to the
social contract no symmetry problem exists, first-parties
just like second-parties are in fact in a situation -
perhaps a matrix 2 situation - in which compliance is
rational. Then there are two problems:
First, the agreement in question - the social contract
- despite strong appearances to the contrary, is not
interest-constraining. Such an agreement, it seems,
imposes no restraint on an individual's exercising her
unlimited right of nature. As David Gauthier explains
The role of so-called 'moral' conventions [would]
then be not to constrain our behavior, but rather
to enable us to coordinate that behavior to maximal
advantage, effecting, like the perfectly
competitive market, the harmony of non-tuisms
.
17
The second problem is even more serious: The social
contract requires at least that each agree to surrender his
right of nature to, and to authorize all the actions of, a
sovereign-elect. (See, for example, K, 180-181) Kavka
suggests that the reason why compliance by first-parties
(and presumably also by second-parties) with the social
contract is rational is that it increases their chances of
membership in a viable commonwealth:
We may see this solution as an extension of
Hobbes's reply to the Fool. There it was suggested
that compliance with a state-of-nature contract is
rational if it increases your chances of later
membership in a viable commonwealth. But surely
first compliance with the orders of a government
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newly founded by agreement increases your chances
of membership in a viable commonwealth. All
problems of commonwealth formation have been solved
at this point, save possibly one: firmly
establishing general expectations of obedience to
the government. (K,244)
I do not here take Kavka to be responding to the unfounded
concern about whether there is a compliance problem in
connection with the edicts of a fully "empowered"
sovereign: Suppose the sovereign is somehow established.
Now he's in charge, and he tells me to pay taxes. If I'm
rational, I'll pay - because he can inflict very serious
penalties on me. Rather, Kavka seems to be responding to
the legitimate worry about whether setting up the sovereign
- abiding by the agreement that tells you to do whatever is
required to establish the sovereign - is rational. But
what Kavka suggests about why persons in the state of
nature have reason to believe they can escape that state by
entering a viable commonwealth seems misguided: Kavka
apparently assumes that first-parties and second-parties
will incur severe costs in the event that they fail to
abide by the social contract, costs associated with non-
admittance into the commonwealth of the future. This
assumption presupposes that such a commonwealth is viable.
This, in turn, assumes that even if Hobbesian individuals
are able to solve the problem of who among them is to
become sovereign, there is no compliance problem in
connection with, for example, agreeing to surrender one's
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right of nature to the sovereign-elect; it is simply
straightforwardly rational to do so. This is a strong and
controversial assumption, one I believe Kavka has not
sustained. It is at least clearly an assumption that
cannot be defended by supposing that compliance by first-
parties and second-parties with the social contract is
rational, since it improves their chances of membership in
a viable commonwealth. It cannot be so defended because
this reason implicitly assumes that compliance is rational:
no commonwealth is viable, because no sovereign would
exist, if it were not rational to surrender one's right to,
or to authorize all the actions of, a sovereign-elect.
To recapitulate briefly: Kavka suggests that the
symmetry problem is to be solved by noting that first-
parties and second-parties incur differential costs when
they renege on their state-of-nature agreements. This is
because founding members of the society to come will react
differently to first-party and to second-party violators.
It is obvious that these founding members could be none
other than Hobbesian individuals themselves. If these
individuals, or at least a portion of them, are to react
differently to these violations, they must have reason to
believe that a commonwealth of the future is in fact
viable. They must, for instance, have reason to believe
that the inauguration of a sovereign involves no PD-like
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problems. Kavka argues that there is no compliance worry
in relation to the social contract. He suggests that it is
forthrightly rational for first-parties, and indeed for
second-parties, to abide by the social contract. Doing so
increases your chances of membership, he suggests, in a
viable commonwealth. But this reason for compliance
assumes that compliance with the social contract is
rational: With no such compliance, no sovereign and so no
commonwealth could come into existence. The differential
cost reply, then, at least as I understand it, ultimately
assumes something that is crucial to what it is meant to
establish - that compliance with natural-state agreements,
on the part of second-parties, is rational.
2 . 8 Conclusions
A variety of states of nature are possible. Some may
contain defensive groups that are stable. In such states
of nature, Kavka's differential cost reply may well resolve
the symmetry problem. In other states of nature no such
groups might exist. In yet others with extant defensive
groups, the groups might be unstable and short-lived. In
real world states of nature where defensive groups can only
come into existence through the making and keeping of
defensive group agreements or agreements relevantly similar
to them, Kavka's differential cost reply won't solve the
symmetry problem. What is perhaps even more important is
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that in such states of nature, it appears that Hobbes'
reply to the Fool that it would be rational for second-
party members to keep their state-of nature agreements
isn't very compelling either: Suppose both first-party and
second-party violators, as I argued, have little or no
reason to believe that they will be able to leave the state
of nature and enter the great Leviathan. Then exclusion
from state-of-nature defensive groups or from civil society
cannot really be taken to be a cost of reneging on a state-
of-nature agreement. If this in turn is true, then parties
in the state of nature will probably not find themselves in
a matrix 2 situation. They may be doomed to a matrix 1 PD.
Interestingly enough, there are worries even if they do
find themselves in a matrix 2 situation in which exclusion
from civil society is a real cost. First, it may then well
be misleading, as Farrell and Gauthier have emphasized,
to read Hobbes as attempting to "ground," morality on the
basis of self-interest: The kinds of agreement that it is
rational to make and keep in matrix 2 situations, as we saw
in section 2.4, do not require constraining one's pursuit
of self-interest. It may then be charged that such
agreements do not require persons to comply with moral
requirements since moral requirements mandate a restraint
on maximizing activity. Second, we have to reconsider the
matrix for going first. If it is rational to go second,
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then the matrix for going first probably does not depict a
PD situation, and there probably is no conflict in the
state of nature.
Maybe a reconstrual of Hobbes' account of state-of-
nature cooperation will make possible a resolution of the
symmetry problem. Although she does not directly address
this problem, Jean Hampton offers us an account of natural-
state cooperation that is distinctly different from what
has been considered so far. She also has many interesting
things to say about sovereign institution. It is to these
views that I now turn.
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Figure 2.6 Matrix 4
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Kavka seems to be suggesting that it is
straightforwardly rational to subjugate yourself to a
sovereign - no matter who in particular it is - than to
remain in the misery-laden state of nature. Why he thinks
this is so is not clear to me. Hampton has something to
contribute to this issue. See footnote 17 above.
19. See Braybrooke's "The Insoluble Problem of the Social
Contract," p. 309.




HAMPTON ON HOBBES ON STATE-OF-NATURE COOPERATION AND
SOVEREIGN INSTITUTION
1 . 1 Introduction
In Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition . 1 Jean
Hampton contends that Hobbes' argument for absolute
sovereignty - the argument that self-interested people in
the state of nature would be able to institute a sovereign
- fails. She tells us that
Hobbes's argument does not fail because he cannot
establish the rationality of creating an absolute
sovereign, nonetheless it fails because he cannot
establish, given his psychology, that men and women
are able to do what is required to create a ruler
satisfying his definition of an absolute sovereign.
(H, 197)
Hampton, as the passage reveals, does not believe the
"sovereignty" argument fails for the reason that what she
identifies as its first premise - that it is more in each
person's interest to be subjugated to a sovereign rather
than to remain in the state of nature (H, 148, 186) - fails.
Rather, she believes it does not succeed for other reasons.
She acknowledges that if the problems involved in sovereign
institution required that persons be able to escape a PD -
that they be able to do the cooperative thing in such a
dilemmatic situation - Hobbesian individuals, being the
SFMs that they are, would be unable to overcome them.
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Suppose, for example, the institution of the sovereign
requires each person in the state of nature to make an
agreement to surrender his unlimited right of nature to the
sovereign. Suppose, as I proposed in the last chapter, the
agreement in question is "interest-constraining:" Each
prefers mutual adherence to mutual violation, but each
would do best if he were to violate unilaterally. Then
although it would be collectively rational to abide, it
would not be individually rational to do so. Hobbesian
individuals who were fully rational would therefore, if the
social contract were interest-constraining, be unable to
escape the natural state and to enter civil society. But
Hampton believes that although the inauguration of the
sovereign requires that Hobbesian individuals be capable of
resolving complex problems, none of these is a PD.
(H , 136 , 138 , 157 , 148 ) I think, however, Hampton's argument
to the contrary notwithstanding, that even the first
premise of the argument for sovereign inauguration is
problematic. I believe that it is problematic because
sovereign institution does in the end succumb to the very
kind of PD-like problems Hampton claims it evades. To see
that this is so, one first needs to understand her views on
Hobbes on natural-state cooperation.
Accordingly, in this chapter I begin with a summary of
Hampton's account of Hobbes on state-of-nature cooperation.
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Although highly interesting, this account - I think - is
afflicted with a serious difficulty. I then show how these
views on cooperation undermine her reasoning in support of
what she takes to be the first premise in Hobbes'
sovereignty argument.
1.2 Hampton's Shortsightedness Account of Conflict
Hampton (like Kavka) is concerned, among other things,
to give an account of the state of nature that entitles
Hobbes to his conclusion that in this situation each
individual is at war with every other. In adducing her
explanation of warfare, she expounds what she takes to be
Hobbes' views on rational cooperation in the natural state.
Hampton begins by suggesting that individuals in the
state of nature are not in a single play PD. Rather, they
are in an iterated PD (IPD) . Roughly, an IPD is a complex
game, consisting of a sequence of other games, each game in
the sequence being PD-like. (H,75) Second, Hampton tells
us that given certain assumptions, it is rational for
Hobbesian state-of-nature individuals to cooperate in an
IPD.
Even if one of the parties behaves
irrationally by breaking his contractual promise in
the first game (or successive games) , [the]
"iterated PD game" counsels that the long-run
benefits accruing from faithful contract keeping
will prompt the other party to continue to keep his
part of the bargain for a time in order to try to
"teach" the breaching party to choose the promise-
keeping act. The idea is to make the breaching
party realize that it is in his best interest to
reward rather than punish his partner's cooperative
act, because otherwise he will be forcing his
partner to renege in subsequent games, and a
pattern of contractual breaches will be established
that will deprive both of them of the benefits of
future bargains. (H, 75-76)
3Assume so far so good. Hampton then introduces a
novel idea. She claims that because of shortsightedness
many in the state of nature will mistakenly take themselves
to be in a single-play PD rather than in an iterated one.
The account [of conflict] would contend that many
people fail to appreciate the long-term benefits of
cooperation and opt instead for the short-term
benefits of noncooperation, and the rest are
legitimately fearful enough of this
shortsightedness afflicting their partners to doubt
that cooperation would have any educative effects.
This worry could then force even a farsighted
person to take a single-play orientation, with the
result that the uncooperative action would
dominate. (H,81)
We can better appreciate the shortsightedness account
of conflict by briefly summarizing two other accounts of
warfare that Hampton develops, and by understanding her
reasons for rejecting them.
Hampton tells us that Chapter 15 of Leviathan suggests
4
what she calls the "passions" account of conflict.
According to this account, various natural psssions of
Hobbesian individuals like partiality, pride, revenge, and
the passion for glory are responsible for warfare. (T,48-
49) On this account, although cooperation among persons in
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the state of nature is generally rational, (T,48) people
will fail to cooperate. They will fail to do so because
some of their natural passions like the ones mentioned will
disrupt many people's reasoning and cause them to
behave irrationally, while the rest [will] fear
this disruption and [will] (rationally) refuse to
cooperate in order to avoid being exploited.
(T , 48
)
This account of conflict, Hampton argues, engenders
difficulties for Hobbes. On the one hand, if these
passions are not widespread among Hobbesian individuals -
if the actions of these persons are not often disrupted by
them, then these passions in combination with the
predominant desire for self-preservation each Hobbesian
individual has, will at most generate only moderate amounts
of conflict. The state of nature will then not be a state
of war of each against each. In consequence, no sovereign
will be needed to rescue these individuals from a
disastrous plight. (T, 49-50) Suppose, on the other hand,
that these passions are sufficiently widespread and deep-
seated to generate total war. Then the passions account
seems to conflict with Hobbes' psychological postulate that
the desire for self-preservation is the predominant desire
of Hobbesian individuals. In addition, the frequent
disruption of people's cooperative activities by these
passions would make the creation and institution of a
sovereign a near impossibility. (T, 49-50)
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An appreciation of these shortcomings of the passions
account, Hampton proposes, may have moved Hobbes to present
a very different explanation of conflict in Chapter 13 of
Leviathan . According to this "rationality" account,
conflict in the state of nature is a function of the
rational pursuit of self-preservation by each individual: 5
Hobbesian individuals, who are roughly egual in their
powers and capacities, compete for scarce goods in order to
acquire more of the same, and to ensure that they continue
to live in a "commodious" way. Each is aware that all the
others are in the same competitive situation. It is
therefore probably in an individual's interest to strike
preemptively. In fact the account, as Hampton indicates,
suggests that each person in the state of nature is in a
PD: Each prefers mutual forbearance to mutual invasion,
but each does best by invading unilaterally. Since
invasion is dominant, each ends up invading. The result of
invasion for purposes of seizing goods coupled with
invasion for the sake of glory, is a condition of total
war. (T, 50-51)
Hampton explains that the rationality account, just
like the passions account, suffers serious problems.
First, if Hobbesian individuals in the natural state are
really in a PD, they could not cooperate to institute a
sovereign. Second, she believes that this account does not
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seem to be true. For persons in the state of nature are
probably in an IPD in which cooperation is rational and not
in a one-shot PD. (T,52)
The shortsightedness account of conflict, Hampton
urges, seems to have "all the advantages of the passions
and the rationality accounts, but none of either
account's disadvantages." (T,52) The account takes
seriously the idea that Hobbesian individuals are in an IPD
situation. This fits well with Hobbes' psychology, since
being in an IPD links cooperation as a means of achieving
peace, with the predominant desire for self-preservation
each Hobbesian individual has. (T,52) The account also
allows for sovereign institution: If Hobbesian persons are
in an IPD in which cooperation is rational, then it is not
impossible for them to cooperate for purposes of
inaugurating a sovereign. (T,52) Yet at the same time,
Hampton insists, since the numerous shortsighted persons in
the state of nature treat PDs as one-time occurrences
rather than as members of a series, "we would be
acknowledging the soundness of the iterated PD argument for
cooperation but still endorsing, in the main, Hobbes's
Chapter 13 account of conflict." (T,53)
Hampton summarizes the "shortsightedness" account in
this way:
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1. The iterated PD game argument establishes that
although it is not rational to cooperate in single-
play games, many and perhaps even most cooperative
situations in the state of nature are multi-play PD
game situations in which it is in one's long-term
best interest to cooperate.
2. The complexities of life in the state of nature
are such that many people will reason, mistakenly,
that it is rational not to cooperate in iterated PD
game situations. This fallacious reasoning will be
common, but not ubiquitous, in the state of nature.
3. The fear that one's partner is too shortsighted
to appreciate the long-term benefits of
cooperation, or the fear that one's partner will
believe that one is shortsighted, will lead one (a)
not to cooperate in high-risk cooperative ventures
(as dictated either by the maximin rule or by an
expected-utility calculation)
,
and (b) not to
cooperate in many (although not all) medium and
low-risk cooperative situations, as dictated by an
expected-utility calculation (where the probability
that one's partner will behave uncooperatively is
generally high)
.
4. The desire for glory, understood as the desire
to have the power and ability to get one's own way,
is a powerful but subsidiary cause of conflict; and
insofar as it encourages the belief that one is
superior to one's fellows, it leads one to
overestimate one's chances of winning a conflict,
and this encourages the conclusion among people in
this state that (as defined in 3(a) or 3(b)) it is
rational not to cooperate. (H, 88-89)
1.3 Two Natural-State Situations
I want to indicate a problem with this interpretation
by asking whether or not on it cooperation is rational in
7
the state of nature.
Item (1) in Hampton's summary tells us that there are
cooperative situations in the state of nature that are IPDs
in which cooperation is rational. Item (2) tells us that
in many, and maybe even in most, such cooperative
79
situations individuals will fail to cooperate because of
mistaken reasoning. Item (3), however, suggests that in
many of the cooperative situations in which persons reason
incorrectly, the rational thing to do, "as dictated by an
expected utility calculation" or a maximin rule is to fail
to cooperate. But if these cooperative situations are IPD
situations as (1) tells us, then since it is allegedly
rational to cooperate in such situations, (see item (1))
rationality cannot also prescribe that persons in them do
the noncooperative thing. The problem can be seen more
clearly if we distinguish between two different sorts of
situation in which Hobbesian individuals in the natural
state might find themselves. In one of these, what I call
a "Cl" situation, cooperation is rational. In the other -
a "C2 " situation - cooperation is not rational.
Cl Situations
Assume that each person in the state of nature is
rational. These persons have true beliefs and reason
correctly. Assume secondly, that they are in a kind of
iterated PD. Here's an illustrative scenario borrowed from
Chapter 2: Larry and Mo are two inhabitants of the state
of nature. Larry raises cattle and his neighbor Mo rears
horses. Cattle and horses are highly coveted by the
numerous bandits who roam the plains. Each of our ranchers
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can expect his establishment to be marauded. Aware of
this, each makes a defense pact with the other. The pact
requires that each come to the aid of the other in case the
person or property of that other is attacked by a third
party.
Suppose Larry is attacked. Should Mo honor the pact
and come to Larry's aid? From a short-term perspective, Mo
might do best by reneging: If he adheres to the defense
pact agreement, he can expect Larry to renege. After all,
in the short run Larry would probably do better if he were
to renege than if he were to help Mo, in the event that
Mo's farm were raided. If Mo now violates the pact, he can
once again expect Larry to renege in the future. From a
short term perspective, then, it may seem to Mo that he is
in a genuine PD, and that the game in which the two find
themselves, a game that completes in two consecutive moves
- first player plays (or aids) first/second player plays
second, is itself PD-like, as diagram 1 on the next page
confirms
.
But suppose raids of this kind are frequent so that
each can expect to find himself in "raid" situations many
times over, but neither knows how many times over. Then
from a long-term perspective, each will probably do best by
upholding the defense pact. Since each is rational and
neither suffers from shortsightedness, each in this IPD
situation will cooperate.
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Figure 3.1 Diagram 1
C2 Situations
Assume, firstly, that most but not all persons in the
state of nature are shortsighted. Shortsighted people
reason badly. They may do so in two distinct ways. First,
their reasoning may be correct, but nevertheless they
reason badly because their reasoning appeals to beliefs
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that are false. (H, 82-83) For instance, these persons
might be in some kind of matrix 2 situation in which
cooperation is rational. Recall that in such a situation
cooperation is dominant for each. But they might believe
that they were in a single-shot matrix 1 PD situation. The
rational thing to do in a matrix 1 situation, they would
reason correctly, is to fail to cooperate. Since in this
imaginary case, they would (mistakenly) take themselves to
be in a single-round PD, they would not cooperate. Here's
another example, more relevant to a discussion of Hampton's
views: The persons might be in some kind of situation in
which if they were rational, smart, and farsighted, it
would be an IPD in which cooperation is rational. But as
it stands, due to their shortsightedness, it isn't. Once
again, suppose they believe that they are in a single-shot
matrix 1 PD. Given their mistaken beliefs, they correctly
reason that in this (hypothetical) case, they should
refrain from cooperating. Second, their reasoning itself
might be faulty. (H,82) They may not, for instance, be
astute enough to ascertain that in an IPD of a certain
type, the rational thing to do is to cooperate. They may
be incapable of any "reasoning that requires any
g
sophisticated long-term reasoning ability." (H, 149)
Assume, secondly, that each shortsighted person in the
state of nature does in fact believe that he is in a one-
time matrix 1 PD and will, in consequence, do the
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noncooperative thing. Assume, thirdly, that each person in
the natural state knows that most persons in this state are
shortsighted and that a few are not shortsighted. Assume,
fourthly, that these Hobbesian individuals cannot determine
whether their prospective interactive partners are either
shortsighted or non-shortsighted
.
Suppose I'm a non-shortsighted person in this type of
state of nature and it's Thursday. Suppose, in addition,
that it's now time to decide whether or not to keep a
defensive pact agreement that I made on Monday. What
should I do? I know I'm in a "C2" situation that abounds
with shortsighted people. Suppose I also know that
shortsightedness, as Hampton cautions, "is difficult, if
not impossible to cure." (H,85) Now I know that
shortsighted persons believe they are in a matrix 1
situation and will do the noncooperative thing come what
may. Since there are many shortsighted people in C2 , the
probability that my partners are shortsighted is pretty
high. Furthermore, I know that if I cooperate while the
others do not, the outcome for me will be either pretty
calamitous or at least fairly damaging. This, together
with the aforementioned items of relevant information I
have about C2 , should be sufficient to convince me that
cooperation in a C2 situation is not rational. Assume that
when it comes to deciding whether or not to cooperate, each
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non-shortsighted person reasons in this way. The outcome
will be mutual non-cooperation. If this in turn is true,
then we know that a C2 situation cannot be a Cl situation
or an IPD of Hampton's variety; in the latter cooperation
is rational, in the former, it is not.
We can allow that this might be true: Maybe if there
were no shortsighted people, the situation would not be of
the C2 type. Perhaps it then would be an IPD analogous to
a Cl situation. It is possible that if everyone were
farsighted, the rational thing to do would be to cooperate.
But even if this is true, it should make no difference to
whether cooperation is rational in a real C2 situation in
which many but not all are shortsighted: What's rational
to do depends in part on what the others will do. If most
are shortsighted, it would not be rational for me to behave
as if they were farsighted.
1.4 A Problem with Hampton ' s Account of Cooperation
Reverting to Hampton's views on cooperation, some
passages suggest that she believes Hobbesian individuals to
be in a situation relevantly similar to a C2 situation.
For instance, in the (full) passage cited on page 75 above,
Hampton appears to believe that noncooperation will be
dominant for each party. A second germane passage is this:
Hobbes can make a fairly good case for the claim
that the rationality of cooperation is sufficiently
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difficult to understand that the number of people
who will reason badly and who thus will fail to
cooperate is high enough to make cooperation
generally too risky. (H,88)
A third relevant passage occurs later in the book:
the iterated PD game argument is supposed to show
the long-term rationality of performing the
collectively rational act in those prisoner's
dilemmas that are part of an indefinite series; but
as we discussed in chapter 3, in most situations
too many Hobbesian people are likely to be
shortsighted to make it rational for even
farsighted people to trust that their partners will
be true to their commitments. (H,134)
Other passages, however, indicate that Hampton
believes the appropriate situation is relevantly like a Cl
. . . . . 9situation. Item (1) in her summary is a nice example. It
should be stressed that Hampton clearly wants to ascribe to
Hobbes the view that in some manner cooperation in the
state of nature is rational: She believes, as I intimated
earlier, that were it not rational, Hobbesian individuals
would be unable to institute a sovereign and escape their
10
predicament. (H, 78-79)
The summary, though, strongly suggests Hampton wants
to have it both ways - that on the one hand, cooperation
really is rational in many cooperative situations in the
state of nature but on the other hand, since such
situations are replete with shortsighted people,
cooperation in them is not rational. This would, of
course, be a mistake. In C2-like situations, cooperation
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is not rational whereas in Cl-like situations, it is. 11
The problem here, perhaps, is this: In some situations
like matrix 1 (or matrix 2) situations, what it is rational
for a party to do does not depend on certain information
about the relevant others. One needn't know, for example,
that the other is incorrectly perceiving the situation as a
matrix 2 situation and will thus probably do the
cooperative thing, in order to know that the rational thing
to do in a matrix 1 situation is to fail to cooperate.
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Breaks the 8,-2 5,5
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Figure 3.2 Matrix 3
sort. In such situations, depending on what the second
party does, one would do best by adjusting one's actions
accordingly. Perhaps the state of nature is similar in
this respect to a matrix 3 situation: If, as Hampton
believes, it is known that many in the state of nature are
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shortsighted and will do the noncooperative thing, this bit
of information, as cases 1 and 2 intimate, should
considerably influence one's decision as to the rational
course of action.
It is possible that Hampton does conceptualize
matters in a somewhat similar fashion to what has just been
suggested. She may be inclined to the view that knowledge
that many in the state of nature are shortsighted
"transforms" a situation that is initially an IPD into one
that is analogous to C2 . But even such a view wouldn't
enable her to have her cake and to eat it as well. For
either such a "transformation" occurs or it does not. If
it does not, then contrary to summary item (3), an expected
utility calculation should not prescribe noncooperation in
most cooperative situations. If it does, then pace summary
item (1), most cooperative situations in the state of
nature will not be IPDs.
Finally, Hampton could say that it's wrong to think of
the state of nature as one big cooperative situation in
which cooperation either is or isn't rational. Rather,
think of the natural state as abounding with many
cooperative situations, most of which are of the C2
variety, but some of which are of the Cl variety. (She
could not here reverse the order, supposing an abundance of
Cl situations. For then in most cooperative situations
cooperation would be rational. The state of nature would,
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as a result, fail to exhibit the kind of conflict Hampton
believes it does.)
The problem with this suggestion is that it is
inconsistent with summary item (1) . Contrary to what that
item tells us, the suggestion now under consideration
proposes that most cooperative situations in the natural
state are of the C2 variety in which cooperation is not
rational
.
In light of the foregoing, let's tentatively conclude
that Hampton's shortsightedness account of conflict
supposes Hobbesian individuals in the state of nature to be
in either a C2-like situation or in a Cl-like situation. I
now want to show that this conclusion undermines what
Hampton believes is the first premise in Hobbes' argument
for absolute sovereignty.
1 . 5 Hampton on Sovereign- institution
The premise in question is this:
1. It is in each person's interest to be
subjugated to a sovereign rather than to remain in
the state of nature. (H,186)
Hampton argues for this premise in the following
passage
:
If we consider how Hobbes describes the state of
nature and what he says about the reasons people
have for instituting a sovereign, his remarks
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indicate that it is not best characterized by the
matrix in Figure 6.6, but by the matrix in Figure
6.7. [These matrices are reproduced on page 91
below.] Actually, this matrix represents an
idealized version of what I will eventually argue
is the real deliberation of the parties regarding
the institution of the sovereign, because it helps
us to clarify what the preferences of the people
are for remaining in the state of nature versus
surrendering their rights to some person or
assembly. In the matrices of Figures 6.6 and 6.7
we are supposing, for simplicity's sake, that there
are three people in the state of nature, that one
of them person Z, has already been selected by some
process as potential sovereign, and that the other
two people, X and Y, are deliberating whether or
not to surrender their rights to all things to Z.
Suppose that I am individual X and you are
individual Y. Would our preferences match those in
Figures 6.6 or 6.7? In the PD matrix of Figure
6.6, I reason that I would be better off in a
partial state of war (where you have surrendered
your rights to Z but where I have not) than I would
be in either a complete state of war or a complete
state of peace. However, this does not seem to be
the preference I would actually have if I were
deliberating whether or not to surrender to Z;
instead, it would seem that I would believe, as the
matrix in Figure 6.7 indicates, that I would be
worse off in this partial state of war than I would
be in the total state of war. In the latter state
there would exist only individuals (i.e. Y and Z)
of strength and abilities roughly equal to my own,
who might be deterred from attacking me because
they would be uncertain of having sufficient
strength to overcome me, or who could be repelled
successfully by me, given their attack, if I had a
slight advantage in strength. But if you should
surrender your right to Z and I did not, there
would be a consolidation of powers in this small
confederacy, making the group significantly
stronger than any single individual like myself.
This confederacy would therefore be likely to
attempt, and be successful in, an attack against
me. But this means I would perceive my life in
such a partial state of war to be less secure than
in a total state of war, so that I would prefer the
latter to the former.
However, as the matrix indicates, I would
regard being a member of this confederacy in a
partial state of war as preferable to being a lone
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individual in the state of total war. If I
surrendered my right to all things to Z
,
I would
gain additional security because I could rely on
the support of Z if I were attacked, and the two of
us together would fare better in any preemptive
strike against another individual like you because
of the strength of our numbers. However, I would
best prefer the situation in which both you and I
would authorize the same person or assembly of
persons as sovereign. My security would be
greatest when there were no other individuals or
groups who were still at war with me, and this
would occur when everyone in the state of nature
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Figure 3.4 Hampton's Figure 6.7
91
The numbers in Figures 6.6 and 6.7 represent preference-
strengths, lower numbers indicating stronger preferences.
Suppose Hampton is right that the matrix in her Figure
6.7 (or as I shall say "matrix 6.7") correctly portrays
persons' preferences for sovereign institution. Then it is
straightforwardly rational for Hobbesian individuals to
institute a sovereign. Her inauguration, contrary to the
discussion in the last chapter, involves no PD-like
problems. I believe, though, that Hampton's argument for
premise 1 leaves something to be desired.
Assume, as Hampton does, that the question of who will
be sovereign is settled. Assume, also, that Hobbesian
individuals are psychologically able to do what is required
to create a sovereign. In deciding whether or not it is
rational to institute a sovereign, each individual in the
state of nature, I think, faces at least two decision
problems. It is a failure to distinguish these two
problems that is the ultimate source of the difficulty for
Hampton's argument:
Let individuals x, y, and z be state-of-nature
individuals. Suppose I am individual x and I am
deliberating whether to surrender my right to all things to
the sovereign-elect, z. Hampton seems to attribute to me
the following kind of reasoning: "Suppose individual y
surrenders his rights to z. Then y and z will unite in a
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defense confederacy. The confederacy will be stronger than
any lone individual like me. I will then in all likelihood
be attacked, because doing so will further the interests of
y and z, now united in a strong team. (Assume that if
their attack were successful, they would split the spoils
50-50.
)
I now have the choice of either surrendering to z
,
or
refraining from doing so. If I fail to surrender, I will
be assailed. I will be unable to repel the invaders and my
life will be hanging on a thread. If I surrender, I will
be spared. Furthermore, I will almost certainly be able to
enjoy a share of the fruits of further raids on lone
individuals by the then enlarged group consisting of x, y,
and z. So if y surrenders, I do best by surrendering.
Suppose, on the other hand, y does not surrender.
Then if I don't surrender, everyone remains in the state of
nature. That would be bad. If I surrender, then z and I
will unite in a defense confederacy. I could rely on the
support of z if I were attacked, and the two of us together
would fare better in any preemptive strike against another
individual like y. So if y fails to surrender, I do best
by surrrendering.
Hence no matter what y does, I do best by
surrendering. So I should surrender."
Notice, however, what this line of reasoning
presupposes. Hampton's argument that matrix 6.7 correctly
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represents the preferences of individuals in the natural
state "for being in such a PD-prone state versus being in a
commonwealth (or something in between)" (H,150),
presupposes an affirmative answer to a different decision
question: whether it is rational for an Hobbesian
individual in the state of nature to cooperate with another
such individual in order to form a defense confederacy.^^
It presupposes, in other words, an answer to the very kind
of question discussed in section (1) above and in the
preceeding chapter - whether cooperation in the state of
nature is rational.
1.6 Prior Results Summarized
In the last chapter I arrived at some general
conclusions on the rationality of the making and the
keeping of defense pact agreements in the state of
13
nature. I argued that in a transparent one-shot
sequential play PD-like situation, it is rational for both
first-party and second-party members to uphold a defense
pact. Hampton, however, eschews considerations of
transparency (H, 218-219). So this conclusion would fail to
impress her. In an opaque, single round PD-like game, I
argued that it is not rational for either first-party or
second-party Hobbesian individuals to adhere to a defense
pact. Again, I think this conclusion would not perturb
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Hampton since she seems to believe that Hobbesian
individuals in the state of nature are in an IPD. The
third conclusion I assumed is that Hobbesian individuals in
an IPD will find it rational to abide by a defense pact
agreement. But again, this conclusion may not be very
germane as far as Hampton is concerned, since she believes
shortsightedness to be widespread in the state of nature.
I assumed, in endorsing the third conclusion, that all
individuals in the IPD were rational.
So let's reconsider Hampton's views on natural-state
cooperation and see how they bear on her argument in
support of premise 1.
1.7 Why Hampton's Account of Sovereign- institution Fails
I concluded section (1) by proposing that on Hampton's
views, people in the state of nature are either primarily
in Cl sorts of situation or they are principally in C2
kinds of situation. Let's examine each possibility.
Assume that raids or preemptive strikes in the state
of nature are common, so that individuals like x and z can
expect frequently to find themselves in raid situations in
which they must defend themselves against attack by third
parties. Well aware of this, neighbors x and z ponder
whether to form a defense confederacy. It is not
unreasonable to suppose that a situation of this sort is an
IPD, or a sort of situation analogous to a Cl situation.
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In a situation of this type cooperation is rational. In
any case, we can assume as Hampton seems to, that it is.
If x, y, and z are in fact in this kind of situation, then
providing each is rational, it is in the self-interest of
each to make and to keep a defense pact agreement.
Hampton, as we saw, believes many in the state of nature to
be shortsighted. But let's initially suppose, to simplify
matters, that x, y, and z are fully rational, farsighted
individuals. Then it would seem that each would make a
defense pact treaty and would abide by that treaty.
Support that Hampton takes x, y, and z to be in this
sort of situation, or at least in a situation in which
cooperation is rational, is found in what she has to say
about the notion of surrendering one's rights to someone
else
:
An individual authorizes another as sovereign [or
surrenders one's rights to all things to the
sovereign (H,174)] by
1. participating with the other inhabitants of the
state of nature in a process in which one of them
is selected as sovereign (e.g., in a peaceful
election process or in violent competition for
leadership in which one confederacy emerges as
dominant, followed by an explicit or tacit
agreement that this individual is sovereign) and
2. obeying the punishment commands (a) of only
this individual (b) to refrain from interfering in
the punishment of another and (c) to actively
assist in the punishment of another, insofar as
these commands are (or have been made by the
sovereign to be) individually rational
[A] 11 of these actions involved in authorizing the
sovereign can be performed by Hobbesian people.
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(H186-187) [This is because it is
straightforwardly rational for each to perform each
of these actions. (H, 187-188 , 207 )
]
So, for example, if x "surrenders his rights to all
things" to z
, x undertakes an action or a series of
actions, each of which is SM-rational. If it is rational
for x (and indeed for y) to form a defense confederacy with
z, then Hampton's argument in support of premise 1 may seem
pretty strong.
However, there's a problem: If it is
straightforwardly rational for x and y, in fact for any
individual, to unite in a defense confederacy with others,
then the state of nature, I think, would fail to exhibit
14substantial warfare. There would then be no need for an
absolute sovereign. To put the point slightly differently,
the assumption that it is rational for individuals in the
natural state to make and to keep defense pact agreements
seems necessary to sustain Hampton's argument for premise
1. At the same time, this very assumption seems to
undermine the shortsightedness account of conflict.
Hampton may object that I have assumed that all
persons in the state of nature are rational and that none
is shortsighted. But she might protest that it is this
very characteristic of Hobbesian persons that is essential
to understanding why the natural state abounds with
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conflict. She stresses that "shortsightedness makes
warfare inevitable." (H,148)
So let's consider the second possibility. Assume that
most individuals in the state of nature are shortsighted.
These persons, being shortsighted, would fail to cooperate.
They would fail to form defense confederacies with others.
They would fail to do so because shortsighted persons, when
deliberating whether or not to enter into a defense pact
agreement, would take themselves to be in a one-shot PD in
which cooperation is irrational. A non-shortsighted person
in this C2 state-of-nature situation would also fail to
cooperate: Suppose Hobbesian individuals x, y, and z are
in this situation. Suppose x is rational whereas the other
two are shortsighted. On Monday x makes a defense pact
agreement with z. It's now Thursday and x must decide
whether to act in accord with the agreement. x knows that
the probability that the other two are shortsighted is
high. He knows that shortsightedness is almost impossible
to cure. He knows that shortsighted persons believe they
are in a one-shot PD and will not do the cooperative thing,
x rightly concludes that it would be irrational to abide by
the defense pact. Cooperation in this C2 sort of situation
is not rational. Since it is not rational for x to adhere
to the defense pact, x will find it irrational to subjugate
himself to z. Hampton argues to the contrary. But her
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argument assumes that it is rational for x and z to form a
defense confederacy. This is not true in a C2 situation.
Her argument therefore, when the relevant situation in
which x, y, and z are is a C2 situation, is not
persuasive. 15
Perhaps what is needed to solve the problem of the
Hobbesian social contract is a reconceptualization of
Hobbes 7 views on rational cooperation. That is precisely
what David Gauthier gives us.
1.8 Prelude to Gauthier 7 s Views
Gauthier's views are discussed in some detail in the
next four chapters. As a prelude to this discussion, I
think it fitting to conclude this chapter with these
provoking remarks of his on Hobbes:
But 'this specious reasoning is neverthelesse
false. 7 Hobbes has another, and better, reply to
the Foole, in his account of right reason Not
only morality, but rationality as well, must come
within [the] ambit [of conventionalism] The
Foole, in appealing to natural reason in support of
injustice, falls into inconsistency, through his
failure to appreciate the tight conceptual
connection between right and reason which is
necessary to Hobbes's thought. The right of nature
expresses right reason. If one lays down some
portion of that right, then one also renounces the
rationality that was the basis of the right laid
down. If one lays down some portion of one's right
to do whatever seems conducive to one's
preservation and well-being, so that one may find
peace, then one renounces preservation as the
standard of reason, in favor of peace. The Foole
appeals to that reason which dictates to every man
his own good - to natural reason, so that he may
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show injustice to be rational. But injustice is a
violation of covenant, and, in covenanting, in
laying down one's right, one has renounced natural
reason as the court of appeal, in favor of a reason





1. See Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract
Tradition (1986), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Page references to this book are as follows: (H, page
number)
.
2. See Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition . chapters
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3. The issues of just what an iterated PD is, and whether
cooperation in such a PD is rational, are controversial.
See, for example, David Braybrooke, "The Insoluble Problem
of the Social Contract," in Paradoxes of Rationality and
Cooperation eds., R. Campbell and L. Sowden (1985),
Vancouver: The University of British Columbia Press, 277-
306; Peter Danielson, "The Moral and Ethical Significance
of TIT FOR TAT," Dialogue 25 (1986), 449-470; Gregory S.
Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (1986) ,
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp.
129-136, and J. H. Sobel, "Utility Maximixers in Iterated
Prisoner's Dilemmas," Dialogue 15 (1976), 38-53. In this
paper Sobel argues that cooperation in an iterated PD is
not rational.
4. Hampton presents the passions account in Hobbes and the
Social Contract Tradition . pp. 63-74, and in "Hobbes's
State of War," Topoi 4 (1985), 47-60. Page references to
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.
5. The rationality account is discussed by Hampton in
Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition . pp. 58-63; 74-79;
and in "Hobbes's State of War." It is basically the same
account that I developed in section 2.3 in Chapter 2.
6. In a high risk situation,
one can suffer crippling losses if the other party
reneges and takes advantage of one's cooperation.
[Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract , p. 81.
See, also, p. 71 of this same work, and Hampton's
"Hobbes's State of War," p. 53.]
7.
Let's ignore the complication of distinguishing, as
Hobbes seems to do, between the rationality of cooperation
with respect to first-party members and with respect to
second-party members in sequential play PD-like games.
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Hampton does not directly address the symmetry
problem. However, it's abundantly clear that she
attributes to Hobbes certain views on the rationality of
cooperation in the state of nature. Her position on the
symmetry enigma may then simply be this: If her
interpretation of Hobbes 7 account of cooperation is
correct, then the problem fails to arise. In other words,
the symmetry problem is to be evaded by reconstruing
Hobbes 7 account of rational cooperation.
8. There is a nice discussion of the sources of
shortsightedness in the state of nature in Hampton's
"Hobbes's State of War," pp. 54-56.
9 . It should be clear that Hampton does not intend
'cooperative situation' to refer solely to a situation
where the rational thing to do is to cooperate. So, for
instance, in summary item (3)
,
she claims that it is not
rational to cooperate in many medium-risk and low-risk
cooperative situations.




11. The tendency to conflate the two situations seems
apparent in the following passage, this time in "Hobbes's
State of War," p. 58:
According to the shortsightedness account of
conflict, although cooperation is rational, the
prevalence of shortsighted and glory-prone people
will mean one usually cannot risk cooperation
oneself because one cannot be sure enough in most
cooperative situations that one's partner will be
cooperative (or learn to cooperate)
.
12.
Braybrooke is sceptical about this. If x and z are
equally resourceful in the state of nature, then
why should either have less to fear from utterly
subjecting himself to the other than from entering
into a contract which the other would be free to
violate? [David Braybrooke, "The Insoluble Problem
of the Social Contract," p. 287]
13.
See Chapter 2, section 2.5, this thesis.
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14. It's possible that a state of nature will emerge with
multiple defense groups. It might then be tempting to
explain the existence of conflict in terms of inter-
defense-group warfare. But this suggestion doesn't fare
too well either: We need only take each group as an
individual and ask whether cooperation among such
individuals is rational. On the possibility now being
entertained, cooperation among natural-state individuals is
rational. So "group individuals" would cooperate to fend
off third parties, again with the result that there would
be insubstantial warfare in this sort of state of nature.
15. Richard J. Arneson, in correspondance
,
has suggested
the following sort of reply available to Hampton in defense
of the claim that the existence of natural-state conflict
is consistent with the eventual ratification of the social
contract
:
It isn't true that if it's rational for individuals to
unite in a defense confederacy with others, the state of
nature would not exhibit much conflict:
Given shortsightedness, many individuals would not
form defense confederacies, and these individuals
would be prone to war against each other and they
would also be tempting prey for such defense
confederacies as do form. If a single defense
confederacy becomes doiminant, and subordinates all
individuals over a large territory, then we have
sovereignty by conquest. If this does not occur,
we have the state of war, hence the strong motive
to form sovereignty by institution. Hampton raises
the question of whether it would be rational to
submit to a sovereign when one knows that many
persons are shortsighted. Her answer is that even
shortsighted people can see their way to
cooperation in this instance, because the payoffs
favor cooperation (submission) even in the very
short term.
Since cooperation is rational in the state of nature
evisaged by Arneson, perhaps we're in a Cl-like situation.
In this sort of situation, raids and preemptive strikes are
common (see page 95 above) . Arneson suggests that even
shortsighted people in such a situation "see their way to"
submission. It is better for these Hobbesians to submit to
a sovereign than to keep warring. Suppose all this is
true. Why, then, wouldn't these very same shortsighted
persons unite in defense confederacies given the frequency
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of raids and preemptive strikes? Surely, if anything, it
is more in their immediate short-term interest to defend
themselves against raiders than to inaugurate a sovereign.
If these shortsighted persons can "see their way to"
submission, they should also, barring any plausible
explanation to the contrary, be able to "see their way to"
forming defense confederacies. If this, in turn, is true,
I don't see, pace Arneson, how many shortsighted persons in
this state of nature would "not form defense confederacies"
and "would be prone to war against each other."
16. See David Gauthier, "Thomas Hobbes: Moral Theorist,"




1 . 1 Gauthier on the Prisoner's Dilemma






Confesses 10,10 1, 30
(a) (b)
Remains silent 30,1 2 ,
2
(c) (d)
Figure 4.1 The Felons' Dilemma
The numbers represent years with Sundance's prison-terms






and (d) as "agreement
outcomes," or outcomes that would result if each felon were
to agree with the other to act in a certain fashion, and
were then to act in that fashion at the appropriate time,
(d) is the "cooperative outcome."
The parts of Gauthier's argument germane to showing
that the dilemma is escapable - that in the example, Butch
and Sundance could rationally cooperate and secure optimal
outcome (d) - are essentially two: First, Gauthier argues
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that as SFMs, agents in the position of Butch and Sundance,
engaged in genuine bargaining over the agreement outcomes,
will settle on (d)
,
the outcome selected by the principle
of minimax relative concession. This principle of
distributive justice, according to Gauthier, expresses the
principle of utility maximization in the context of
bargaining. (M by A, 145,151) Second, rational bargainers
can assure themselves that their would-be partners do not
cheat when the time comes to act on the terms of a rational
agreement, because their "constrained rationality" enjoins
compliance with agreements that are rationally made.
In this chapter I discuss rational bargaining. In the
next, I deal with the issue of compliance.
1.2 The Bargaining Issue





and (d) may seem to pose no special problem:
the cooperative outcome, (d)
,
seems to be salient. It
seems to be the one that rational agents should seek to
attain. So let's for the moment leave Butch and Sundance
and talk about others. We'll then return to our two
felons
.
Gazing at the starry skies one night, Tom and Dan
-
two SFMs - are promised by VOICE that if they were
rationally to agree on how to divide $100 between them,
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each would find the appropriate sum under his pillow the
next day. To reach agreement would be to consent to act in
accord with a strategy. A strategy - roughly speaking -
consists in a set of actions, one for each maximizer.
Since there are many possible splits, Tom and Dan have
available to them many different strategies. In conformity
with what principle, if any, would it be rational to choose
among these strategies? If we suppose that in settling on
an option some compromise will be required - neither on the
face of it, if rational, will agree to a $100/$0 or $0/$100
split - then each will have to bargain with the other to
make certain concessions.
David Gauthier proposes that SFMs in such bargaining
situations will settle on a compromise in which the largest
concession anyone makes is smaller than it would be in any
other compromise available: They will choose agreement
outcomes on the basis of the principle of minimax relative
concession (MMRC). 1
In this chapter, I begin with a summary of Gauthier's
2
theory of rational bargaining. This is a theory that
purports to specify the terms of rational agreement. It
sets aside the issue of whether compliance with an
agreement rationally entered into is itself rational. I
then argue that SFMs need not bargain on the basis of the
principle Gauthier recommends. They would be no less
rational, in certain bargaining situations, to strike
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agreement in some other way. This questions Gauthier's
assumption that there is a uniquely attractive principle of
rational bargaining.
1*3 Gauthier' s Theory of Rational Bargaining
Assume, plausibly, that cooperation often makes
possible a surplus of goods that would be unavailable if
those who cooperate to produce this surplus were to refuse
to interact, and were instead to act independently.
Bargaining theory is addressed to how this surplus is to be
apportioned among those who contribute to its production.
Gauthier tells us that in bargaining it is natural to
think of each person as beginning from a base point - a
prebargaining payoff that is not called into question by
the bargaining situation. The prebargaining payoff may
initially be identified with what each person could expect
3
to garner in the absence of any cooperative interaction.
Each person then makes a claim reflecting her desire to
gain as much as possible from agreement, subject to the
constraint not to drive others away and not herself to be
excluded from the bargaining table. Given this constraint
and the desire to maximize payoffs, each person's claim is
the largest slice of the pie he could get consistent with
each other bargainer getting his prebargaining payoff. In
the example of our star-gazers, each has a prebargain
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payoff of $0 and each will claim $100. A rational bargain
gives each individual no more than his claim and no less
than his base point. Incompatible claims will require
bargainers to make concessions if agreement is to be
reached. Since each wishes to gain as much as possible,
each will endeavor to minimize her concessions.
Now the magnitude of concession is established not
with reference to some absolute scale of utility,
but rather with reference to the particular
bargaining situation; concession is a measure of
the proportion between the part of one's claim that
one abandons, and the entire claim, or gain over
one's base-point payoff, that one originally
advances. Since the bargainers are equally and
fully rational, the maximum concession - the
greatest proportion of his or her original claim
that any bargainer gives up - must be minimized.
Since all benefit from reaching agreement, some set
of concessions is rational for all to accept, but a
particular set is rational for all only if any
alternative would require a concession at least as
great as the maximum in the given set.
In bargaining, therefore, rational persons
will act on a principle of minimax concession - the
. . 4
greatest or maximum concession must be a minimum.
Let's introduce some abbreviations.
(1) UA(Oi) is the value of outcome Oi for some agent A.
(2) UAmin is A's minimum cooperative utility. It is the
minimum utility she must be guaranteed by any agreement
5
outcome if she is to choose any such outcome. UAmin is
equal to what A could expect to acquire from her own
efforts in the absence of agreement.
(3) UAmax is A's maximum cooperative utility or A's claim.
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Suppose the total gains that cooperation may bring to a
two-person group of bargainers consisting of members A and
B, gains over and above the base points of A and B, is some
quantity k. (If k is some good, assume that bargainers'
utilities are linear with respect to their share of this
good.) k is the cooperative surplus . When there are only
two bargainers, as in the case of A and B, A's claim will
be the whole cooperative surplus. When there are more than
two bargainers, one's claim will be that portion of the
cooperative surplus to which he contributes. At least for
two-person bargaining situations, it appears that your
claim is equivalent to the maximum amount of utility you
could hope to obtain from cooperation compatible with your
gpartner receiving her minimum cooperative utility.
(4) RA(Oi)adv is the relative advantage of Oi to A. If Oi
is any agreement outcome, then RA(Oi)adv = (UA(Oi)-
UAmin) / (UAmax-UAmin) . The numerator of this ratio is the
difference between the utility a person is going to obtain
from cooperation and that person's minimum cooperative
utility.
7
(5) RA (Oi) cone is the relative concession of Oi to A. If
Oi is any agreement outcome, then RA(Oi)conc = (UAmax-
UA(Oi) )/ (UAmax-UAmin) . The numerator of this ratio is the
difference between a person's maximum cooperative utility
and the utility she is going to receive from agreement.
This difference is, therefore, simply the amount of utility
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For anya person forgoes in not getting her maximum .
8
agent, a, and agreement outcome oi, the sum of Ra(oi)adv
• 9and Ra(oi)conc is one.
We can now finally formulate Gauthier's principle of
rational bargaining, the principle of minimax relative
concession.
MMRC: Given a range of agreement outcomes each of which
requires concessions by some or all bargainers if it is to
be selected, an agreement outcome should be selected only
if the greatest or maximum relative concession it requires
is no greater than the maximum relative concession required
by every other agreement outcome . 10
Think of MMRC in this way: An agent's actual
concession is the difference between her claim and what she
gets from the outcome eventually agreed to. Her maximal
concession is the difference between her claim and her
prebargaining payoff. Her relative concession is simply a
ratio of her actual concession to her maximal concession,
or what she actually concedes in bargaining relative to the
most she could concede in bargaining. For each possible
outcome of bargaining, this parameter can be calculated for
each agent. We can somewhat unrealistically think of
bargainers acting on MMRC as doing the following: First,
they inspect all possible agreement outcomes. Second, they
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demarcate the largest relative concession required in each
outcome. Call this set of largest relative consessions
" LRC . " Each outcome has an LRC member. Third, bargainers
select the outcome with the smallest LRC member.
Intuitively, Gauthier's elegant formal machinery is
designed to capture this idea: Assume a two-person
bargaining situation. Assume in addition that there is a
single good, produced in fixed quantity and divisible in
any way among the cooperators. 11 Suppose that by acting
independently, each agent can produce k units of the good.
Suppose that by pooling their resources and cooperating,
they can generate 4k units of this good. The cooperative
surplus, as we noted, is the difference between what can be
produced by individual activity and what can be produced by
joint activity - in terms of our example, this amounts to
4k-(k+k) = 2k units of the good. Each cooperator, Gauthier
reasons, is entitled to her prebargaining payoff, k, and to
a share of the cooperative surplus proportional to the
amount of that surplus that he makes possible. In a two-
person cooperative venture, if there is a cooperative
surplus, each party is equally responsible for its
production. So in such a case, each cooperator is entitled
12
to an equal share of the surplus (2k/2 = k units).
A down-to-earth example should further help illuminate
Gauthier's intuitions about bargaining: Fred has $200 to
invest and Bruce has $300. Investments under $500 earn 5%
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and those of $500 and over earn 10%. Their only options
are to invest separately, or to pool their funds and to
invest jointly. Investing separately, Bruce can expect a
return of $15, and Fred a return of $10. If they pool
their money, they can expect a return of $50 on the
collective fund. Joint investment generates a cooperative
surplus equivalent to $50- ($15+$10) = $25. Without the
cooperation of the other, no such surplus would be
possible. Each contributes equally to its generation, and
so each, Gauthier proposes, is entitled to an equivalent
share. Bruce will end up with a total of [$300 (his
principal) + $15 (his prebargaining payoff) +$12.50 (his
share of the cooperative surplus)] = 327.50; and Fred with
[$200 +$10 + $12.50] = 222.50. The example highlights what
appears to be Gauthier's conviction that a principle of
rational cooperation must specify, in an acceptable
fashion, how the contributions each makes in a cooperative
endeavor are related to the production of the cooperative
14surplus
.
Let's now revert to Butch and Sundance. Assume their
utility matrix is identical to the one in Figure 4.2 on
page 114 below. Numbers portray expected utilities so that
more is better. What each could expect to secure in the
absence of cooperation is one utile. In other words, Umin







Remains silent 0, 10 9,9
(c) (d)
Figure 4.2 The Felons' Utility Matrix
18-1 =17. We can now calculate the relative concession
each would make if each "selected" one of the outcomes (a)
,
(b) , (c) , or (d)
.
The formula for relative concession is
this: (Bargainer's claim - UBargainer (Oi) / (Ubargainer-max
- UBargainer-min) . The relative concession of outcome (a)
to each, then, is ( 17-1) /( 17-1) = 1. Similarly,
Reach (b) cone = 0.44; Reach (c) cone = 1.1; Reach (d) cone =
0.5. We may represent each outcome as a set of relative
concessions: {(a) or (1,1), (b) or (0.44,1.1), (c) or
((1.1,0.44), (d) or (0.5, 0.5)}. By inspection, MMRC
prescribes (d) - it recommends that each do the cooperative
thing.
An alternative route to the same result is this: MMRC
allocates to each his base point and the part of the
cooperative surplus to which he contributes. The
cooperative surplus = (9+9) -(1+1) = 16. Each contributes
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equally to the realization of this surplus. In
consequence, MMRC awards to each 1 + (16/2) = 9 utiles.
I have assumed that if IS is a bargaining situation
with n agents, an agreement outcome may equally well be
represented as a set of n relative concessions, one for
each agent of IS. Let S be a bargaining situation and let
ASI, /ASi be the agreement strategies available to
members of S. A minimax concession in S is a relative
concession that is the maximum concession in the set of
relative concessions (or the agreement strategy) in which
it occurs, and that is no greater than a maximum concession
in each ASi that is a possible outcome of S.
1.4 An Argument for MMRC
Gauthier argues that rational persons like Tom and
Dan, bargaining over monetary splits - or more generally,
bargaining over agreement outcomes - will act on the basis
of MMRC:
If there is to be agreement, then someone must
make a concession at least equal to the minimax.
Now if it is not rational for me to make such a
concession, then, since the policy which is
rational for me is rational for everyone, it is not
rational for any person to make such a concession,
and there can be no rational agreement. But it is
rational for me to enter into an agreement; hence
it must be rational for me to make a minimax
concession. Furthermore, since agreement can be
reached without any person making a larger
concession, and since it cannot be rational for me
to make a greater concesssion than necessary, it
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cannot be rational for me to make a concession
larger than the minimax. Hence it is rational for
me to enter into any agreement requiring at most
the minimax concession from me. Since everyone
reasons similarly, bargaining among rational




Let S be a bargaining situation. Then presented
somewhat more systematically, the argument can be
summarized in this way:
1. If it is rational for any member of S to make an
agreement (i.e. if it is rational for any member of S to
select an agreement outcome)
,
then it is rational for some
member of S to make a concession at least equal to the
. . 17minimax
.
2. It is rational for any member of S to make an




3. Therefore, it is rational for some member of S to make
a concession at least equal to the minimax. (1,2)
4. a. Assume I am a member of S.
b. If it is not rational for me to make a concession
at least equal to the minimax in reaching
agreement, it is not rational for any member of S
to make such a concession.
Line (4) is justified by an appeal to the equal
rationality of all bargainers.
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5. Given (3) and (4b), it is rational for me to make a
concession at least equal to the minimax in reaching
agreement.
Notice (5) allows the possibility that it would be
rational for me to make a concession larger than the
minimax in selecting an agreement outcome. To block this
possibility the argument continues in this way:
6. Rational persons would reject, and they would expect any
other rational person to reject, a given relative
concession if no one need make such a large relative
18concession
.
7. In reaching an agreement no one need make a concession
. 19larger than the minimax.
8. If (6) and (7), then (9).
9. In reaching agreement rational persons would reject,
and would expect any other rational person to reject, a






11. It would be irrational for any person and so
irrational for me to make a concession larger than the
minimax in reaching an agreement. (9,10)
(12), (13), and (14) complete the argument.
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12. If it is rational for me to make a concession at least
equal to the minimax but no larger in reaching an
agreement, then it is rational to make an agreement
requiring at most the minimax concession from me.
13. Therefore, it is rational to make an agreement
requiring at most the minimax concession from me. (5,8,9)
14. Since all rational agents reason similarly, bargaining
among such agents proceeds on the principle of MMRC
.
1.5 MMRC ' s First Competitor
Premise (6) is crucial in establishing the
irrationality of any bargainer making a concession larger
than the minimax. But this premise imposes an arbitrary
constraint on rational bargaining - at least that is what I
now want to argue.
Rewritten, we can interpret (6) as a precept of
rational bargaining:
Bl: Rational persons ought (rationally) to reject, and
they would expect any other rational person to reject, a
given relative concession if no one need make such a large
relative concession.
There are alternatives to Bl: The total cooperative
gain is the maximum total payoff that would be available to
a group of potential bargainers were they to act on an
agreement strategy. If Tom and Dan, for example, were to
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reach agreement and cooperate, the maximum total payoff
available to them would be a $100.00. A maximin rule for
bargaining tells an agent to compare the minimum values of
each outcome and to settle for the outcome whose minimum is
the maximum value for all the minimums. Now compare B1
with B2
.
B2 : Rational persons ought to reject, and they would
expect any other rational person to reject, a given net
utility (that is, a utility a bargainer stands to receive
from an agreement outcome) if (i) no one need have such a
small net utility, and (ii), distrubution of the total
cooperative gains by the maximin procedure in (i) results
in each bargainer receiving more than his prebargaining
payoff. If (ii) is not satisfied, then bargainers should
proceed in accordance with Bl.
B1 and B2 generate different results in bargaining as
the table on the next page illustrates. Abel's and Mabel's
minimum cooperative utilities are 180 and 80 respectively
as indicated by the payoff each would receive if each were
to select 01. Assume that the total cooperative gain is
$500.00. Abel's and Mabel's maximum cooperative utilities
can now be calculated: UAmax = 500-80 = 420; UMmax = 500-
180 = 320. Having established minimum and maximum
cooperative utilities, relative advantages and relative
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Table 4 . 1 The Abel/Mabel Case
Agreement
Outcomes 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Relative
Advantages
A 0 1 0 0.1 0.2 0 . 3 0.4
M 0 0 1 0.9 0.8 0 . 7 0.6
Utilities A 180 420 180 204 228 252 276
M 80 80 320 296 272 248 224
Relative A 1 0 1 0.9 0.8 0 . 7 0.6
Concessions
M 1 1 0 0.1 0.2 0 . 3 0.4
Agreement
Outcomes 08 09 010 Oil 012 013
Relative A 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0 . 9 0 . 29
Advantages
M 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.71
Utilities A 300 324 348 372 396 250
M 200 176 152 128 104 250
Relative A 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.71
Concessions
M 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.29
concessions can now easily be determined in conformity with
definitions (4) and (5) given in section 1.3 above. By
inspection B1 prescribes 08, and B2 013. Were 013 not a
possible outcome, B1 would once again prescribe 08, but B2
would now prescribe 06. Suppose we change the example by
assuming that 01 yields Abel 260 units of utility, that is,
Abel can get this without cooperating. If clause (ii) of
B2 were omitted, then since the total gain is 500, and by
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assumption utility is fully transferable, B2 without clause
(ii) would assign Abel 250 units - less than he would
recieve by not cooperating. B2 , then, without clause (ii)
would be a non-starter as a bargaining principle; no
rational person will employ a principle that might require
him to accept less than he could get by not bargaining. So
if 01 affords Abel 260 units, B2 requires the two to revert
to Gauthier's minimax rule.
Since B1 and B2 generate non-equivalent results, why
prefer the first to the second? A suggestion in the texts
is that B1 enjoys a theoretical advantage over B2
.
Given the claims of the bargainers, what
concessions is it rational for them to make? To
answer this question we must first consider how
concessions are to be measured. The absolute
magnitude of a concession, in terms of utility, is
of course the difference between the utility one
would expect from the outcome initially claimed and
the utility one would expect from the outcome
proposed as a concession. But this magnitude
offers no basis for relating the concessions of
different bargainers, since the measure of
individual utility does not permit interpersonal
comparisons. However, we may introduce a measure
of relative concession which does enable us to
compare the concessions of different bargainers,
and which thus gives us a basis for determining
what concession each must rationally make. (M by
A, 134-135)
Hence, although we may not assume that the
numerical utilities of different persons are




The suggestion, then, is that B1 enables a comparison of
the concessions each bargainer makes without need to
postulate an interpersonal utility scale, or a scale that
indicates how much one person likes one item relative to
how much other people like the same item. B2
,
on the other
hand, needs to presuppose some such scale. Relative to Bl,
B2 is therefore at a disadvantage since it is probably not
possible to make interpersonal utility comparisons.^^
Such reasoning, however, ought not to convince a SFM
to prefer Bl to B2 : Gauthier informs us that in most cases
acting in accordance with MMRC will result in bargainers
selecting an agreement outcome that will require each to
• . 22make equal relative concessions. Now suppose there is no
valid interpersonal scale of utility and rational
bargainers Tom and Dan select an outcome, 0*, that requires
each to make the same relative concession. Assume, now,
that had there been a valid interpersonal scale of utility,
Dan would discover that by selecting 0*, he has conceded in
absolute terms - that is, in terms of the amount of utility
conceded - twice as much as Tom. Given this possibility,
Dan may reasonably conclude that acting on the principle of
MMRC yields unfair results. More to the point, however, it
seems that measures of relative concessions (or relative
advantages) provide rational bargainers with no basis to
decide whether each is better or worse off relative to the
others in the absence of assuming some valid interpersonal
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scale of utility : Given the assumptions of our conjecture,
Dan would not know whether he were better or worse off than
Tom in choosing 0* if there were no way to compare the
utilities afforded each by 0*. It is no consolation to Dan
to know that he has made the same relative concession (or
equally, gained the same relative advantage) in selecting
0* if their utility scales differ markedly. Similarly, Dan
would be in no position to know whether he was doing better
(worse) than Tom in selecting an agreement outcome that
afforded him a larger (smaller) relative advantage than it
did Tom, in the absence of a valid interpersonal scale of
utility. If Dan's selecting an outcome that offers him a
larger relative advantage than it does Tom is no guarantee
that he is better off than Tom in so selecting, why should
he be in the least inclined to select agreement outcomes on
the basis of MMRC, or as I shall say, on the basis of
minimaxing, if persons' utilities are not comparable?
Matters could, of course, be rectified by postulating a
scale that allows interpersonal comparisons of utility. In
that case, though, B1 would be no more attractive than B2
since it would no longer enjoy the theoretical advantage it
is suppposed to have over B2
.
So it seems that B1 is an arbitrary constraint on
rational bargaining. SFMs have been supplied with no
cogent reason to prefer it to B2
.
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1.6 MMRC ' s Second Competitor
The arbitrariness of B1 is accentuated by recognizing
that in addition to B2 it has other competitors. Let's
introduce the notion of maximum shared gain: For each
combination of strategies, take the total cooperative gain,
C. Then divide C by the number of participants. Call the
result "shared gain." A combination of strategies
maximizes shared gain if no alternative combination has
higher shared gain. Call the shared gain of such a
combination of strategies "the maximum shared gain." So,
for example, the shared gain of the combination of
strategies, "CS1," that would result in 01 is (180+80)/2 =
130. CS1 fails to maximize shared gain since the shared
gain of each other combination of strategies is 250. Now
consider B3
.
B3 : Rational persons ought to reject, and they would
expect any other rational person to reject, a given
agreement outcome if each did not receive from that
agreement outcome a utility equal to the maximum shared
gain
.
Were Abel and Mabel to act in accord with B3 , they
would reject all outcomes except 013, the outcome that
23
affords each equal maximum shared gam.
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Since Abel is a maximizer, he might argue that he does
worse by acting on B3 than he does by following Bl. B1
would require him to reject the outcome prescribed by B3
and to accept the outcome that gives him 300 utiles (or
dollars) and Mabel 200 utiles. Why should he make a larger
relative concession than Mabel? Since Mabel is also a
maximizer, she might retort that Abel places a premium on
equalizing shared gains. Why is it any more rational to
prefer equalizing relative concessions than it is to prefer
equalizing shared gains? "But I brought to the table more
than you. Why should I then settle for an equal split of
the cooperative gains?" Abel might complain. Of course,
Mabel should reply: "You ought to because if we didn't
cooperate you'd be worse off. (Assume a universe with only
two potential cooperators, Abel and Mabel.) By accepting
250 utiles you still do better than you would in the
absence of cooperation."
Gauthier suggests that
"The fundamental rationale for the principle of
minimax relative concessions turns on an
interpersonal comparison of the proportion of each
person's potential gain that he must concede.
However, were we to assume a measure of utility
permitting interpersonal comparisons, and were we
then to be tempted by some principle of equal
gain, we should remind ourselves that any such
temptation could be countered by a principle of
equal loss, in relation to one's claim." (M by A,
139)
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On Gauthier's suggestion, Abel should rejoin that
rather than egualize total cooperative gains they should
equalize losses in relation to their claims. But, assuming
a measure of utility permitting interpersonal comparisons,
to equalize such losses in relation to bargainers' claims
is just to act in accordance with Bl. In the Abel/Mabel
case, for example, let x be the loss that is to be
equalized in relation to their claims. The total
cooperative gain for all combinations of strategies
excluding the combination that would result in 01 is 500.
Abel claims 500 less Mabel's minimum cooperative utility -
that is, he claims 500-80 = 420. Mabel claims 500 less
Abel's minimum cooperative utility or 500-180 = 320. If
losses from claims are to be equalized, then (420-x) + ( 320-
x) = 500. Since x = 120, losses are equalized when each
accepts the outcome prescribed by Bl. The point, of
course, is that by countering that they ought to equalize
losses in relation to potential gain, Abel has not offered
a reason why it is any more rational to do so than it is to
equalize cooperative gains.
In summary, it is not evident that the principle
of minimax relative concession "expresses the principle of
utility maximization in the context of bargaining." (M by
A, 145, 151) There is nothing in the theory of SM, for
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example, that compels favoring B1 over B3 . At least, I see
no argument to show that it would be SM-irrational to adopt
B3 .
1.7 MMRC / s Third Competitor
Shifting away from the argument in 1.4, I now want to
make some general comments on Gauthier's theory of
bargaining. In particular, in this section I want to
question Gauthier's assumption that minimaxing is the only
rational way to break a deadlock.
Since B1 is arbitrary in the sense explained, suppose
Tom and Dan act on a diffferent precept, B4
.
B4 : A rational person ought to reject, and would expect
any other rational person to reject, a given agreement
outcome if that person need not obtain as small a utility
as she would were she to select that outcome.
If anything, it seems B4 and not B1 is a corollary of SM.
But this aside, if Tom and Dan subscribed to B4 , they would
deadlock. Tom would select the outcome that afforded him
$100.00 and Dan nothing, whereas Dan would select the
outcome that afforded him $100.00 and Tom nothing.
B4 may seem to be a non-starter. Suppose Tom and Dan
are offered two unbreakable gold pieces, one worth $100.00
and one worth $101.00. Any decision they reach about who
is to get which piece will be irrational according to B4
.
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But interestingly enough, B1 seems to suffer a similar
defect: If we assume that the prebargaining payoff of each
is $0, and there are only two possible outcomes - either
Tom gets the coin worth $101.00 and Dan gets the other,
or Dan gets the coin worth $100.00 and Tom gets the
other, would B1 not countenance an analogous problem as B4?
If one of B4 or B1 were true, then perhaps sometimes SFMs
would be no more successful in making agreements than in
escaping the PD.
Be that as it may, perplexed by their stalemated
situation and cognizant of the fact that entering into an
agreement is mutually advantageous, suppose star-gazers Tom
and Dan decide to break the deadlock. Suppose, further,
that Tom is aware of Dan's penchant for gambling and Dan is
also aware of Tom's similar passion, both having frequented
the same casinos in Monte Carlo. In true gambler's spirit
Dan reasons with Tom: "Gauthier's a conservative. He
thinks that deadlocked SFMs like us should always minimax.
We're adventurous, why not flip a coin and winner take all?
Besides, notice an interesting fact about our situation.
If we minimax, the probability of each of us getting $50.00
is unity; if we coin-flip, the probability of one of us
getting a $100.00 is 0.5, and nothing in case one of us
lucks out, is also 0.5. The expected utility of
minimaxing, assuming our utilities are linear with money
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values and assuming we either both coin-flip or both
minimax, is therefore 50X1 = 50 and that of gambling is
[ (0. 5X0) +(o. 5X100) ] = 50. So it is no more rational to
coin-flip than to minimax. What say you we coin-flip?"
Suppose Tom and Dan do in fact coin-flip. Have they
acted irrationally? I'm inclined to answer in the
negative. Their case, I think, strongly suggests that what
concessions it is rational to make partly depends on one's
dispositions (other than the disposition to be SM-rational)
and the dispositions of one's fellow cooperators. At least
this much is true: SM does not preclude one from being
disposed to being adventurous any more than it precludes
one from being disposed to conservativism. In addition, if
a batch of bargainers were disposed to gambling, then in
certain situations I think it would be no less rational -
SM-rational - to break a deadlock by coin-flipping than it
would be by minimaxing.
1.8 A Final Problem with MMRC
I want to conclude by suggesting a final worry with
Gauthier's theory that has to do with the size of the total
cooperative gain. Recall, the total cooperative gain is
the maximum payoff that would be available to a group of
bargainers were they to act in accordance with an agreement
strategy. The size of the total cooperative gain plays a
crucial role in Gauthier's theory since, given their
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minimal cooperative utilities, it is only in relation to
the cooperative gain that SFMs can advance their claims.
It is then only in relation to these claims that they are
able to make concessions in order to secure agreement.
What exactly determines the magnitude of the total
cooperative gain in a bargaining situation? There is no
set answer to this question. In the case of Tom and Dan
the total cooperative gain is a gift they will receive
contingent on their agreeing to a split. In other cases
the total cooperative gain may be directly related to how
hard each member of a group of cooperators is willing to
work. For instance, in the absence of cooperation assume
Larry and Mo can each prepare five cakes. If they work
together they can manage fourteen. It is possible that
Larry works better with Curly than he does with Mo.
Although Curly may manage the same number of cakes as does
Larry were each to work on his own, together they would
produce seventeen. In these cases potential bargainers are
cognizant of the size of the cooperative gain prior to
cooperation. Furthermore, in such cases the decision to
bargain in one way or another has no effect on the
cooperative gain - the size of the gain is fixed at the
outset. The problem bargainers face is to agree on a
principle of distribution. Now it seems that there may be
cases in which the very size of the cooperative gain may be
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influenced by knowledge of how the gain - whatever it is or
will be - is to be distributed: Suppose Larry and Curly
both stand to benefit from entering into an agreement. But
Larry knows that Curly knows that he, Larry, will work much
harder if he were to make a smaller concession than Curly.
Larry just has this distinctive psychological or
motivational trait. As a result of this peculiarity,
assume the cooperative gain would be much larger were Larry
to make a smaller concession than Curly than if they were
to make equal relative concessions as required by MMRC in
their particular case. To illustrate, assume for
simplicity, that the initial prebargaining payoff of each
is 0 units. Assume the cooperative gain (and hence the
cooperative surplus in this initial case) is 500. Since
each contributes equally to the production of this gain,
MMRC awards to each 250 units. Suppose Larry and Curly
agree not to split the gains equally; then Larry (but not
Curly) works harder with a resulting cooperative gain of
1000. Suppose the two agree to divide this total so that
Curly receives 300 units and Larry the rest. Assuming
Curly's prebargaining payoff remains unchanged, Curly does
better than he would have done had he not have agreed to
unequal splits, and in consequence, had he settled for
dividing the surplus of 500. Larry, in relation to the
first option, does better as well. His gross payoff is
700; we may plausibly assume that his net gain is larger
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than 250 units. So cooperative gains do not need to be
fixed by factors independent of the bargaining process
itself. Knowledge of the very principle that bargainers
are to use in distributing the cooperative gain may
influence its magnitude. If this is all true, then in the
relevant sorts of cases it may be SM-irrational for
bargainers to minimax.
To conclude, I have tried to establish that an
essential premise in Gauthier's argument that rational
bargainers will act on MMRC is arbitrary. It is arbitrary
in the sense that if this premise is construed as some kind
of rational precept, there is no need to suppose that SFMs
would prefer this rational precept to competitors. I have
also tried to show, contrary to Gauthier, that there is
little if any reason to assume that minimaxing is rational
in every bargaining situation.
Are there more problems with Gauthier's ambitious
contractarian project? Let's assume the bargaining problem
solved: rational agreements are those sanctioned by MMRC.
Assume Butch and Sundance know this. Will they escape the
dilemma? Not unless they can overcome the "genuinely
problematic element in a contractarian theory."
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1 . 1 The Issue
Gauthier tells us that
The genuinely problematic element in a
contractarian theory is not the introduction of the
idea of morality, but the step from hypothetical
agreement to actual moral constraint. Suppose that
each person recognizes himself as one of the
parties to agreement. The principles forming the
object of agreement are those that he would have
accepted ex ante in bargaining with his fellows,
had he found himself among them in a context
initially devoid of moral constraint. Why need he
accept, ex post in his actual situation, these
principles as constraining his choices? A theory
of morals by agreement must answer this question.
(M by A, 9)
He proceeds to "defend compliance with agreements based,
explicitly or implicitly, on the principle of minimax
relative concession." (M by A, 158) He says that
If our defence fails, then we must conclude that
rational bargaining is in vain and that co-
operation, although on a rationally agreed basis,
is not itself rationally required we must
conclude that a rational morality is a chimera, so
that there is no rational and impartial constraint
on the pursuit of individual utility. (M by A,
158)
The classic PD nicely serves to illustrate the
"compliance problem" to which Gauthier calls attention in
these passages: Butch and Sundance contemplate with a






Remains silent 0,10 9,9
Figure 5.1 Matrix 5.1
The numbers represent utilities with Sundance's preferences
recorded first. As SFMs they know that they can do no
better than attain a suboptimal outcome. The DA gives them
more time. He even goes so far as to let them consult with
each other. Perhaps by agreeing to do the cooperative
thing, they will be able to escape their plight. But each
soon realizes that such an agreement will not further their
common end: Suppose the two have been convinced by
Professor Gauthier's solution to the bargaining problem, in
simplified terms, the problem of rationally "selecting" one
of a number of non-equivalent mutually beneficial outcomes
that could result from agreement.'*' Bargains reached in
accord with the principle of minimax relative concession
(MMRC) , the solution recommends, are rational.
Since this
principle, according to Gauthier, impartially constrains
the pursuit of direct self-interest and is "rationally
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justified," it also enjoys the status of being a moral
2principle. So suppose Butch and Sundance, having been
convinced by all this, agree during one of their
consultation sessions to do the MMRC-prescribed cooperative
thing - each will keep his lips sealed. However, although
optimal, the ensuing outcome is not in equilibrium. ^ if
one party does his part - if he complies with the agreement
- the other party can do better by defecting. Since both
are SFMs it appears that compliance with the agreement
would be irrational even though making it were perfectly
rational
.
It is the failure of the outcome prescribed by
rational bargaining as conceived by Gauthier, to exemply
together, the properties of optimality and equilibrium,
that contributes essentially to the compliance problem.
The problem can be formulated this way: Suppose it is
rational to enter into agreements which, if complied with,
would result in outcomes that are fair and optimal but not
in equilibrium. Why should you comply with these interest-
constraining agreements?
A radio broadcast revives hope for the two felons.
They hear that similarly situated prisoners are rejoicing
all over. These others are celebrating Gauthier's answer
to the compliance problem. That eminent philosopher has
declared that it is rational to comply with the variety of
agreement that is of concern to them.
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But let's be more cautious than our revellers. Morals
By Agreement suggests that this answer is open to a number
of interpretations. Each merits scrutiny. Once we have
carefully examined them, we will be in a better position to
judge whether the felons really have cause for all their
fanfare.
1.2 The PR-rationality of Compliance
In the introductory chapter of his book, Gauthier
explains that
A contractarian theory of morals, developed as
part of the theory of rational choice, has evident
strengths. It enables us to demonstrate the
rationality of impartial constraints on the pursuit
of individual interest to persons who may take no
interest in others' interests. Morality is thus
given a sure grounding in a weak and widely
accepted conception of practical rationality [SM]
.
(M by A, 17)
The passage may be taken to indicate that Gauthier's
response to the compliance problem is that compliance with
the kind of agreement Butch and Sundance favor is SM-
rational . But this, of course, could not be his considered
view. In terms of our example, since confessing in the PD
is the dominant strategy, Butch and Sundance could comply
only on pain of being SM-irrational
.
Gauthier's view is perhaps better explicated in the
following set of passages.
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we defend compliance, not just with agreements, but
with practices that would be agreed to or endorsed
on the basis of the principle of minimax relative
concession. (M by A, 158)
We shall do this by demonstrating that, given
certain palusible and desirable conditions, a
rational utility maximizer, faced with the choice
between accepting no constraints on his choices in
interaction, and accepting the constraints on his
choices required by minimax relative concession,
chooses the latter. He makes a choice about how to
make further choices; he chooses on utility-
maximizing grounds, not to make further choices on
those grounds. (M by A, 158)
The received interpretation of practical
rationality identifies rationality with
utility-maximization at the level of particular
choices. A choice is rational if and only if it
maximizes the actor's expected utility. We
identify rationality with utility-maximization at
the level of dispositions to choose. A disposition
is rational if and only if an actor holding it can
expect his choices to yield no less utility than
the choices he would make were he to hold any
alternative disposition. We shall consider whether
particular choices are rational if and only if they
express a rational disposition to choose. (M by A,
182-183)
Gauthier affirms that a SFM would adopt "constrained
maximization, as his disposition for strategic behaviour."
(M by A, 170)
These passages may leave the impression that Gauthier
is defending the view that it is SM-rational merely to be
disposed to comply with agreements made on the basis of
MMRC. But I think his view is more interesting. For he
tells us elsewhere that his theory of morals defends the
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"rationality of actual compliance " with moral principles
(M by A, 182-183) To be disposed to comply with fair
agreements is consistent with not complying with them on
occasions when non-compliance is utility maximizing.
What, then, is the view advocated in this seguence of
passages? It may be something like this (solution "PRS")
:
First, identify a rational disposition, D, for making
choices. Next, establish the acceptability of a principle
of practical reason analogous to PR.
PR: An act is rational if and only if it "expresses" D.
Finally, show that PR prescribes as rational acts of
complying with agreements sanctioned by MMRC.
Notice that even if successful such an undertaking
would at most sustain the PR-rationality of compliance. It
would not, contrary to what Gauthier seems to have
intended, ground morality "in a weak and widely accepted
conception of practical rationality:" Assuming the
extensional non-equivalence of SM and PR, presumably such a
bona fide "grounding" would require establishing both the
SM-rationality of making the kinds of agreement of interest
to this discussion, and the SM-rationality of complying
with such agreements. Let's, nevertheless, assess this
interesting proposal directing attention primarily to its
first component.
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1 . 3 Constrained Maximization
Gauthier defends the position that the disposition to
constrained maximization (CM) rather than to SM is the
rational disposition for making choices. An understanding
of his defense requires clarification of the two theories,
, 4SM and CM. SM, as explained in Chapter I, is the theory
that for any agent, s, and any act, a, a is SM-rational
(for s) if and only if none of its alternatives has a
higher expected utility (for s) than it has. CM is not as
easily formulated. To facilate matters note that in
parametric contexts where one's choices do not affect
others' choices, SM and CM are extensionally equivalent.
In strategic contexts where each interacting agent chooses
her action partly on the basis of her expectations of
others' choices, CM requires that
Each person's choice must be a fair optimizing
response to the choice he expects the others to
make, provided such a response is available to him;
otherwise, his choice must be a utility-maximizing
response. (M by A, 157)
A fair optimizing response is
one that, given the expected strategies of the
others, may be expected to yield an outcome that is
nearly fair and optimal - an outcome with utility
payoffs close to those of the cooperative outcome,
5
as determined by minimax relative concession. (M
by A, 157)
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It appears that in strategic contexts where you expect
your fellow interactors to cooperate in achieving an
outcome that is fair and optimal, then provided such an
outcome is possible, CM requires that you do the
cooperative thing. In those strategic contexts where such
an outcome is possible, but where you have no expectation
of your fellow interactors cooperating to achieve it, as
for instance could be the case were your fellow interactors
SFMs, CM requires that you do the SM-rational thing. CM
tries to ensure that those disposed to cooperate are not
taken advantage of by potential exploiters. Finally, in
strategic contexts where a fair and optimal outcome is not
possible, CM again requires that you do what is SM-
. . , 6rational
.
1.4 The Choice Argument
Gauthier's alluring argument that the disposition to
CM is rational is this:
To demonstrate the rationality of suitably
constrained maximization we consider what a
rational individual would choose, given the
alternatives of adopting straightforward
maximization, and of adopting constrained
maximization Taking others' dispositions as
fixed, the individual reasons parametrically to his
own best disposition [He ought to reason as
follows:] Suppose I adopt straightforward
maximization. Then I must expect the others to
employ maximizing individual strategies in
interacting with me; so do I, and expect a utility,
u.
Suppose I adopt constrained maximization.
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Then if the others are conditionally disposed to
constrained maximization, I may expect them to base
their actions on a co-operative joint strategy in
interacting with me; so do I, and expect a utility
If they are not so disposed, I employ a
maximizing strategy and expect u as before. If the
probability that others are disposed to constrained
maximization is p, then my overall expected utility
is [pu' + (l-p)u].
Since u'is greater than u, [pu' + (l-p)u] is
greater than u for any value of p other than 0 (and
for p=0, the two are equal). Therefore, to
maximize my overall expectation of utility, I
should adopt constrained maximization. (M by A,
172
)
Although there is undoubtedly something very
persuasive here, in the end I feel the argument is not
, 7utterly watertight. To ascertain its shortcomings, let's
recast it into a form that makes it easier to evaluate. To
do so, I first list a number of assumptions that I believe
it presupposes.
(1) The choice between CM and SM is to turn on the
expected utility of adopting either conception. The
selection of a particular conception is rational if and
only if no alternative has a higher expected utility than
it has for the agent in question. The expected utility of
a conception of rationality is to be identified with the
expected utility of the act of undertaking a permanent
commitment to that conception. Suppose R and R* are
conceptions of rationality and S an agent contemplating a
choice between them. The expected utility of R for S is
calculated as follows: Consider all the possible outcomes
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of choosing R. For each, consider the utility of that
outcome. For each, consider the probability of that
outcome given that R is chosen. Multiply, for each, the
probability and the utility. Add these products. The sum
is the expected utility of R for S.
(2) The utility of choosing a conception of
rationality is to depend solely on the utility of the
actions required by that conception. 8 This assumption
restricts the outcomes that are to be taken into account in
so choosing to actions. The fact, for example, that the
choice of a particular conception, R, would maximize the
satisfaction of an agent's preferences in virtue of his
valuing acting in accord with the prescriptions of R, is to
be considered irrelevant when choosing among conceptions.
(The justification for this assumption will emerge shortly
in section 1.5 below.)
(3) In every situation except Prisoner's Dilemma-like
(PD-like) situations of a certain kind - "salient PD-like"
situations - CM and SM prescribe identical actions. A
salient PD-like situation is a situation (i) with agents
who are directly aware of each others' rational
disposition, or who at least have a good chance in
identifying the rational dispositions of others; and (ii)
in which the counterfactual independence condition is
violated. This is the condition that no matter what choice
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either player makes, he would still make that choice no
matter what choice the other makes. 9
The rationale for this assumption needs explaining.
Gauthier claims that (a)
To choose between SM and CM a person needs to
consider only those situations in which they would
yield different behaviour. (M by A, 171)
And (b)
,
These situations must satisfy two conditions.
First, they must afford the prospect of mutually
beneficial and fair co-operation, since otherwise
constraint would be pointless. And second, they
must afford some prospect for individually
beneficial defection, since otherwise no constraint
would be needed to realize the mutual benefits. (M
by A, 171)
Assumption (3), it may be supposed, takes (a) into
account insisting that it is only with respect to salient
PD-like situations that CM and SM "yield different
behaviour." In addition, it may be thought that this
assumption also accomodates (b) since both the conditions
therein specified are met by salient PD-like situations, as
the example soon to be presented might be taken to
illustrate
.
Clause (i) in the specification of a salient PD-like
situation reflects Gauthier's admission that his argument
takes choosers to be either transparent or translucent.
They are transparent when "Each is directly aware of the
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disposition of his fellows, and so aware whether he is
interacting with straightforward or constrained
maximizers .
"
(M by A, 174) Choosers are translucent when
"their disposition to cooperate or not may be ascertained
by others, not with certainty, but as more than mere
guesswork." 10 (M by A, 174)
The need for clause (ii) may be rationalized in this
way: Persons disposed to CM adopt a conditional
disposition that makes their strategies dependent on each
other. In a PD-like situation, for instance, CM-rational
Butch will cooperate with CM-rational Sundance if and only
if Butch is willing to cooperate in order to secure an
outcome that is fair and optimal, and he expects Sundance
to be so willing as well. As Gauthier reminds us, "the
probability of the others acting co-operatively [is
not] independent of one's own disposition." (M by A, 172)
For suppose it were, and suppose the absence of all other
possible influences like causal ones that would literally
make agents' actions interdependent. Then the
counterfactual independence condition would be satisfied.
In that case, however, a dominance argument Gauthier and
others have claimed, demonstrates that SFMs choosing
between SM and CM would choose the former. 11 It is in
consequence - if these philosophers are right - only in
cases in which the counterfactual independence condition is
not met that CM reputedly has a greater expected utility
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for an agent than SM. It may be urged that this, for
example, would be the case if each player's actions were
related to the other's actions in a way indicated by the







Figure 5.2 Matrix 5.2
indicate conditional probabilities of a choice on a choice.
So, for example, the conditional probability of Sundance's
(Butch's) choosing SM if Butch (Sundance) chooses SM is
0.99. The matrix shows that either player will choose a
disposition if and only if the other player chooses that
very same disposition. Assuming that in the future they
will be in the PD-like situation with payoffs specified by
the matrix in Figure 5.1, each player's utility matrix, it
may be proposed, would be matrix 5.3. (This matrix appears
on page 150 below.) Expected utilities calculated on the
basis of the information contained in these two matrices
yield the desired results: The expected utility of SM for
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each player would be = (1)(0.99) + (10) (0.01) = 1.09;
whereas that of CM for each would be greater, (0) (0.01) +





Figure 5.3 Matrix 5.3
Given assumptions (1), (2), and (3), in a world with
no salient PD-like situations the expected utility of SM
for an agent and that of CM for that agent are identical.
(4) (a) In every salient PD-like situation CM and SM
prescribe different actions. (b) In a world with one (or
more) salient PD-like situations, the expected utility of
CM for an agent is greater than the expected utility of SM
for that agent.
(5) Prior to choosing between CM and SM choosers know







On these assumptions it appears that the choice of CM
is SM-rational. Gauthier's argument for this, now recast,
is simple:
(1) Chooser's choice (Chooser is a SFM) of a conception of
iorial ity is rational if and only if none of its
alternatives has a higher expected utility than it has for
Chooser.
(2) Among Chooser's choices, the expected utility of CM
for Chooser is higher than the expected utility of SM for
Chooser
.
(3) Therefore, Chooser's choice of CM (and not SM) is
rational
.
1.5.1 The First Problem with the Choice Argument
Is this "choice argument" sound? I don't think so.
Both premises are controversial.
First, assume premise (2) is true. Then despite its
being the case that SM's expected utility for Chooser is
not as great as that of CM's for Chooser, a SFM like
Chooser should not select CM over SM. Premise (1) should
be rejected. This is so since the premise fails to take
into account the implications of the fact that rational
choices are not made from a "rationality-neutral"
perspective, but that they presuppose some such
perspective: Consider what a choice of CM over SM would
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involve from the point of view of a SFM. It is obvious
that a person's preferences in choosing a conception of
rationality will be influenced by her knowledge of what
that conception entails. In her deliberations on whether
to choose CM a significant and relevant piece of
information is that sometimes CM will require that she
restrict the pursuit of her own wants. Such restraint is
required if one is to carry through with the kind of
agreement that makes CM attractive. But to restrict the
pursuit of her own wants is, for a SFM, to act contrary to
reason. So available to such a maximizer will be the
information that there will be occasions when CM requires
her to act contrary to reason. But then it seems
irrational for a SFM to adopt as her very conception of
rationality, one that will sometimes require that she act
contrary to the prescriptions of SM. Similarly, if one's
initial conception of rationality were CM, it would be
irrational to choose SM over CM. This would be so not
because SM as of a particular time of choice, has a lower
expected utility (as we are now supposing) than CM.
Rather, the reason would be that when certain opportunities
present themselves, as perhaps in some types of PD with
trustworthy others, SM would prescribe exploitation. Such
behavior is rationally unacceptable to a CM.
Friends of the choice argument may reply in this way:
"It's true that SM requires that on each occasion of
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you choose the alternative that is best— for—you as
of that time. If you are a SFM and you want to choose
rationally, you are commited to choosing in this way - you
cannot choose otherwise. Maybe all this provides you with
some reason to refrain from choosing CM - you know, for
example, that if you now choose CM you won't be able to
exploit gullible others in PDs. But if you are moved by
this consideration, it can only be because you place a
premium on acting consistently with SM over time. However,
the choice of CM (by assumption) is utility maximizing.
Forget about considerations of "temporal consistency."
Think only about utility!"
The right response here, I think, should be this: "It
might be true that the SFM places a premium on acting
consistently with SM over time. After all, to be a SFM
just is to do the best for yourself on each occasion of
choice. But suppose, when confronted with the choice of
deciding between SM and CM, you then choose CM. Then you
must place a premium on maximizing utility as of that time:
As a SFM you well know that your choice of CM as of then
will sometimes prevent you from doing the utility
maximizing thing in the future; in some PDs to come, you
will have to forgo maximizing your advantage. So if you
choose CM, you must place a premium on maximizing utility
on one particular occasion of choice. You must think that
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it is more important to maximize utility on this occasion
of choice, than it is to maximize utility on each (future)
occasion of choice. Why is it any less rational, though,
to place a premium on maximizing utility at each choice-
point in time, than it is to place a premium on maximizing
utility at one choice-point in time?"
The approach I have attributed to Gauthier in deciding
among conceptions of rationality has a semblance of
plausibility but is misleading. Its apparent strength
derives from the assumption that the utility of CM for
Chooser is greater than that of SM for Chooser. Chooser,
as a SFM (and indeed as a constrained maximizer)
,
need not
(although she should as we will soon see) deny this. It
isn't the case, as Gauthier reminds us, that the
constrained maximizer "taking a larger view than her
fellows" reasons "more effectively about how to maximize
. . . . 13her utility," but she reasons in a different wav . (M by
A, 170) From the point of view of a constrained maximizer,
the SFM, in those PD situations in which he violates his
rationally entered into agreements, acts irrationally.
From the point of view of a SFM, the constrained maximizer
in these same situations in which he complies with his
rationally made agreements, acts irrationally. Premise (1)
is insensitive to important differences to which Gauthier
himself calls attention in the way in which these two kinds
of maximizer reason.
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1-5.2 A Possible Second Problem
This rejection of premise (1) may fail to convince the
reader. Even so, Gauthier's argument still suffers
defects. That is because whether it is sound partly
depends on the cogency of assumptions (1) to (5). Both
assumption (2) and assumption (4)
,
I believe, are suspect.
Let's consider each in turn. In discussing the second, I
proceed as if the fourth is beyond reproach.
Assumption (2) may impose an arbitrary restriction on
the outcomes that are to be considered in choosing among
conceptions of rationality. Why restrict as it does the
relevant outcomes to actions? An SM-rational agent, for
instance, may value being a SFM just as she may value being
charitable or kind. Choosing SM would maximize the
satisfaction of this particular preference. To elaborate,
assume that some SM-rational agent values acting in accord
with the prescriptions of SM. If such an agent were to
choose CM, she would know that in salient PD-like
situations she would have to act SM-irrationally
:
assumption (4a) tells us that in such situations SM and CM
prescribe different actions. As we have already remarked,
from the point of view of a SFM, a constrained maximizer
acts irrationally in some situations of this type. In
light of this knowledge and given her values, the choice of
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SM and not CM, it would seem, would maximize the
satisfaction of her preferences.
Consider, secondly, a' SFM whom we shall call
"Reasonable." Reasonable values acting on the basis of
rational precept RP.
RP: If S ought (SM-rationally) to do a at time tl, and S
cannot do a at tl without doing b at an earlier time to, S
ought (SM-rationally) to do b at to.
Prior to choosing between SM and CM, suppose
Reasonable knows that he will find himself in a salient PD-
like situation. Suppose the SM-rational thing to do in
such a situation is to confess whereas the CM-rational
thing to do is to remain silent. In order both to act SM-
rationally and to act consistently with RP in the
dilemmatic situation to come, Reasonable must choose SM:
If he were to commit himself to CM he could not then act
consistently with these preferences. Yet again, choice of
SM would maximize the satisfaction of Reasonable's
preferences
.
It is important not to loose sight of the fact that a
requirement of SM is that one consider all possible
outcomes of relevant alternatives in one's deliberations.
So preferences like the ones Reasonable has cannot be
discarded in deciding on the rational course of action in
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the absence of sound justification. What could this
justification be, though, given that SM, at least in the
fashion interpreted by Gauthier, does not constrain the
content of agents' preferences? 14
Gauthier would probably reply that I have muddied the
waters here by adding extra payoffs in addition to those to
be gained by action in the PD-like situation. He may
readily concede that certain individuals like Reasonable
with certain "nontraditional values" would not choose CM
over SM. They would choose conversely. They would so
choose because their idiosyncratic values would ensure that
their choice situation is no longer any interesting variety
of PD.
In light of this rejoinder, let's stipulate that there
are no hidden payoffs: The numbers in matrix 5.1 exhaust
everything that the choosers have at stake. But even with
this proviso the choice argument, I think, does not work.
It fails because assumption (4) is questionable. In fact,
I think both its parts are false.
1.5.3 A Third Problem with the Choice Argument
Reconsider the case of Butch and Sundance. Assume
that the PD-like matrix in Figure 5.1 correctly portrays
the value of each possible outcome for each of these
agents. Assume, in addition, that the two felons are
transparent so that matrix 5.2 is an accurate depiction of
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how the actions of each are related to the actions of the
other. Assume, further, that prior to being in the PD-like
situation Butch and Sundance agree to do the cooperative
thing. In this example, to do the cooperative thing is
tantamount to keeping silent. Since each is transparent
each will be aware of whether the other is disposed to
cooperate. Transparency ensures that cheating is not
possible. (M by A, 173-174)
If each is a constrained maximizer each will
cooperate. Each will honor the pre-PD agreement and will
receive 9 points. Now consider what will happen if each is
straightforwardly rational. The felons know that they
cannot cheat. Transparent Butch, for instance, cannot make
the agreement with the intention of later failing to carry
through. He cannot because being transparent, Sundance
would know of the intention to be dishonest and would, from
the start, refuse to make the agreement. Moreover, this
must be emphasized: If all Butch knew about Sundance is
that Sundance is disposed to CM, Butch would be foolish,
merely on the basis of this information, to do the
cooperative thing. As we saw earlier, to be disposed to CM
is consistent with doing the utility maximizing thing on
various occasions. If Butch is not to be deceived - if as
of a particular time he is to have realistic expectations
of achieving a fair and optimal outcome, he must know
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something over and above Sundance's rational disposition.
He must know something about Sundance's intentions, and
something about Sundance's intentions to act on those
intentions. So the assumption of transparency is a strong
one. We must assume that not only does transparency
disclose the rational dispositions of agents, it also
discloses agents' intentions to act in certain ways on
specific ossasions of choice, and at least the likelihood
that they will act on these intentions on those occasions.
Now each knows that if he keeps silent so will the other
and if he confesses so will the other. Such an
" interdependency" of actions is an interesting conseguence
of transparency. So if each does the cooperative thing and
remains silent each can expect 9 points. If each confesses
each can expect 1 point. It would therefore be
straightforwardly rational for each, in this PD-like
situation, to remain silent.
Suppose, now, that Butch and Sundance are choosing
between SM and CM. Suppose they are told that they will
find themselves in a world with precisely one salient PD-
like situation, a situation exactly like the one just
described. The discussion in the last paragraph should
make it clear that their utility matrix is matrix 5.4.
(See page 160.) Expected utilities calculated by assuming
probabilities recorded in matrix 5.2 tell us that each will








Figure 5.4 Matrix 5.4
It won't help to assume that the PD situation in which
Butch and Sundance anticipate finding themselves will be an
authentic one in which the counterfactual independence
condition is satisfied: In such a situation SM counsels
confessing. But so does CM. In an authentic PD, we cannot
assume any interdependency of action that could, for
example, result from the supposition that agents are
transparent. Introduce such interdependency and the
counterfactual independence condition is violated. Then
the actions of one partly "determine" the actions of the
other. The resulting PD-like situation would conseguently
not be a real PD; it would in fact not be any different
from the dilemmatic situation in which we first supposed
the two felons to be. So assume, in this second case, that
Butch and Sundance are not transparent - or at least assume
that each has no idea about the rational disposition of the
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other. If agents' actions are not interdependent in any
such way as they would be if agents were transparent, then
the relevant utility matrix — I think — would be matrix







Figure 5.5 Matrix 5.5
point. Each as a constrained maximizer would also confess
and would receive 1 point. Hence, no matter what your
rational disposition, and no matter what the rational
disposition of your partner, you would do best by
confessing. The result once again is that SFMs do not do
better than constrained maximizers in such authentic PDs.
To summarize results, in both inauthentic PD-like
situations and in genuine PDs in which deception is not
possible, transparent SFMs will do just as well as their
constrained cousins. In the former sort of dilemmatic
situation both types of maximizer will "cooperate." In the
latter sort of situation they will refrain from
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cooperating. So it seems unlikely, as Gauthier believes,
that "because they differ in their dispositions,
straightforward and constrained maximizers differ also in
their opportunities, [to cooperate] to the benefit of the
latter." (M by A, 173)
1.5.4 A Fourth Problem with the Choice Argument
Finally, it's worth observing that assumption (5)
forces a certain construal of the claim that CM is the
rational disposition for making choices: Perhaps there are
some dilemmatic situations in which a constrained maximizer
would do better than a SFM. Assume there are. Even so, a
SFM who expected to find himself in a world devoid of these
kinds of situation would do no better by adopting CM than
by adopting SM. If it is Gauthier's intention to convince
any SFM - even a one like Reasonable - that she would do
better under any conditions by becoming a constrained
maximizer, the choice argument won't help him.
To skirt this difficulty one might retreat to the more
cautious claim that it is SM-rational for agents with
certain values in certain situations to choose CM over SM.
I have no quarrel with this weaker view. But if the very
justification for CM consists in showing that any SM-
rational agent would do better by choosing CM over SM, then
it is the stronger and not the weaker claim that needs to
be sustained. Similarly, if SM is to be abandoned for the
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reason that SM-rational agents would not choose SM over a
15competitor, it is once again the stronger claim that
needs to be upheld: Why suppose a principle of rationality
defective if choice of it is SM-rational for agents with
certain values in certain situations, but not so rational
for agents with a non-equivalent set of values in a
different set of situations? 16
The choice argument, it appears, is not free of
worries
.
1.5.5 A Problem with PR
Assume, contrary to what has just been concluded, that
the disposition to CM is the rational disposition for
making choices. Then the principle of practical reason,
PR, appealed to by the second componet of PRS is to be
interpreted as claiming that
An act is rational if and only if it "expresses" the
disposition to constrained maximization.
Barring questions of just what PR so interpreted
17
amounts to, Gauthier presents no argument in its defense.
He asserts that
If one's dispositions to choose are rational, then
surely one's choices are also rational. (M by A,
186)
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But mere assertion constitutes no reason for accepting PR.
Gauthier's defense of solution PRS is at best incomplete.
1 * 6 CM-rationality of Compliance
Although the choice argument does not succeed it is
evident that CM as a theory of practical rationality
enjoins compliance, under certain conditions, with fair
optimal practices. So perhaps the solution to the
compliance problem being sought is that it is CM-rational
to comply with agreements that are rationally entered into.
In "Reason and Maximization," however, Gauthier tells
us that CM is a moral principle. 18 Suppose, in addition,
that CM is "rationally justified." Suppose it is interest-
constraining, as it indeed seems to be; it reguires
compliance, under specific conditions, with agreements
based on the principle of minimax relative concession.
Suppose, finally, that it is impartial. Gauthier seems to
rely on different accounts of impartiality. Sometimes he
says that "a joint strategy is impartial because it is
acceptable from every standpoint, by every person
involved." (M by A, 151) At other times, he relies on a
Rawlsian notion of impartiality - principles are impartial
just in case they are selected from an "Archimedean Point"
behind a "veil of ignorance." If these suppositions are
all true, then on the criteria proposed in Morals By
Agreement . CM would again qualify as a moral principle. It
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would in fact be a moral principle that is also a principle
for rational choice. But even if CM had this attractive
j-eature
, Gauthier would still encounter a difficulty: The
rationality of compliance and so the rationality of being
moral would on the present consideration be sustained on
moral grounds. This would defeat Gauthier's project of
generating morality "as a rational constraint from the non-
rcoral premisses of rational choice." (M by A, 4, my
emphasis.) Assume, then, that CM is not a moral principle
so that this worry does not arise. This would not,
unfortunately, permit Gauthier to circumvent a new problem:
SM-rational agents will have been given no reason
whatsoever to comply with agreements they rationally make.
(Remember, the choice argument falls short of accomplishing
what it is meant to.) Why should a SFM be in the least
moved by being apprised that it is CM-rational but not SM
so to comply with fair optimal practices?
A way out would be to argue that SM suffers a defect
not shared by CM, that SM maybe, fails to satisfy a
criterion any adequate principle of rationality must meet.
"Reason and Maximization" intimates such a criterion. It's
the criterion that a theory of rationality is adequate only
if "self-supporting." Several versions of this criterion
are amplified and evaluated in the next chapter.
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For now, we conclude that on its own the choice
argument fails to resolve the compliance problem,




1* Gauthier's theory of bargaining is presented in Chapter
V, in David Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (1986), Oxford:
Clarendon Press. We discussed this theory in the last
chapter.
2. Gauthier claims that "our concern is to validate the
conception of morality as a set of rational, impartial
constraints on the pursuit of individual interest." (M by
A, 6)
3. A Nash equilibrium outcome is the product of a set of
actions, one for each interacting person, such that for
each such person, there is no alternative action that this
person would prefer, the actions of all the others being
fixed.
4 . I think it is misleading to take CM to be a rational
disposition. CM, like SM, is a theory of rationality.
Just as one can be disposed to act in accord with SM, so
one can be disposed to act in accord with CM.
5. Gauthier explains that
We speak of the response as nearly fair and optimal
because in many situations a person will not expect
others to do precisely what would be required by
minimax relative concession, so that he may not be
able to choose a strategy with an expected outcome
that is completely fair or fully optimal. But we
suppose that he will still be disposed to co-
operative rather than to non-co-operative
behaviour. (M by A, 157)
6.
If something more formal is desired in the
characterization of CM, perhaps the following will suffice:
Let's suppose that each act is either performed in a
parametric context, in which case it is a "P-act," or in a
strategic one, in which case it is an "S-act." Then CM can
be formulated in this way:
CM: For any agent, R, and any act, a, a is CM-rational if
and only if
(a) if a is a P-act, then a is SM-rational.
(b) if a is an S-act, then
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(i) if there is an outcome, o, such that o is
the product of a set, A, of actions, one for each
interacting person, o is fair and optimal, and R
expects each interacting person to be ready to
cooperate in achieving o, then a is a member of A
and R's doing a, provided the other interactors
did the cooperative thing, would result in o; or
(ii) if there is an outcome, ol, such that ol=o
in (i), and R does not expect each interacting
person to cooperate in achieving oi, then a is
SM-rational ; or
(iii) if there is no outcome, o2
,
such that o2=o
in (i), then a is SM-rational.
7. I here part company with what many have said on the
choice argument: Richmond Campbell (Richmond Campbell,
"Gauthier's Theory of Morals by Agreement," forthcoming in
Philosophical Quarterly ) believes that transparent SFMs,
choosing between SM and CM, would choose CM. Edward
McClennen expresses a similar belief in his paper
"Constrained Maximization and Resolute Choice," forthcoming
in Social Philosophy and Policy . While Peter Danielson
takes the disposition to "reciprocal cooperation" and not
the disposition to CM to be the rational disposition to
adopt (Peter Danielson, "The Visible Hand of Morality,"
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1988), 357-384, pp. 375-
378) , he seems to agree that when choice is limited to CM
and SM, the choice of CM is utility maximizing. Gregory
Kavka says that it "may will be true" that CM is more
rational than the disposition to maximize expected utility.
(Gregory Kavka, "A Review of Morals By Agreement," Mind 96
(1987), 117-121, p. 120) L. W. Sumner thinks that Gauthier
"has made a very strong putative case for thinking" that "a
utility maximizer should not be a straightforward
maximizer." (L. W. Sumner, "Justice Contracted," Dialogue
26 (1987) , 523-548, p. 544)
Fred Feldman, in contrast, characterizing SM "in a
slightly unorthodox way" believes that SFMs won't do worse
than constrained maximizers in PD-like situations. See
Fred Feldman, "On The Advantages Of Cooperativeness,"
forthcoming in Midwest Studies in Philosophy , especially
section 7.
8. As Gauthier claims, "A disposition is rational if and
only if an actor holding it can expect his choices to yield
no less utility than the choices he would make were he to
hold any alternative disposition" (my emphasis) . See
Morals By Agreement , pp. 182-183.
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9. I owe this formulation of the counterfactual
independence condition to Professor Fred Feldman. See
Feldman, "On The Advantages Of Cooperativeness , " section 3.
10. Gauthier is sensitive to the charge that to assume
transparency is to rob the argument of much interest as it
is not realistic to suppose that "real world" persons are
transparent. For this reason, he explores the merits of
the argument when the choosers in question are
"translucent." I believe the argument has problems even
when transparency is assumed. I will therefore restrict
discussion to the ideal case in which this assumption
holds
.
For a critical discussion of the choice argument in
"real world' contexts, see Richard J. Arneson, "Locke
versus Hobbes in Gauthier's Ethics," Inquiry 30 (1987),
295-316, section V, pp. 304-315.
11. See Morals By Agreement . p. 173 and Daniel M. Farrell,
"Hobbes As Moralist," Philosophical Studies 48 (1985), 257-
283, pp. 272-273. I remain unconvinced by these arguments.
I think that in PDs in which the counterfactual
independence condition is satisfied and in which deception
is not possible, SFMs choosing between SM and CM would
choose either. My reasons for so thinking are presented in
section 1.5.3 in this chapter.
12. Gauthier agrees with this. See, for example, David
Gauthier, "Reason and Maximization," Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 4 (1975), 411-432, p. 415.
13. Morals By Agreement . pp. 169-170.
14. Morals By Agreement . pp. 25, 34, 48.
15. Gauthier suggests this in "Reason and Maximization,"
pp. 429-430; in David Gauthier, "The Irrationality of
Choosing Egoism - A Reply to Eshelman," Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 10 (1980), 179-187, pp. 184-185, and in Morals
By Agreement , pp. 183-184.
16. The interesting issue of assessing theories of
practical rationality will be considered in much more
detail in the next chapter.
17. David Copp and Richmond Campbell draw similar
observations in David Copp, "Contractarianism And Moral
Scepticism," forthcoming and in Richmond Campbell,
"Gauthier's Theory of Morals by Agreement," respectively.
See, also, Holly Smith's discussion in her paper
"Gauthier's Moral Contract," forthcoming.
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18. In "Reason and Maximization," p. 432, Gauthier says
that "The policy of agreed optimization [i.e. the policy of
CM] may be identified with morality."
19. See David Gauthier, "Moral Artifice," Canadian Journal
of Philosophy 18 (1988), 385-419, section 6, and Morals By
Agreement . Chapter VIII, for Gauthier's account of Rawlsian
or "Archimedean" impartiality.
David Copp conducts an interesting discussion of
Archemedean impartiality in "Contractarianism And Moral
Scepticism," section 5. One conclusion he there argues for
is this:
[U]nless everyone in society is roughly equal in
power and productivity, schemes or arrangements
that would pass the test of contractarian
rationality [i.e. schemes or arrangements like the
Lockian Proviso or the principle of minimax
relative concession that would be rationally agreed
to (let's suppose) by SFMs] would not pass the test
of impartiality [they would not be selected by
rational agents behind a Rawlsian veil of
ignorance], at least not without qualification, and
schemes that pass an unqualified impartiality test
would not pass the rationality test. (pp. 28-29)
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CHAPTER 6
ASSESSING THEORIES OF RATIONALITY
1 . 1 Introduction
In Morals By Agreement David Gauthier expresses an
intriguing view about rationality when he claims that
At the core of our rational capacity is the ability
to engage in self-critical reflection. The fully
rational being is able to reflect on his standard
of deliberation, and to change that standard in the
light of reflection. (M by A, 183)
In a similar vein, in "Reason And Maximization" Gauthier
affirms that
Far from supposing that the choice of a
conception of rationality is unintelligible, I want
to argue that the capacity to make such a choice is
itself a necessary part of full rationality. A
person who is unable to submit his conception of
rationality to critical assessment, indeed to the
critical assessment which must arise from the
conception itself, is^rational in only a restricted
and mechanical sense.
The notion of subjecting our beliefs and acts to
critical scrutiny is not too hard to grasp, but what about
the notion of subjecting our standards of critical scrutiny
themselves to critical scrutiny? The trouble with the
latter notion seems to be that in assessing our standards
we cannot appeal to any higher authority - for there is
none higher than these very standards themselves.
Nevertheless, as is evidenced by the passages just cited,
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Gauthier not only believes that it is possible to raise
questions about the ultimate adequacy of these standards
but that "full rationality" demands that one do so.
In this chapter I offer a number of interpretations of
what I consider to be Gauthier's test for assessing
theories - at least formally adequate ones - of
rationality. I argue that none is cogent.
1.2 Two Sorts of Evaluative Test
It is important to distinguish between two different
notions of an evaluative test for principles of practical
reason. According to the "criterial notion" the test
specifies a necessary condition any formally adequate
theory of practical reason must satisfy. In contrast, the
"comparative test" allows us to determine which of two
competing theories, if any, is better. A theory's being
better than a competitor is compatible with its failing to
meet a necessary condition of adequacy for any such theory.
I distinguish these two notions since both, I believe, are
suggested in the relevant texts by Gauthier. What I call
the "choice interpretation" of the evaluative test is
itself succeptible to two interpretations. It can be
construed as propounding either a criterial or a
comparative test for assessing theories of rationality.
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The "self-referential" interpretation, unlike the first,
explicitly enunciates a criterial test.
To formulate the various interpretations, concede the
intelligibility of the claim that a person's conception of
rationality is something he can rationally choose to
change. Assume that to choose among conceptions of
rationality is simply to choose among acts of undertaking a
permanent commitment to one of them. With this in mind we
can now attempt to elucidate the variants of the choice
interpretation
.
1.3 A Criterial Test
Gauthier explains that a SFM, choosing among
conceptions of rationality, will elect to abandon egoism in
favor of an alternative, "constrained maximization" (CM)
.
To demonstrate the rationality of suitably
constrained maximization, we solve a problem of
rational choice. We consider what a rational
individual [i.e. an SM-rational individual] would
choose, given the alternatives of adopting
straightforward maximization, and of adopting
constrained maximization, as his disposition for
strategic behaviour. Although this choice is about
interaction, to make it is not to engage in
interaction. Taking others' dispositions as fixed,
the individual reasons parametrically to his own
best disposition. (M by A, 170-171)
[W]e suppose it possible for persons, who may
initially assume that it is rational to extend
straightforward maximization from parametric to
strategic contexts, to reflect on the implications
of this extension, and to reject it in favour of
constrained maximization. (M by A, 183-184)
173
In these passages Gauthier appears to be proposing
that non-equivalent substantive theories of practical
reason are to be evaluated on the basis of a rational
choice among them. The favored alternative ( s) is the one
the choice of which is rational.
As a criterial test, CT, the choice interpretation
says this:
CT: A principle of rationality is adequate only if choice
of it (presumably by any agent) is rational.
CT faces an obvious objection. A rational choice of a
theory of rationality is impossible without assuming some
theory, itself an adequate one, as a basis for such a
choice
.
The force of this objection is better appreciated once
it is elaborated into a dilemma. Let the theory under
evaluation be Tl. If choice of T1 is to be rational we
must assume some theory of practical reason, T*, as a basis
for our choice. Now either T* is identical to Tl or it is
not. Suppose it is. Then CT is a self-referential
criterion of adequacy. This criterion appropriately
formulated, though, is flawed as I argue below. So CT
itself is flawed. Suppose, alternatively, that T* is not
identical to Tl. Then T*'s ultimate adequacy may itself be
questioned. On what basis do we establish its credentials
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as an acceptable theory of practical reason? On the one
hand, T*'s adequacy cannot be assumed since the very
purpose of the test is to provide a criterion of adequacy
for theories of rationality. On the other hand, a
consistent application of the evaluative test now under
consideration requisitions a rational choice of T* on the
basis of some other non-identical theory, T**. But then of
course the adequacy of T** itself may be queried. On pain
of regress, it seems best to bow to this horn.
1.4 A Comparative Test
Although CT fails it's still open to a defender of the
choice intepretation to hold that this interpretation
enunciates a comparative test for theories of rationality.
The attractions of such a test, it may be claimed, are
evident: A comparative test avoids the unpromising or
perhaps even impossible task of discovering and formulating
criteria of adequacy for theories of practical reason. For
what else other than our intuitions could we appeal to to
discover such criteria if indeed there is anything to
discover? But it is patent, it may be held, that our
intuitions are unreliable when it comes to making such
2
discoveries. The most we can hope for in the face of
competing theories like SM and CM is to try to ascertain
which of them is better, and to attempt this by avoiding
any appeal to our questionable intuitions.
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To formulate the choice interpretation so that it
captures the notion of a comparative test, let's limit our
choice to two non-equivalent theories, T1 and T2 . Then the
comparative criterion, CCO, recommends that
CCO : T1 is better than T2 if and only if a choice of T1 is
rational
.
But rational on what basis? Again, there appear to be
two possibilities. The choice of T1 may be rational on the
basis of either one of T1 or T2, or T3
, on the supposition
that T3 is identical to neither T1 nor T2
.
The second alternative, however, isn't really one
since by assumption there are only two theories of choice,
T1 and T2 . We are assuming that there isn't a further
theory that can be used as a basis for choosing between
them. Even if there were, that theory would have to be
sound: rational choices cannot, unless fortuitously, be
forthcoming from defective theories of rationality. If
sound, its being so could presumably be confirmed by a set
of criteria of adequacy for theories of rational choice.
But a powerful impetus for propounding a comparative test
as opposed to a criterial one, derives from scepticism
about there being any such set, and even if there were, of
our being able to discover it.
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So suppose T3 is identical to either T1 or T2 . Then
the test would have to be construed in this fashion:
CC1: T1 is better than T2 if and only if choice of T1 is
rational given one of T1 or T2 as a basis for choice.
CC1 encounters a difficulty: Suppose the choice
between T1 and T2 is to be made on the basis of Tl. Then
it seems that the supposition begs the question in favor of
Tl. It seems to presume that Tl is better than T2 for
purposes of choosing between them. The arbitrariness of
this sort of manoeuvre should be clear. One might attempt
to resolve the problem in this manner: The context of
choosing among conceptions of rationality, Gauthier tells
us, is a parametric one. Assume the extensional
equivalence of Tl and T2 in parametric contexts. Then
these theories prescribe the very same actions in such
situations of choice. Hence to use either as a basis for
rationally choosing between them is not to presume one
superior to the other and is therefore not to beg the
question in favor of either.
This solution to the problem, however, incurs costs.
The most obvious is that the criterion of adequacy for
theories of rationality as summarized by the choice
interpretation must now be construed as a restrictive and
not a general one. The test limits itself to theories like
SM and CM that are extensionally equivalent in parametric
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contexts and has no application whatsoever to theories that
may not be so equivalent. 3 It may be possible to show, by
independent argument, that all "maximizing" theories of
rationality like SM and CM are in fact extensionally
equivalent in parametric contexts so that there is no worry
here. But then again it may not. In that case the
objection needs to be defused.
Here's a suggestion: Why not first compare T1 and T2
relative to Tl, then relative to T2
, and then evaluate on
the basis of CC2
.
CC2 : For any theories, Ti and Tk, Ti is better than Tk if
and only if it is better as judged both by Ti and Tk.
Hence, if Tl and T2 are extensionally equivalent in
parametric contexts, then one is chosen or they tie. If
. . 4they are not so equivalent, then they tie.
There is a problem, however, with this suggestion as
well. The problem, by the way, would persist even if it
could be shown that all "maximizing" theories are
extensionally equivalent in the relevant context. In a
nutshell, the problem is that one and the same theory of
rationality may recommend different courses of action
depending on the characteristics of the choice situation.
The choice of theories of rationality, supposing a certain
theory as a basis for choice, is not invariant across all
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parametric choice contexts. As we saw in the last
5chapter, and indeed as Gauthier himself emphasizes, under
certain conditions SM prescribes the choice of SM; under
others, it may prescribe CM. 6 Confronted by this
observation one must, I think, conclude one of two things.
Either CC2 fails; or, eschewing this verdict, one must
assume the burden of explaining why certain choice
situations and not others are relevant to the testing of
theories of rationality. We shall have more to say on this
below. 7
1.5 An Absolutist Self-support Test
Earlier works, in particular "Reason and
Maximization," lend support to another criterial test for
conceptions of rationality. Roughly, the idea is that
theories of rationality are to be assessed self-
referentially.
After explaining that a rational egoist will reject
egoism in favor of CM, Gauthier tells us that
straightforward maximization is not self-
supporting; it is not rational for [a SFM] to
g
choose to be a straightforward maximizer.
On the plausible assumption that to abandon a theory of
rationality is to reject it as untenable, the passage
suggests that egoism is defective because it is not self-
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supporting. This, in turn, suggests that a necessary
condition of a principle of rationality's being adequate is
that the principle is self-supporting.
The notion of self-support is introduced by Gauthier
in this way:
It is rational to choose a conception of
rationality if, given that conception of
rationality, it is rational to choose it.
The notion is ambigious. It can be construed in either an
"absolutist" or a "relativist" fashion. According to the
former,
ASS: Principle of rationality, R, is self-supporting =df.
for any agent, under any conditions, the choice of R would
be permitted by R.
According to the latter,
RSS: Principle of rationality, R, is self-supporting =df.
for any agent, under certain conditions, the choice of R
would be permitted by R.
It appears that it cannot be to the ASS conception of
self-support that Gauthier subscribes: CM, unlike SM, is
meant to be self-supporting. But on the absolutist
conception, there are conditions under which this is not
true. Here's one. Suppose a terrorist puts a gun to your
head and threatens: "If you adopt CM, I'll kill you."
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Under these conditions, CM prescribes that you ought not to
adopt CM. So CM is not absolutely self-supporting.
1.6 Relativist Self-support Tests
Perhaps the self-referential principle endorsed by
Gauthier is SRI:
SRI: A principle of rationality, R, is adequate only if R
is relativistically self-supporting ("RSS").
SRI is singularly unhelpful since it leaves
unspecified the conditions under which adequate principles
of rationality are to be self-supporting. To isolate these
conditions, it will be helpful to remind ourselves that in
situations of the relevant kind, Gauthier suggests that SM
but not CM is not self-supporting.
First, notice that for agents with a particular
psychological profile, SM may not fail in the required
way.
10
This becomes evident if we reflect on rational
agent Tom's disposition to maximize. Tom is a tenaciously
ardent SFM . Ardent SFMs value being SFMs; they value being
the sort of person that has as her conception of
rationality SM. Just as one may value being generous,
ardent SFMs value acting in accord with the prescriptions
of rational egoism. Tenaciously ardent SFMs value being
SFMs much more than they value being any other sort of
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maximizer. Presented with the choice between any other
maximizing conception of rationality and SM, a tenaciously
ardent SFM would choose to remain such a maximizer.
^
In light of this counterexample, SRI may be amended by
a slight modification:
SR2 : A principle of rationality, R, is adequate only if
(i) given that R is one's principle of choice, and (ii) one
does not value being an R-rational person, it is rational
to choose R.
If one is a SFM, for example, clause (ii) of SR2 is to be
construed as saying that one does not value being a SFM.
SR2 suffers at least two serious defects. To explain
the first we need to distinguish between "teleological" and
"non-teleological" theories of rationality. Teleological
theories place no constraints on the ends of rational
agents or on what rational agents may value. SFMs, for
example, espousing a teleological theory - SM - may value
the happiness of others, cooperativeness in PDs, or being
12 ...
SFMs. Non-teleological theories . in contrast, are ends-
constraining branding as irrational certain ends. Some
such theory, for instance, may rule that it is irrational
to value being a tenaciously ardent SFM.
In adducing a principle of adeguacy for a class of
theories of rationality, it is desirable that the principle
be applicable to every member of this class. Without such
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generality of applicability it would fail to be a principle
of much interest. In particular, it should not turn out in
the absence of any justification to the contrary, that such
a principle preclude assessing theories of the relevant
kind merely in virtue of the values of those holding these
theories. This is especially true if the theories in
question are teleological - such theories do not in any way
constrain the values of rational agents. It should be
evident that SR2 fails in this respect. Since Tom is a
tenaciously ardent SFM, SR2 cannot be used by him to
evaluate SM. Suppose that unlike Tom Dan does not value
being a SFM though he is such a maximizer. SR2 is then
available to him as a principle of critical assessment.
Given Tom's values SM is self-supporting. Given Dan's
values it may not be self-supporting and hence Dan but not
Tom may have to conclude that SM is defective. Suppose,
now, that Tom undertakes "cognitive conversion therapy" and
as a result comes to loathe being a SFM. In using SR2 to
assess SM, he may now have to conclude like Dan that it is
inadequate since it is not self-supporting. How can the
mere fact of changing one's values call into question a
teleological theory of rationality? Of course, the kind of
problem I am trying to articulate would not arise if the
theories under scrutiny were non-teleological : according
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to these theories, it might well be irrational to value SM
as Tom does.
It may be objected that this worry can easily be
dispelled by stipulating that the utility of choosing a
conception of rationality depend entirely on the utility
produced by the actions required by the relevant
13conception. So SR2 should be rejected in favor of SR2*.
SR2 * : A principle of rationality, R, is adequate only if
(i) given that R is one's principle of choice, and (ii) the
utility of choosing a conception of rationality is to
depend solely on the utility of the actions required by
that conception, it is rational to choose R.
The trouble with SR2 * is that clause (ii) lacks
justification. Why accept the restriction it imposes
especially if one is a tenaciously ardent R-rational
person?
Alternatively, it might be rejoined that the problem
would be avoided by wording SR2's right hand side
counterfactually
.
SR2CF: A principle of rationality, R, is adequate only if
were R one's principle of choice for conceptions of
rationality, and were one a person who did not value being
R-rational, it would be rational to choose R.
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SR2CF avoids the original worry only at the expense of
having no relevance at all in assessing teleological
theories given persons' actual values. Why be impressed by
the results of an evaluative test if it requires us to
indulge in the fiction that we are fundamentally different,
in the relevant respect, from what we actually are?
I said above that SR2 has at least two defects. Its
second defect (which also afflicts SR2*
) is that it cannot
be Gauthier's principle of self-support: On Gauthier's
principle SM is not self-supporting. But SR2 allows for
situations in which SM is self-supporting. Gauthier
himself directs our attention to them. 14 These are PD-like
situations that meet certain conditions. The most
important of these conditions, for our purposes at least,
is the counterfactual independence condition. The
condition states that no matter what choice either player
makes he would still make that choice no matter what choice
15the other makes. SFMs who place no special value on
being such maximizers, choosing between SM and CM in such
PD-like situations, would choose the former. A dominance
1
6
argument, Gauthier informs us, establishes this. We need
not here concern ourselves with CM nor with the details of
17
the dominance argument. For the point that needs
recognition is simply that if Gauthier is right, SFMs in
such PD situations who do not value SM, will choose SM over
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a competitor . In these situations SM is therefore self-
supporting.
Under what conditions is SM non—self-supporting? An
answer to this question will conceivably leave us in a
better position to formulate Gauthier's principle. As I
understand him, Gauthier argues that SM fails in the
required way in PD-like situations with "causal" dependence
and with agents who are directly aware of each others'
rational disposition or who at least have a good chance of
correctly identifying the rational disposition of others. 18
But merely specifying the condition in this way is not
enough. One must also suppose, as we have seen, that the
choosers in question must not value being SFMs. So perhaps
Gauthier's principle amounts to this:
SR3 : A principle of rationality, R, is adequate only if
given that R is one's principle of choice, R must be such
that in a PD-like situation with "causal dependence" and
with parties (i) who do not value being R-rational, and
(ii) are directly aware of each others' rational
disposition or are at least in a good position to identify
the rational disposition of others, R is self-supporting.
SR3 seems incredible. Why accept it as a condition of
adequacy for theories of rationality? For starters, it
suffers one of the same defects as does SR2 : It implies
that the acceptability of a theory of rationality - even a
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teleological one - crucially depends on the values of
rational agents. But we saw that this is unacceptable.
For another thing, what's so special about PD-like
situations of the specified sort? More specifically, why
is it that situations of this kind have any significance
when it comes to assessing theories of rationality?
Evidently the reason cannot be that in such situations SM
fails. That would just beg the question against this
theory. Perhaps the thought is this: Persons in the real
world often find themselves in PD-like situations of the
type now under consideration. It may be urged that
situations in which each benefits from mutual cooperation
in relation to mutual non-cooperation, but benefits from
non-cooperation whatever the other does, are situations of
this sort. The relevance of "causal dependence" may be
this: Assuming that each is directly aware of the rational
disposition of his fellows, or at least has a good chance
in identifying the rational disposition of his fellows,
persons disposed not to abide by their agreements to
cooperate when it is best for themselves to do so would be
excluded from cooperative arrangements they would find
advantageous. Those not so disposed may be expected to be
included in such arrangements and so reap benefits which
19
are not otherwise available.
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Even if all this is true, we have failed to be given
any justification to believe that such PD-like situations
are relevant to testing the adequacy of principles of
rationality. Such considerations would be relevant were
our condition of adequacy something like this:
SR4 : A principle of rationality, R, is adequate only if R
does not preclude R-rational agents who are directly aware
of the rational disposition of others, and who do not value
R, from cooperating when such agents find themselves in PD-
like situations with "causal dependence."
Notice, though, that SR4 is not a self-referential
criterion. It does not, for example, mention anything
about self-support. It cannot therefore be Gauthier's
principle. It is, moreover, as controversial as SR3
.
A final comment on SR3 is worth making. Its idea that
a theory of rationality's failing to be self-supporting in
a specified situation is reason enough to reject that
theory seems fundamentally misconceived. It is a mundane
truism that a theory of rationality will probably prescribe
as rational different choices in different situations. In
certain situations, for example, it may be rational for a
SFM to adhere to her rationally made agreements; in other
situations - some PD-like ones perhaps - it may not be.
From this truism nothing seems to follow about the adequacy
or inadequacy of these sorts of theories. Why should
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things be any different when the objects of choice are
conceptions of rationality? Under certain conditions a
theory of rationality may recommend itself as the object of
rational choice. Under other conditions it may not. None
of this though, I think, should lead us to believe that
there is anything out of the ordinary about the relevant
theory, any more than a theory's telling us to do different
things under different conditions should generate suspicion
about that theory.
1.7 An "In Between" Self-support Test
So far I have argued that neither ASS nor RSS is
tenable. ASS runs afoul of "terrorist counterexamples."
RSS succumbs to, amongst other things, Tom-like cases. But
it may now be objected that these two kinds of
counterexample would probably impugn any theory of
rationality. For this very reason such counterexamples, it
could be urged, are not very interesting. They do not
indicate anything particularly amiss with, for example, SM,
or CM, or for that matter any theory of rationality.
Furthermore, at least the second of them is highly unusual
and perhaps even illicit: It is surely a reasonable
demand, the objection may continue, that an evaluation of a
theory of rationality should not be affected by our prior
valuation of that theory. So although the rejection of ASS
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is justified, one need not go as far as RSS . Why not
introduce a new "in between" notion of self-support, the
AASS or "almost always self-supporting" notion?
AASS : A principle of rationality, R, is adequate only if
for any agent under any nice R condition, the choice of R
is permitted by R.
A situation is nice R if and only if no agent in it
values or disvalues any agent's being commited to R, and no
agent tries to get any agent to be or not to be so
commited. AASS, it may be claimed, escapes terrorist-like
and Tom-like objections. It also satisfies the requirement
that SM but not CM fail to be self-supporting.
The last claim, however, is not true: Consider SFM
Gullible. Gullible is an "unconditional compiler," a
person who always complies with agreements rationally
entered into. Assume Gullible values being such a person.
Would she renounce SM in favor of CM? Probably not, since
CM enjoins compliance with fair and rational agreements
only with trustworthy others, and not with, for example,
exploiters who will defect from such agreements when doing
so is utility maximizing.
To cope with this problem, the specification of nice R
could be broadened so that a situation is nice R if and
only if no agent in it values or disvalues being commited
to R, or to any non-trivial entailment of R, and no agent
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tries to get any agent to be or not to be so commited. But
this won't do either. Reconsider friend Reasonable,
another SFM . Reasonable values acting on rational precept
RP.
RP: If S ought (rationally) to do a at time tl and S
cannot do a at tl without doing b at an earlier time to, S
ought (rationally) to do b at to.
Prior to choosing between SM and CM Reasonable knows
that he will find himself in a PD-like situation with
Gullible. He knows that the SM-rational thing to do in
such a situation is to confess, and the CM-rational thing
to do (let's suppose) is to remain silent. To act
consistently with RP in this PD-like situation, Reasonable
must choose SM: If he commited himself to CM, he could not
then act SM-rationally nor in a manner consistent with RP
in the expected dilemmatic situation. So the choice of SM
and not CM would maximize the satisfaction of Reasonable's
preference to act consistently with RP.
Of course, one may elect to deal with this hurdle in
the same manner as one dealt with the former, by re-
specifying nice R. But it should be evident, or at least
highly suspect, that such a move would be ad hoc . In the
absence of a non-question begging and non-ad hoc
specification of nice R, AASS is implausible.
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1.8 Does Self-support Matter?
In the last couple of sections I have proposed and
evaluated various principles of self-support. Of these it
is apparently only SR3 that reflects what Gauthier may have
in mind. But even SR3
, I argued, is controversial. In
evaluating these principles I have not attacked the notion
of self-support per se, the notion held in common by each
of them. Rather, my criticisms have been directed to other
specific features of each individual principle. I wish to
conclude by extending criticism to the concept of self-
support itself.
Why might it be thought that a principle of
rationality's not being self-supporting is sufficient to
impugn that principle? The guestion is pressing since the
inference from a principle of rationality's not being self-
supporting, to the conclusion that it is thereby
inadequate, is obviously suspect if not clearly a non-
sequitur . From the fact that a principle of rationality,
R, is not self-supporting in certain circumstances, it does
not seem to follow - at least not on first glance and not
even on second - that R is not adequate. What follows, if
anything, is that under those circumstances it is rational
by R's own terms not to undertake a permanent commitment to
R. But this fails to provide legitimate grounds for
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questioning R's adequacy. An extra premise is required to
sustain the charge of inadequacy, one to the effect that
If it is R-rational not to undertake a permanent commitment
to R, then R is not adequate.
This premise, however, is false or at least extremely
contentious. If Gilligan, for example, were so
psychologically constituted that were he to undertake a
permanent commitment to R - supposing R to be his principle
of choice - he would suffer paroxysms of mental anguish, it
would be R-rational for him not to do so. Why should any
of this, though, lead us to believe that R is defective?
A final reply to our question is this: It is
desirable as "fully rational" agents to subject our
theories of rationality themselves to rational assessment.
However, it seems impossible to appeal to further standards
to do so. But then, it might be urged, the only way in
which we can assess our ultimate theories is self-
referentially - is it rational by the theory's own terms
for a person to choose it?
Grant it is not possible to assess utlimate principles
of rationality by appealing to further standards. Even so,
the response is flawed: Such impossibility does not entail
the view advocated by the reply. Exactly how our basic
principles of practical reason are to be evaluated, if at
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all, is a difficult and perplexing question. But without
additional reasons than those provided by this reply, there
seems to be nothing compelling about the recommendation
that the sole means to assess ultimate principles is self-
referentially .
1.9 The Unresolved Compliance Problem
I ended the last chapter on this note: Gauthier
cannot solve the compliance problem by relying on the
"choice argument." That argument fails. He might,
nevertheless, insist (correctly) that (under specific
conditions) it is CM-rational to comply with your
rationally made agreements. If you have made a rational
agreement with your trustworthy partner to do the
cooperative thing in a PD-like situation, then CM requires
that you comply with that agreement. If you are a SFM you
should not be impressed by this fact, not unless you have
been given reason to believe that SM but not CM is
defective, or that CM is a better theory, in the light of
an acceptable comparative test, than SM. The evaluative
tests for conceptions of rationality that we have
considered in this chapter won't help here. They do not
show that SM is defective. Nor do they establish the
superiority of CM to SM.
The compliance problem remains a problem.
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Notes
1. David Gauthier, "Reason And Maximization," Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 4 (1975), 411-433, p. 431.
2. Aware that his substantive theory of justice will
conflict with our moral intuitions about concrete cases,
Gauthier tells us to trust his theory over our intuitions.
(David Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (1986), Oxford:
Clarendon Press, p. 269) Presumably, he would adopt a
similar position with respect to the role of our intuitions
in assessing theories of practical rationality.
3. The extensional equivalence of CM and SM in contexts of
choice for theories of rationality may be explained in this
way: CM, among other things, expresses a principle of
interdependent action - action on the basis of agreement
with others:
[A] person acting interdependently acts rationally
only if the expected outcome of his action affords
each person with whom his action is interdependent
a utility such that there is no combination of
possible actions, one for each person acting
interdependently, with an expected outcome which
affords each person other than himself at least as
great a utility, and himself a greater utility."
["Reason And Maximization," p. 427]
Gauthier explains that "to act independently is to act
interdependently with oneself alone." ("Reason And
Maximization," p. 427) Independent action is therefore a
special case of interdependent action. As a consequence,
with respect to independent action, CM and SM are
extensionally equivalent.
4.
Here's an explanation of these results. Suppose,
first, that T1 and T2 are extensionally equivalent in
parametric contexts. Then there are three possibilities:
(i) Both recommend a choice of Tl. Then T1 is chosen and
so Tl is better. (ii) Both recommend a choice of T2
.
Then T2 is chosen, and so T2 is better. (iii) Both
recommend either Tl or T2 . Then neither is better than the
other - they tie. Suppose, next, that Tl and T2 are not
extensionally equivalent. Then Tl is not better than T2
,
and T2 is not better than Tl. I'm calling this outcome "a
tie . "
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5. See Chapter 5, section 1.5.2, this thesis.6.
In Morals By Agreement
, pp. 181-182, Gauthier says
this
:
If we fall into a society - or rather into a state
of nature - of straightforward maximizers, then
constrained maximization, which disposes us to
justice, will indeed be of no use to us, and we
must then consult only the direct dictates of our
own utilities. In a world of Fooles, it would not
pay to be a constrained maximizer, and to comply
with one's agreements. In such circumstances it
would not be rational to be moral.
But if we find ourselves in the company of
reasonably just persons, then we too have a reason
to dispose ourselves to justice.
7. See sections 1.6 and 1.7 below.
8. "Reason And Maximization," p. 430.
9. "Reason And Maximization," p. 429.
10. If this is true, then in the interests of accuracy RSS
should be interpreted thusly:
RSS: Principle of rationality, R, is self-supporting =df.
for some agents, under certain conditions, the choice of R
would be permitted by R.
11. Howard Sobel makes a very similar observation on page
685 in J. Howard Sobel, "Interaction Problems for Utility
Maximizers," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1975), 677-
688 .
12. Gauthier holds that the content of a person's
preferences is beyond rational assessment. (Morals By
Agreement . pp. 25, 34, 48).
13. The concept of the expected utility of a conception of
rationality may be elucidated in this way: The expected
utility of a conception of rationality may be identified
with the expected utility of the act of undertaking a
permanent commitment to that conception. Suppose R and R*
are conceptions of rationality. Suppose S is an agent
contemplating a choice of conceptions. The expected
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utility for S of R is calculated in this fashion: consider
all the possible outcomes of choosing R. For each,
consider the utility of that outcome. For each, consider
the probability of that outcome given that R is chosen.
Multiply, for each, the utility and the probability. Add
these products. The sum is the expected utility of R for
S.
Clause (ii) of SR2* restricts the outcomes of choosing
a principle of rationality to actions.
14. Morals By Agreement
. p. 173.
15. I owe this formulation of the counterfactual
independence condition to Professor Fred Feldman.
16. Morals By Agreement, pp. 172-173. In the last chapter
(section 1.5.3), I expressed reservations about this
conclusion of Gauthier's. I there suggested that in PD
situations that satisfy the counterfactual independence
condition and in which deception is not possible, SFMs
choosing between SM and CM will be indifferent between
these two theories.
17. For an explanation of CM, see footnote 5 above, and
section 1.3, Chapter 5, this thesis.
18. See Argument ( 2 ) . in Morals By Agreement . p. 172, and
the subsequent discussion on p. 173. Again, I disagree
with Gauthier here: In PD-like situations with transparent
SFMs, and in which deception is not possible, such
maximizers will again choose either theory when confronted
with a choice between SM and CM. See Chapter 5, section
1.5.3. I will proceed, though, as if Gauthier is right -
that in such situations, SM fails to be self-supporting.
19. See Morals By Agreement , p. 173 and p. 183. I have
different views about this matter that I present in section
1.5.3 in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 7
THE RATIONAL CREDENTIALS OF THE CHOICE THEORY OF MORAL
JUSTIFICATION
1 . 1 Introduction
The moral sceptic and his collegue - Hobbes' Fool,
question the rational credentials of morality. In fact,
they do more. They reject all moral requirements as
"unjustified," because these requirements interfere with
their pursuit of self-interest. Considerations of rational
self-interest, they believe, provide the sole legitimate
grounds for action. The contractarian strategy of Gauthier
(and of others) to convince the amoralist otherwise, is to
show that acknowledgment of at least some moral constraints
is required by the very conception of reason endorsed by
the amoralist.
The last couple of chapters have raised a question
about the rational credentials of a theory of practical
rationality itself. If we are to believe Gauthier, there
are different standards of reason. There is the standard
of SM accepted by the Fool and his sceptical friends and
there is its rival, CM. In adopting this position,
Gauthier does the Fool one better: While the Fool eschews
morality, he acccepts reason as unproblematic. Gauthier's
scepticism - at least his initial scepticism, extends even
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further - theories of practical reason themselves fall
within its ambit.
To successfully deflate the Fool's amoralism, then,
Gauthier must undertake at least a two-fold task. Not only
must he show that morality can be "derived" from a theory
of practical rationality, he must also establish the
acceptability of the very theory of reason on which
morality is to be "founded."
Morals By Agreement offers a unified contractarian
scheme for the "justification" of both a morality and a
theory of practical rationality. In this final chapter on
Gauthier, I look more closely at this justificatory scheme.
In so doing, I continue - in part - the discussion of the
last chapter on assessing theories of practical
rationality. But I now come at this issue from a slightly
different angle.
1.2 Theories of Moral Justification
One of the central tasks, if not the central task, of
Morals By Agreement is
to seek to prove that principles of action that
prescribe duties overriding advantage [i.e. moral




The issue of what we mean when we say that a morality is
"justified" is interesting because controversial. A few
possible answers are these:
The epistemic answer says that a morality, M, is
justified for a person, S, at time, t, if and only if S is
epistemical ly justified in believing that M is true at t.
In other words, a justified moral theory is one that we are
epistemically justified in accepting.
Another answer is the moral one. A moral theory, M,
is justified for S at t if and only if it is morally right
for S to accept M at t. In this case, some higher order
moral theory would be required to determine whether it
would be morally right for S to accept M at t.
A third answer might be a sort of "best from the point
of view of our intuitions" answer. The idea here is to try
to see that you have landed on a set of beliefs that you
will be able to "live with" come what may. Perhaps what is
here being sought is a moral theory that seems to capture
how we really feel about morality at the deepest level.
The "functional" answer assumes that a morality has a
function and that it is justified for S at t if and only if
it fulfils its function at t.
The last on the list of possibilities I canvass is the
"abstract rationality" answer. According to this answer,
moral theory M is justified for S at t if and only if it
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would be rational, in some sense of 'rational, ' for S to
accept M at t. Maybe S's life, for instance, would go
better for S if S were to accept M than if S were to accept
any other morality. Alternatively, perhaps S's preferences
would be satisfied to a greater extent than they would be
were S to choose some other theory. From the fact that it
would be rational for you to accept M, it does not follow
that you have any evidence that M is true. You may well
have plenty of evidence that M would maximally satisfy your
preferences if you were to choose it. But that is
different from having evidence that M is true. It is in
this respect that this "choice" conception of justification
differs in an essential way from the epistemic one.
I believe the notion of justification appealed to in
Morals By Agreement is the abstract rationality one. In
fact, Professor Gauthier appears to use something like this
notion to justify not only moralities but, paradoxical as
it may seem, theories of rationality as well. 1 I argue in
this chapter that this conception of justification
generates problems for Gauthier and like-minded theorists
who endorse a view of values as "subjective." It also
engenders difficulties for theorists who espouse an
"ob j ectivist " axiology. More specifically, I attempt to
show three things: (1) Choice theory in conjunction with
an objectivist axiology runs afoul of the "morality is not
itself justified" (MJ) objection. This is the objection,
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roughly, that from the fact that a person is justified in
accepting a morality, possibly because choice of that
morality for the person is rational, it does not follow
that that morality is itself justified relative to that
person. If values are objective, there may well be reasons
rejecting a morality as unjustified, even if choice of
that morality for any person is rational. (2) When the
object of justification is a theory of rationality, and if
choice theory appropriately modified is held in conjunction
with a subjectivist axiology and a criterion specifying a
necessary condition of adequacy for theories of
rationality, choice theory is also open to an MJ-like
objection. (3) In cases in which the object of
justification is a morality, and the choice of a morality
is to be made from a set of theories, some of which are
moral and some of which are not, choice theory in
association with a subjectivist axiology is again
vulnerable to an MJ sort of objection.
1.3 Gauthier ' s Abstract Choice Theory
This section elaborates the version of choice theory
to which Gauthier subscribes. Although the passage does
not explicitly mention anything about justification, it's
fairly clear that Gauthier advocates choice theory when he
says
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Rawls' idea, that principles of justice are the
objects of a rational choice, is indeed one that we
shall incorporate into our theory [W]e shall
represent the choice as a bargain or agreement
among persons [W]e claim to generate morality
as a set of rational principles for choice. We are
committed to showing why an individual
, reasoning
from non-moral premisses, would accept the
constraints of morality on his choices. (M by A, 5)
The justification of a morality, Gauthier tells us, is
to proceed in relation to a group of rational egoists whose
goal is to maximize individual value. Somewhat
surprisingly, Gauthier believes that goal must be achieved
by validating "the conception of morality as a set of
rational, impartial constraints on the pursuit of
individual interest." (M by A, 8, my emphasis.) The
rationale for constraint is contractarian:
Morals by agreement offer a contractarian
rationale for distinguishing what one may and may
not do. (M by A, 9) [T]he appeal to rational
choice enables us to state, with new clarity and
precision, why rational persons would agree ex ante
to constraining principles, what general
characteristics these principles must have as
objects of rational agreement, and why rational
persons would comply ex post with the agreed
constraints." (M by A, 10)
The "weak and widely accepted" theory of rational
choice on the basis of which individuals are to select
principles is straightforward maximization (SM) . Let's
remind ourselves about SM. On this theory a person chooses
rationally if and only if she maximizes her expected
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utility. (M by A, 182) The utility of an outcome, O, of
some action, a, for some agent, S, is the value of 0 for S.
r^e —xpected utility of an action, a, for some agent, S,
can be conceptualized as a measure of the extent to which
the various outcomes that could result were S to do a,
would satisfy S's considered preferences for those
outcomes. Considered preferences . Gauthier says, are those
"that would pass the test of reflection and experience."
(M by A, 31, 21-26) The expected utility of a for S is to
be calculated by appeal to probabilities on S's evidence
regarding the extent to which the various outcomes of a
would generate satisfactions of S's considered preferences.
The abstract rationality conception of justification,
CT, underlying Morals By Agreement can now be formulated
more perspicuously in this fashion:
CT: A morality, M, is justified in relation to the members
of a group if and only if it is rational for each member of
that group both to accept M and to comply with M, given
their considered preferences and their particular
circumstances of choice.
2
I said that Gauthier appears to use a version of
choice theory to justify not only moralities but theories
of rationality as well. He argues that "constrained
maximization" (CM) is to be preferred to SM on the grounds
that the former and not the latter would be chosen (under
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suitably specified conditions of choice) by SM-rational
agents if they were to choose between them. Let PR be
either a theory of morality or a theory of rationality.
Then (abridging for convenience) Gauthier would probably
accept principle CTR:
CTR. PR is justified in relation to the members of a group
if and only if it is rational for each member of that group
to accept PR.
The link between rational choice theory and the choice
theory of justification should now be evident. There is,
in addition, an interesting connection between rational
choice theory - at least the kind of maximizing theory held
by Gauthier - and value theory, and in consequence, an
interesting connection between the choice conception of
justification and axiologies. Let me first sketch this
connection and then elucidate the theories of value
commanding our interest.
I explained that Gauthier accepts a theory of rational
choice that identifies rationality (at least in parametric
contexts) with the maximization of a person's expected
utility. Think of expected utility in the manner I
recommended as a measure of a person's preferences for
various possible outcomes realizable in action. Gauthier
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equates this measure with value. He holds that outcomes
have value in virtue of being desired or preferred.
It appears to be Gauthier's view that any SM-rational
agent, selecting among principles that are to govern his
interaction with others, would select the principle of
minimax relative concession (MMRC)
.
3
MMRC, he tells us, is
a principle of distributive justice. Furthermore, he
believes that any constrained maximizer but no SFM
, would
comply with MMRC's "interest-constraining" prescriptions
when called upon to do so. So at least part of CT as
conceived by Gauthier, the part saying that any rational
agent would accept a moral principle, is to be understood
as claiming that the selection of a particular morality
would maximize the value of each member of that group. We
can properly speak of each member's value since Gauthier
believes that the expected utilities of individuals are not
interpersonally comparable. (M by A, 134, 135) As far as
compliance is concerned, matters are more complicated.
Here I think CT must be construed as saying that it is CM-
rational for each member of a group to comply with a moral
principle that it is SM-rational for each to select,
provided the others are ready to comply as well.
In contrast to Gauthier's "subjectivism,"
"objectivism" denies that value is "created" by preference.
On this rival view, states of affairs can have value
independently of being preferred or desired by anyone.
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Rationality would then be concerned with the maximization
of such "objective" value. The notion of maximizing
objective value would, of course, have to be explained in
an acceptable fashion. CT would then have to be
interpreted as recommending that a morality is justified
either s imp
1
iciter or in relation to a group of persons if
and only if if there is no alternative having a higher
degree of objective value than it has.
1.4 Subjectivism and Objectivism
The distinction between subjectivism and objectivism
needs refinement in order better to apprehend the contrast
between the two. Gauthier explains that
To conceive of value as dependent on affective
relationships is to conceive of value as
subjective . (M by A, 47)
Value on this conception is a measure of
[considered] preference. A measure depends for its
existence on what it measures - no preference, no
value [OJbjects or states of affairs may be
ascribed value only in so far as, directly or
indirectly, they may be considered as entering into
relations of preference. Value is then not an
inherent characteristic of things or states of
affairs, not something existing in a manner
quite independent of persons and their activities.
Rather, value is created or determined through
preference. (M by A, 46-47)
A consequence of this view is that
a state of affairs is characterized not by a single
value, but by a set of values, one for each person
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into whose preferences it does or may enter. Value
does not afford a single uniform measure of
preference but a measure relative to each valuer.
(M by A, 25. See also p. 49 in this work.)
The passages show that the subjectivist theory in
consideration is complex, having many tenets the most
significant of which for our purposes are these:
SI: Value cannot exist independently of persons.
S2 : States of affairs have value only in relation to the
desires, feelings, hopes, fears, aversions etc. of persons.
More succinctly, states of affairs have value only in
relation to the affections of persons.
S2 specifies the particular feature of persons that
according to this variety of subjectivism is essential to
the existence of value.
S3: The value of a state of affairs for a person is
identical to the value, if any, that that state of affairs
has for that person. A state of affairs, SI, has value for
a person, P, if and only if P has a considered preference
for SI.
A variant of this kind of subjectivist theory holds that a
state of affairs has value for a person if and only if it
is desired by the person. On either variant, what is to be
stressed is that a thing has its value relative to a person
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iri virtu© of the fact that the person values the
Preferences or desires, we might say, create value.
States of affairs, if they exemplify what we could call
"derived value" in relation to some person, do so in virtue
of the fact that the person prefers them. On this view,
values are to states of affairs as secondary properties
like redness are to physical objects. There are other
types of subjectivist theory. The kinds of theory,
however, to which I confine attention are the ones just
described. I shall hereafter take 'subjectivism' to denote
theories of this sort.
Opposed to subjectivism is objectivism.
To conceive of value as objective is to conceive of
it as existing independently of the affections of
sentient beings (M by A, 47)
The objectivist may insist that there is a
necessary linkage between sentient beings and
value, holding that value provides the norm for our
affections. The proper object of preference is,
and is necessarily, the good. But this link, on
the objectivist view, is not found within sentient
affection, but ties that affection to something
else which in itself affords the ground of the tie.
This other terminal of the link (and we shall not
impose on the objectivist a particular account of
what it is) must be independent of sentient beings
and their affections, even though linked to them.
In our discussion, we shall designate this alleged
other terminal, obi ective value . (M by A, 56)
Departing somewhat from the characterization of
objectivism summarized in these passages, an objectivist
need deny neither SI nor S2. An objectivist hedonist, for
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example, may contend that if there were no sentient beings
and their affections, nothing could have value. Other
objectivists would reject both SI and S2. Thus if one
believed that the 11 form" of The Good endows states of
with value, and that there is no necessary
connection between persons' affections and The Good . then
one would have no reason to accept either SI or S2.
The common strand of all objectivist theories is the
denial of the "derived-value" thesis, S3. States of
affairs, according to these theories, do not have value in
virtue of being desired or preferred by anyone. This
should be clear in relation to theories of the platonic
variety, an example of which we just noted. But theories
like objective hedonism also deny S3: A hedonist may hold
that the state of affairs, S, Tom takes pleasure in surfing
at time t, has intrinsic value. If S did in fact have
value, if it were intrinsically good, it would be so
independently of being desired or preferred by anyone, Tom
included. That is of course not to deny that S's goodness
may cause some person, perhaps Tom, to desire it. But some
person's desiring S, or deriving pleasure from S, the
objectivist insists, cannot "endow" S with value. We may
now formulate objectivism in this way:
Objectivism: The value of a state of affairs, S, is an
objective property of S. F is an obi ect ive property of S
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=df. S has F, and S does not have F in virtue of any
perons s desiring S, or wanting S, or deriving pleasure
from S, or - generalizing somewhat barbarously - seeing to
it that S has "derived value."
1-5 A Preliminary Observation
Consider the choice theory of justification, CT, held
in association with a subjectivist account of value. CT
(abbreviated for ease of exposition) states that a
morality, M, is justified in relation to the members of a
group, G, if and only if it is rational for each member of
G to accept M. Embracing a subjective account of value,
Gauthier imposes no substantive constraints on the states
of affairs rational agents may prefer and so value.
Indeed, he holds that the contents of persons 7 considered
preferences cannot be rationally assessed. (M by A, 25,
26, 34) Given this freedom from constraint, it is
unlikely, as I argued in Chapter 5, that SFMs will
unanimously choose the same moral principles to constrain
their interactions. The reason for this, roughly, being
that their considered preferences for states of affairs,
unless by an happy coincidence or as a mere matter of
contingent fact, will not all be identical. In that case,
no morality would be justified for the relevant group.
211
This preliminary observation aside, there is an
objection to the necessary and sufficient conditions on
moral justification enunciated by CT that I now wish to
develop. I first show how this sort of objection - the MJ
objection - afflicts CT held in combination with an
objectivist theory of value. I then argue that when the
object of justification is either a morality or a theory of
rationality, choice theory in conjunction with a
subjectivist axiology, together with certain additional
considerations, succumbs to a similar problem.
1.6 Choice Theory and Objectivism
Consider a simplified version of choice theory, CTS,
according to which a morality, M, is justified in relation
to a person, S, if and only if the choice of M by S is
rational. Does S's rational choice of M suffice to justify
M itself? Is such rational choice even necessary to its
justification? The answers are fairly evident if CTS is
considered in conjunction with an objectivist account of
value. Suppose "platonic" objectivism is true so that the
form of The Good determines what is good. Suppose,
further, that there is no necessary connection between
person's preferences and The Good . In Gauthier's
terminology, assume that value does not provide a "norm"
for our preferences; the proper object of our preferences
is not necessarily The Good . Then it is entirely possible
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that although S's choice of M would be justified because
rational, such a choice would not serve to justify M
itself. There could well be independent reasons that
undermined the tenability of M itself, reasons in one way
or another having to do with objective value. An example
might be useful. Since we are assuming objectivism is
true, let's also not implausibly assume that there is a
true morality, act utilitarianism. Let act utilitarianism
be the theory that an act is right if and only if none of
its alternatives has a higher utility than it has. Let the
utility af an act, a, be the result of subtracting all the
units of intrinsic badness, if any, from all the units of
intrinsic goodness, if any, that would result if a were
performed. Ignoring certain complications, let relativism
be the theory that an act is right if and only if it is
permitted by the conventions of its society. Suppose
choice of the latter and not the former theory would
maximize S's expected utility if S were to choose between
the two. Then it should be clear that although S's choice
of relativism would be rational, this theory would not
itself be (objectively) justified - relativism, by
stipulation, is false. If values are objective, then it
seems proper to require that a theory be justified only if
it bears some important relation to objective value.
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Suppose objective value did provide a norm for our
preferences. In fact, assume these to be true: For any
states of affairs, Si and S j , and for any agent, p, p
prefers Si to Sj if and only if si is better than Sj . For
any states of affairs, Si and S j , Si is better than Sj if
and only is Si has a higher degree of intrinsic goodness
than S j . Now, once again, suppose the choice of M were to
maximize the satisfaction of S's, in fact anyone's,
considered preferences and so were to gualify as rational.
In this case wouldn't M itself be justified? I don't think
so: There is a difference between the objective value of
the choice of M, and the objective value of the actions M
tells you to do or the objective value of M itself. It
would be true that if the choice of M were maximally to
satisfy anyone's considered preferences, its choice would
be objectively better than the choice of any alternative.
But that, I think, wouldn't support the further distinct
desideratum that M itself were justified. I may be wrong
here. Suppose, then, that in the case now under scrutiny M
itself were justified. Even then there is a problem: M
would be justified on what is now the supposition that it
were beter than alternatives. That it would be better in
this fashion, though, would be an objective fact, true
independently of any choice of any person. Assume, now,
that objective values do provide a norm for preferences,
but assume also that most rational preferences happen to
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violate the norm. Then rational choice of a morality does
not guarantee that the morality is objectively justified.
So it seems that if values are objective, a rational
choice of a morality does not show the morality itself to
be justified. At best, it shows that the choice of the
morality is justified. If I am right about this, then the
abstract rationality account of justification is not
neutral among conceptions of value. 6 It may be held in
association with an objective theory of value only on pain
of falling prey to the foregoing objection.
1.7 Choice Theory and Theories of Rationality
Gauthier uses the abstract rationality theory to
defend not only moralities but theories of rationality as
well. So let's evaluate the appropriate form of choice
theory as it is used in this capacity. To do so, consider
a simplified version of CTR, CTRS
,
which says that a theory
of rationality, PR, is justified in relation to a person S
if and only if the choice of PR by S is SM-rational. In
addition to being a principle of rational choice, PR may
also be a moral principle as it may satisfy criteria for
being such a principle. So, for example, if PR constrains
one's pursuit of self-interest, is ’’rationally justified,"
and is "impartial," Gauthier would probably acknowledge
that it is a moral principle. (M by A, 3, 4) I introduce
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this complexity because Gauthier believes that the choice
of CM and not SM (under specified conditions) is utility
maximizing for any SM-rational agent. (M by A, 157-189)
Furthermore
, he believes that CM is a moral principle.^
There are two main variants of CTRS that demand
attention. There is the variant that results if CTRS
stands on its own, and the one generated if CTRS is held in
tandem with a criterion of adequacy for theories of
rationality. We examined something very similar to the
first of these variants in sections 1.3 and 1.4 in Chapter
6. In these sections we discussed CT and various
modifications of CT . CT says that a theory of rationality
is adequate only if choice of it is rational. If we
replace 'adequate' with 'justified,' then CT so amended is
part of CTRS; CTRS implies that a necessary condition of a
theory of rationality's being justified in relation to a
person is that choice of the theory by that person is
rational. But we saw that CT is defective. So the first
sort of variant of CTRS must also be defective.
Now consider the second variant. Suppose CTRS is held
in conjunction with (i) a subjectivist axiology, and (ii),
a criterion of adequacy, C, for theories of rationality.
The criterion may be something like this: A theory of
rationality is adequate only if absolutely self-
supporting. The notion of absolute self-support is to be
understood in this way: Principle of rationality, R, is
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absolutely self supporting —df. for any agent under any
conditions, the choice of R would be permitted by R. it is
reasonable to require that a justified conception of
rationality at least satisfy a criterion of adequacy for
any such conception. How can a justified conception fail
in this respect? In light of this constraint, CTRS may be
modified to the view that
PR is justified in relation to S if and only if (i) the
choice of PR by S is rational, and (ii), PR satisfies C.
Call this principle CTRS*. Formulated in this way, a
problem with CTRS* may now be fairly obvious. There is no
guarantee that a precept of practical rationality will
satisfy both conditions (i) and (ii). A precept that
satisfies condition (i), for instance, may fail to satisfy
condition (ii). In such a case, although the choice of the
relevant precept would be justified, the precept itself
would not be justified. Let's consider an example. Let PR
be CM and let C be the criterion of absolute self-support.
Then CTRS* tells us that CM is justified in relation to
some agent, S, just in case S's choice of CM maximizes S's
utility, and CM is absolutely self-supporting. Gauthier,
as I said before, argues that any SFM, and so S, would
(under appropriate conditions) choose CM as his conception
of rationality if presented with the choice of adopting
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either CM or SM. Assume he is right about this. But CM,
as we saw in the last chapter (refer to section 1.5 of this
chapter)
, is not absolutely self-supporting: If a
terrorist puts a gun to your head and threatens: "If you
adopt CM, I'll kill you," CM prescribes that you ought not
to adopt CM. In such cases, the choice of CM would be
justified because rational. CM, however, would not be
justified, at least not by the lights of CTRS*, because CM
is not absolutely self-supporting.
In addition, CTRS* has another problem. It has the
same defect that undermines the first variant of CTRS, one
to which we alluded above.
1.8 Choice Theory and Subjectivism
The criticism of choice theory just discussed might be
thought to be of limited interest. It is, after all,
primarily meant to show that Gauthier cannot consistently
endorse the appropriate form of choice theory when the
object of justification is a rationality, and some
criterion of self support. It is also designed to caution
us that theories of rationality cannot be justified in the
way in which choice theory recommends. But the problems
with choice theory do not end here. I want, now, to
evaluate its credentials in the most general and
interesting of cases.
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Suppose one wishes to answer Hobbes' Fool who
challenges the rationality of being moral. The Fool
insists that there are certain situations in which one must
act either irrationally or immorally. Some prisoner's
dilemma situations may be situations of this sort.
Suppose, further, that the challenge is to be met by
showing that fully rational persons, SM-rational persons,
would voluntarily agree to restrain their maximizing
activity by choosing to be moral. In Gauthier's words, the
challenge is to be met
by demonstrating that a rational utility
maximizer, faced with the choice between accepting
no constraints on his choices in interaction, and
accepting the constraints on his choices required
by [a particular moral principle, MMRC]
,
chooses
the latter. (M by A, 158)
If this strategy to meet the Fool's challenge is to
succeed, some of the principles among which rational agents
are to choose, as the passage acknowledges, must be
principles requiring no restraint on maximizing activity.
That is, the alternatives among which rational agents are
to choose must not be restricted to moral principles. In
the sorts of cases when choice among alternatives is so
restricted, choice theory loses much of its theoretical
appeal. For much of this appeal, I think, derives from the
hope that the challenge of the moral sceptic like Hobbes'
Fool can be answered by showing that it would be rational
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for any individual, and so for the rational sceptic
himself, to choose to be moral.
So consider the interesting case like the one
discussed by Gauthier and arguably by Hobbes, where
rational agents are to select principles of practical
reason from an "impure set" that has both moral and non-
moral principles as elements. CM and SM, for example,
might be the members of one such set. Let's allow that
some of the members in the impure set are principles that
qualify as both moral principles and principles for
rational choice so that we can accomodate the possibility
that "to choose rationally, one must choose morally." (M
by A, 4) Now let's evaluate choice theory, held in
conjunction with a subjectivist axiology, in cases where
the putative object of justification is a morality to be
selected from an impure set.
It would be misleading to formulate the version of
simplified choice theory here appropriate in this way:
CT*: A morality, M, is justified in relation to S if and
only if S's choice of M is rational.
CT* is misleading because it fails to alert us to the fact
that choice of a morality is to be made from an impure set.
A better formulation would be this:
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CTheory: P is a justified morality in relation to S if and
only if (i) the choice of p by S from an impure set is
rational, and (ii), P satisfies necessary and sufficient
conditions for being a morality.
If we are concerned to answer Hobbes' Fool, choice of
principles must be made from an impure set. Clause (i)
records this requirement. Since principles are to be
selected from an impure set, it is possible that a rational
choice may result in a principle that is non-moral. In
order to be a justified morality . though, the principle
whose choice is rational must be a principle that is a
moral one. Clause (ii) is sensitive to this demand.
Formulated in this appropriate fashion, however, it
appears that CTheory is afflicted with one of the same
sorts of difficulty that is damaging to CTRS*: There is no
guarantee that a principle that satisfies the condition
specified by clause (i) in CTheory also satisfies the
condition specified by clause (ii). Again, examples will
be helpful. Let the members of the impure set from which
principles are to be selected be SM and CM. SM is not
"interest-constraining." It is therefore, as Gauthier
agrees, not a moral principle. If any morality, then, is
justified CM must be justified, since it is the sole moral
principle in the impure set now under consideration.
However, in Chapter 5, we saw that under certain conditions
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the choice of SM and not CM is rational. A person, S, who
values acting in accord with SM and who hates CM, for
example, would do best if he were to choose SM. Here's
another example: Suppose S knew that he would find himself
in exactly one PD situation in which his partner, Gullible,
would do the cooperative thing come what may. S would
again do best if he were to settle for SM. By adopting SM
but not CM, S could exploit Gullible. In these cases,
although the choice of SM would be justified because
rational, the object of choice would not itself be a
justified morality. CTheory, it appears, yields incorrect
results. To evade this worry, one might invoke Desperate:
Desperate: For any impure set, #, and any member, pi of #,
and any agent s, if s's choice of pi is rational, then pi
is a moral principle.
Desperate is false as the examples above demonstrate. Not
only is it false, it cannot be appealed to with propriety
without begging the question against Hobbes' Fool.
If CTheory is the correct version of abstract
rationality theory underlying Morals By Agreement , then I




Gauthier has failed to provide Butch and Sundance with
adequate justification to believe that they will be able to
escape the PD. Even if they were to become constrained
maximizers, they would do no better than they would have
done had they remained straightforwardly rational. Even as
constrained maximizers, the rational thing to do in the
authentic PD in which they are is to confess.
A note from the underground surreptitiously reaches
our felons. It urges them not to loose hope. Word has
leaked out that resolute agents can overcome PDs. Is there






1 . 1 Introduction
Edward McClennen has recently argued that the one-shot
PD is "resolvable." 1 it is resolvable in the sense that
fully rational agents are able to do whatever it takes to
achieve an optimal outcome. His solution to the dilemma is
meant to provide rational agents who face such a dilemma
with a rationale for cooperation. It would also provide,
if tenable, what we might take to be a vindication of the
claim that it is rational to be moral.
McClennen tells us that (like David Gauthier) he has
"become persuaded that there is a need for a reappraisal of
the requirements of rational choice as typically
presented." (PD and RC, 95) Unlike Gauthier who
(according to McClennen) argues for cooperation by
appealing to the notion of maximizing expected utility at
the level of dispositions to choose, (Ibid.) he argues for
it on the basis of "maximizing utility at the level
of particular choice, but that this utility is
contextually dependent on the nature of the choice
situation." (Ibid.) His arguments are, consequently, of
special interest to this thesis. But do they succeed? I
believe not - for reasons that I will shortly present.
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McClennen provides a diagnosis of what he conceives to
be the central problem with SM, a problem he thinks that
clearly surfaces when the theory is extended to "dynamic
choice situations" in which agents are called upon to make
a sequence of choices over time. It is this shortcoming of
SM, he believes, that ultimately prevents SM-rational
agents from escaping the dilemma. He then proposes his
solution which appeals to the notion of rationality as
"resolute choice."
In this chapter I begin with an explanation of the
problem McClennen finds with SM - in a nutshell, that SM
fails to satisfy a criterion of adequacy for conceptions of
rationality. I then summarize the theory of resolute
choice. Finally, I challenge McClennen's claim that
rational agents who choose resolutely do better in PDs of a
certain variety than do agents who choose in a
straightforward fashion.
1.2 McClennen's Assessment of SM
The fault with SM, at least with the theory as it is
normally construed, McClennen thinks, has to do with its
requiring that
on each occasion calling for decision, [persons
or selves] maximize with respect to an antecedently
and exogenously specified preference function given
(again from the perspective of that same occasion




An example of decision making in dynamic contexts will
help illuminate the difficulty. Consider the case of
Ulysses and the Sirens.
As Ulysses approaches the island of the Sirens, he
has no desire to be detained by them; but if he
acts on his present preferences (to get home as
quickly and as inexpensively as possible)
,
he faces
a problem. He is informed that once he hears the
Sirens, he will want to follow them. Since here
,
now he does not desire to have this happen, he
precommits. He buys wax to stop up the ears of his
sailors, good strong hemp with which to have
himself bound to the mast, and (what is perhaps
most costly of all) arranges for his first-mate to
act as his agent
It may be objected that [this tale]
describes a case in which the self is thought to be
temporarily overcome by some irrational (or non-
rational) force. But [w]e have only to suppose
that Ulysses realizes that he is in a situation in
which he can predict that his preferences will
undergo a specific change. (PD and RC, 98-99)
In tree diagram form, Ulysses' problem looks like this:
(c) Ignore Sirens 03
( Best)
(a) Sail on 0 node 1 (nl)
(d) Give in 02
(Worst)
0 (b) Precommit 01
node 0 (nO) (Second best)
time = to at nO time = tl at nl
Figure 8.1 Ulysses' Tree Diagram
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In such "dynamic" contexts of choice the SFM acts as
what McClennen calls a "sophisticated chooser." Such an
agent chooses at the outset - node 0 in our example - a
plan consisting of a sequence of actions that maximizes the
satisfaction of the preferences of his present self against
the expected independent maximizing behavior of his future
self. Assume Ulysses is a sophisticated chooser. What
sequence of actions should he select at the first choice
point in his decision tree? Ulysses then has three
alternatives that we may represent as ac, ad, and b. If he
were to choose the course of action that is best from the
vantage point of nO
,
he would choose ac. But Ulysses is
aware that this plan of action is not feasible. He is
aware that if he were to reach node 1, he would be in the
grips of the singing sisters and so would be unable to do c
as the best-from-nO plan requires. Expressed somewhat
differently, Ulysses as a sophisticated chooser is
cognizant that his future self at nl will act in accord
with the best-from-nl plan available to it then. Knowing
this, he now knows that ac is not feasible for his present
self. But as of to each of ad and b is feasible. Since
Ulysses is a maximizer, he does best by choosing b as of
that time. McClennen summarizes the sophisticated approach
to dynamic choice in this way:
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a [sophisticated] chooser regiments his ex ante
choice to his projected ex post choices. That is,
he makes a projection of how he will be disposed at
nl to choose from the options available at nl, a
projection that is presumably independent of how he
is disposed at nO to choose from the plans
available at nO
, and he takes this projection to
condition the feasibility of plans available at nO.
(DC and R, 9)
It will be helpful to introduce some terminology:
Assume that agent, s, is in a dynamic choice context in
which s has to make a sequence of choices over time.
Assume that s's problem to choose among the various courses
of action can be represented by a tree diagram. Call the
choice situation that this diagram describes "s's decision
tree .
"
(1) A plan is a set of directives that specifies what is
to be done as of a time at each choice point in a decision
2tree. An agent implements a plan if and only if she acts
in accord with each of its directives.
Let T be a decision tree and let A be a set of plans
pi, ,pi, in T. Let nl, ,ni be the nodes in T and
let tl, ,ti be the times corresponding to nl, ,ni.
Assume in other words, that s will be at nl at tl and for
any i>l, s will be, if s ever is, at ni+1 at ti+l, at ni+2
at ti+2 and so on. To facilitate matters, it will be
helpful to think of a plan as an ordered n-tuple of
actions, P, available at a time to s in T. The number of
members in P = the number of nodes, as of a particular
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time, at which s could be in T. So, for example, if at to
there are eleven nodes nO, ,nlO at which s could be in
T, then the plans available to s as of to will have eleven
members, aO, ,alO. Assume, in addition, that were s to
implement such a plan at to, s would do aO at to, al at tl,
and so on.
(2) The expected utility of plan p for s in T is the sum
of the s-expected utility of all the actions in p.
3
(3) Plan p is adequate for s in T as of time t if and only
if as of t, no alternative plan for s in T has a higher
expected utility for s than p.
(4) Plan p is best for s in T as of t if and only if as of
t, p's expected utility for s in T is higher than the
expected utility for s of all other plans then available to
s
.
Assume, to simplify matters, that as of any time there
are always plans that are best for s in T.
(5) Plan p _is feasible for s in T as of t if and only if
as of t, each of the actions that p specifies s do at each
node in T is such that s can then do that action.
To ascertain whether a plan is feasible as of a time,
we can (unrealistically) view s as determining whether at
each choice point the plan prescribes an action that s is
then able to perform. If s comes across some plan-
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prescribed action at some node that s believes s won't then
be able to do, s discards the plan as not feasible.
Best plans need not be feasible. From the vantage
point of nO, ac is Ulysses' best plan. But this plan is
not feasible for him as it requires that he ignore the
Sirens at tl, something he cannot then do.
These definitions permit a concise characterization of
sophisticated choice . Let ni be a node in s's decision
tree, T. Then as a sophisticated chooser, s selects and
implements the best of the feasible plans available to s in
T at ni as of ti.
We are now in a better position to understand
McClennen's reservations about SM. The SFM acts as a
sophisticated chooser in dynamic contexts. Sophisticated
choice presupposes a separability principle, "SEP." This
principle governs a rational agent's subsequent preferences
in a decision tree. It requires that
what determines preference at any point in a
sequence of decisions to be made is what would
govern preference at that point, were the agent to
confront that choice de novo . as a new decision
problem, i.e., not against the background of any
previous decisions. (CM and RC, 20)
SEP has implications for what plans are feasible for
agents in sequential choice situations. It is SEP, for
instance, that constrains the set of plans available to
Ulysses at his point of initial choice.
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As I understand McClennen, SEP is unacceptable. The
constraint it imposes on rational dynamic choice is
therefore also unacceptable. SEP is not acceptable because
it violates a criterion of adequacy for conditions that
constrain rational choice. In most general terms the
criterion is this:
rational choice [is] choice of efficient means
to given ends I propose to adopt a strong form
of this criterion, according to which a given
condition does not qualify as a constraint on
rational choice unless it can be shown that
violating the condition involves the agent in
choice of means insufficient to his ends. That is,
I take the existence of a pragmatic argument for a
given axiom as not merely sufficient for its
qualifying as a rationality condition but as
necessary . (DC and R, 12)
Reformulated, the criterion says that a condition, C, on
rational choice is adequate if and only if it involves the
agent in a choice of means sufficient to his ends. The
criterion can be amplified, I think, in this way: Let R be
a theory of rationality and let C be a condition
presupposed by R. C, that is, is a necessary condition of
R.
Crit: C is adequate if and if only if there is no
alternative to R, R*, such that (i) R* does not presuppose
C, and (ii), R*-rational agents do better in certain
situations - "hard case situations" - than R-rational
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agents, and (iii) R*-rational agents do at least as well as
R-rat iorial agents in all situations other than hard case
ones
.
Understood in this way, Crit really specifies a standard of
adequacy for theories of rationality. The general
intuition underlying Crit may still be unclear. The
following passage, I believe, sheds some light on this
matter.
such [a sophisticated] agent, unlike the resolute
agent, must forego certain opportunities or expend
valuable resources. This is to say that parametric
reasoning works against such continuing interests
of the agent—that agents who are capable of
adopting and carrying through on plans will do
better, over time, than do those who always reason
parametrically. (CM and RC, 16-17)
Taking our cue from this passage, we can now finally
formulate McClennen's worry about SM: SEP violates Crit.
Since SM is commited to SEP, SM is inadequate. There are
hard case situations in which those who can only choose in
an SM-rational manner will fail to do as well as those who
are capable of being resolute.
To assess this central claim of McClennen's, we need
to say something about hard case situations, and we need to




1 . 3 Hard Case Situations
PD-like situations of a certain sort and relevantly
similar sequential choice situations are the two varieties
of hard case situations. Reconsider Ulysses' case. Think
of his present and future selves as discrete agents each
with "its own agenda of preferences." if we think of one-
person sequential cases in this way, then it is fairly
simple to see that such cases display important
similarities to PDs. As a basis for comparison, consider




Confesses 1,1 10 ,
0
(a) (b)
Remains silent 0,10 9,9
(c) (d)
Figure 8.2 Matrix 8.2




and (d) as "agreement outcomes" that would result were
Butch and Sundance - both SM-rational agents - to agree to
act in a certain fashion and then act in the agreed-on
manner when called upon to do so. Assume Gauthier is right
234
in supposing that the principle of minimax relative
concession (MMRC) governs the ex ante agreement that
underlies a fair and rational cooperative venture. 4 Then
Butch and Sundance, acting on MMRC will both elect to
remain silent; they will do the cooperative thing. On the
assumption that MMRC "expresses the principle of utility
maximization in the context of bargaining," 5 choosing in
accord with the principle should satisfy Butch's and
Sundance's strongest ex ante preferences - their
preferences to cooperate. Now suppose the time comes when
each is called upon to comply with his ex ante agreement.
Each has as his strongest preference at this later time,
the preference to do whatever will maximize his own utility
regardless of the behavior of the other. That is, the
preference of each at this time is determined by SM.
Matrix 8.2 illustrates that no matter what the other does,
each in light of the preferences each now has does best by
not complying. So an argument from dominance yields the
result that each should now confess.
In both this case and the Ulysses' case agents or
selves (whatever the case may be)
,
as SFMs, maximize with
respect to the preferences they have at discrete times. In
addition, in both cases there is a need to coordinate the
preferences between past and future selves if the gains of
an optimal outcome are to be enjoyed: If Butch and
Sundance each has as his strongest ex ante preference and
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as his strongest ex post preference the preference to
cooperate, each would be able to comply with the mutually
beneficial interest-constraining agreement. Similarly, if
it were possible for the preferences of Ulysses' present
self and those of his future self (when the latter existed)
to be coordinated, Ulysses' would be able to disregard the
singing Sirens and sail right by the island.
McClennen's claim is that resolute choosers do better
than SFMs in cases similar to the ones just considered that
meet these conditions: (1) Each agent (or self) knows or
has reasonable grounds for supposing that every agent (or
self) is rational. (2) Agents (or selves) are
"transparent" to each other. That is, an agent is directly
aware not only of the rational disposition of others, but
is also aware, or at least has good assurance, of how the
others will act, given their estimation of how the agent
will act. Deception is therefore impossible. Cases that
satisfy condition (2) are those in which the counterfactual
independence condition is violated. Recall, the condition
states that no matter what choice agents (or selves) make,
an agent (or self) still makes that choice no matter what
choices the others make. This condition would be violated,
for example, if Butch's actions were related to those of
Sundance's in a way depicted by matrix 8.3. (See page 237
below. The numbers indicate conditional probabilities of a
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choice on a choice.) In cases such as these, Butch will
cooperate with Sundance if and only if Butch wants to do
the cooperative thing and he expects Sundance to want to do





Remains silent 0.01 0.99
Figure 8.3 Matrix 8.3
1 . 4 Resolute Choice
McClennen tells us that resolute choice involves
the notion that the agent is a being who continues
over time, with concerns that have some continuity
to them. Such an agent can be understood to view
himself as deliberating over alternative plans .
i.e., seguences of choices to be made over time and
subject to various contingencies, as choosing some
particular plan, and then proceeding, at least in
the normal course of events, to make specific
choices (at different points in time) that serve to
execute or implement the plan chosen. What is
characteristic of such an agent is that his ex post
preferences among available actions are disciplined
or shaped by what he judges, from the perspective
of plans taken as wholes, to be the best plan to
pursue. If such an agent is successful in this
regard, then it can be said that what he chooses ex
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post to do is consistent with what he resolved (or
planned) to do. Such an agent can be described as
a resolute chooser. (CM and RC, 16)
While the sophisticated agent disciplines ex ante
choice to his projection of ex post independently
based choice, the resolute agent disciplines ex
post choice to ex ante choice of a plan. (DC and
R, 10)
Sophisticated choosers do the very best they
can, given the constraints imposed by the need to
adjust present choice to future given behavior.
This is what Ulysses does and what most of us do.
But such an approach to choice involves a
retreat to second-best If Ulysses manages to
save himself from the cursed isle by means of wax,
hemp, and agency arrangements, still he could have
done even better if he had simply resolved to sail
right by the island and pay the singing sisters no
mind. But so, also, if rational players who know
each other to be such do well enough by devising
various precommitment schemes or other devices to
provide one another with incentives to cooperate,
they could do better still by simply resolving to
so cooperate. (PD and RC, 101)
From these passages it is possible to extract an
account of resolute choice : Let ni be a node in s's
decision tree, T. Then as a resolute chooser, s selects
and implements the best plan at s's disoposal in T at ni as
of ti
.
Compare resolute choice with sophisticated choice. As
a sophisticated chooser, s selects and implements the best
of the feasible plans available to s in T at ni. In terms
of our examples, sophisticated Ulysses at nO implements
plan b. In contrast, resolute Ulysses saves himself the
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cost of precommitment
, resolves to ignore the Siren's song,
and then ignores their song. He implements the best-from-
gnO plan, ac. Similarly, each of resolute Butch and
resolute Sundance selects the plan which calls for an agent
to make and keep the interest-constraining agreement, and
then proceeds to implement that plan. SFMs Butch and
Sundance, however, each end up confessing. In this way
resolute agents do better than SFMs similarly situated, at
least so seems to claim McClennen.
1*5 Straightforward Maximizers versus Resolute Agents
This last claim of McClennen's can be challenged.
Consider a hard case PD-like situation with SM-rational
agents Butch and Sundance. Each knows that the other is
SM-rational and each is transparent to the other.
Transparency ensures that the counterfactual independence
condition is violated. We may consequently take matrix 8.3
as accurately portraying the way in which Butch's actions
are related to Sundance's actions: Each will confess if
and only if the other does. Each will remain silent if and
only if the other does. Under conditions of transparency,
as we remarked earlier, it is not possible to dissemble.
It is not possible, for example, for Butch to make an
agreement with Sundance to remain silent with the intention
of not later doing his part. Being transparent, Sundance
would be aware of this intention of Butch's and would
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refuse to make the agreement in the first instance. Assume
that matrix 8.1 is the relevant utility matrix, but this
time assume that numbers represent not expected utilities
but just plain utilities with Butch's values listed first.
The expected utility of confessing for each party is
( 1) ( 0 . 99 ) + ( 0 . 01) ( 10) = 1.09. This is less than the
expected utility of cooperating for each which works out to
( 0) ( 0 . 01) = (9 ) ( 0 . 99 ) = 8.91. On the assumption that it is
SM-rational for each to make an agreement to do the
cooperative thing, SM, under the present assignment of
probabilities and utilities, requires that each keep the
agreement. SFMs will therefore do the "cooperative" thing
in this hard case situation. But then they would do no
worse than they would have done had they chosen resolutely.
For presumably the best plan available to each at the
outset calls for each to make and keep an agreement to do
the "cooperative" thing.
Consider the case of Ulysses. If Ulysses' selves are
transparent to each other, then Ulysses' present self
(let's imaginatively suppose) is aware of the rational
disposition of his future self and (let's suppose again) is
aware of what his future self will do. Ulysses will
therefore sail on and ignore the Sirens if and only if he
now has the desire to do this and he now expects his future
self to have a similar desire as well. But then choosing
240
resolutely or choosing in a sophisticated manner will once
again yield identical results.
Consider, now, a really hard case situation in which
though Butch and Sundance know each other to be SM-
rational
, they are not transparent to each other. So
assume that in this authentic PD situation the
counterfactual independence condition is satisfied. The
SM-rational thing to do here is to violate the agreement to
do the cooperative thing. As I understand McClennen,
resolute choosers in this situation would also fail to
adhere to the interest-constraining agreement. They would
renege since the best plan at the disposal of these agents
sanctions violation: Suppose Butch is debating what plan
to implement. Assume that of the interesting
possibilities, he could implement either the plan that
calls for cooperation, or the one that prescribes reneging.
Which of these is best for him? Suppose Sundance does the
cooperative thing. Then Butch does best by implementing
the latter plan. Suppose Sundance reneges. Then again
Butch does best by implementing the second plan. No matter
what Sundance does, Butch does best by implementing the
second plan. This plan, it seems, is therefore best for
Butch. Since positions are symmetric, the plan is best for
Sundance as well.
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It appears, to collect results, that transparent SM-
rational agents do no worse than transparent resolute
agents in PD-like situations in which the counterfactual
independence condition is violated. The same is true of
"opaque" SM-rational agents in authentic PDs.
It is evident that something has gone wrong here.
These are not the results anticipated by McClennen.
Suppose, in light of this observation, McClennen is
construed as recommending that even in these very hard PD
situations, resolute choosers would adopt and implement a
plan that requires making and keeping an agreement to
remain silent. The notion of what plan is best, assuming
such agents still select and implement best plans as of a
time and a place, would require reinterpretation. It might
then be claimed that such resolute choosers would do better
than would SFMs in a similar position. This claim,
however, would once again be mistaken: Resolute choosers
of this sort would not, contrary to what this proposal
assumes, find themselves in an authentic PD. The
"preference problem" ensures that this is so.
1.6 The Preference Problem
The preference problem arises because of certain
special features of authentic PDs. If agents are to be in
this sort of PD, at least two things must be true. First,
the counterfactual independence condition must be
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satisfied. Second, assuming there is a "cooperative"
outcome, agents must rank their preferences for outcomes
from most preferred to least in this fashion: (1)
Unilateral noncooperation; (2) mutual cooperation; (3)
mutual noncooperation; (4) unilateral performance of the
act the mutual performance of which would result in the
cooperative outcome. Rational agents who face an impending
PD may prefer ex ante to cooperate. They may, for example,
find it advantageous to make an interest-constraining
agreement. But if their ex post preferences to keep the
agreement are stronger than their ex post preferences to
violate unilaterally, then it seems that they would not be
in a genuine PD. The problem of the PD, after all, has its
roots in the fact that agents have preferences that they
rank in the manner just delineated. We may now formulate a
necessary condition for being in an authentic PD:
NCPD: If agents are to be in an authentic PD, these agents
must have have PD preferences that are "standardly ranked."
McClennen's discussion of rational cooperation
generates a problem about preference because McClennen
sometimes gives the impression that resolute choosers could
be in an authentic PD even though they fail at the relevant
time to have preferences that are standardly ranked.
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Responding to a worry of the economist Sen, for example,
McClennen says
One can mark here what appear to be two distinct,
although closely connected issues. One concerns
whether certain ways of arguing that rational
agents should cooperate in a Prisoner's Dilemma
situation might be dismissed on the grounds that
the reasons cited imply that those who are so
disposed do not face a genuine Prisoner's Dilemma.
The second is whether some particular account of
how persons might come to cooperate in such a
situation could be faulted on the grounds that it
"resolves" the problem in an purely ad hoc manner.
It would seem, for example, that those who are
concerned about the welfare of others, and who are
led thereby to act in a cooperative manner can be
said, in so behaving, to reveal their concern for
others. However, if one supposes them to cooperate
for that reason, then they do not really face a
Prisoner's Dilemma. Moreover, such a "resolution"
of the problem has the air of being ad hoc .
The model I have proposed is not subject to
either of these objections. Following Sen, I start
with the assumption that the agents' preferences
for outcomes conform to the pattern of a classic
Prisoner's Dilemma situation. I simply move from
there to challenge the distinct assumption that
preferences for outcomes, abstractly considered,
must be taken as controlling for preferences over
actions and, hence, for choice. (CM and RC, 18-19)
He further informs us that
Again, it may be argued that what counts against my
model is that the very concept of preference itself
implies that the agent will be disposed, at each
choice point in time, to choose an alternative that
is maximally preferred and that the plan the agent
adopts must have the property that it calls upon
the agent to make choices at each choice point that
are consistent with the preferences he has at that
point in time. Call this the principle of Dynamic
Consistency. This principle is clearly one to
which my proposed model is faithful. (CM and RC,
19-20)
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Finally, in a footnote to a sentence in a passage in which
McClennen gives a reinterpretation, in terms of choosing
resolutely, of Gauthier's claim that an agent can behave as
a constrained maximizer, McClennen explains that
Since on the account offered here a rational agent
does not ever act contrary to the preferences he
has for actions at the time of choice, and,
correspondingly, does not choose other than a
utility maximizing action, it is perhaps misleading
to describe him as a constrained maximizer. He
maximizes in an unconstrained sense his preferences
for available actions, although not his preferences
over (separably considered) outcomes. (CM and RC)
How do we interpret "maximally preferred" and "utility
maximizing action" in the last two passages if we are to
suppose, consistent with what the first passage seems to
suggest, that the relevant resolute agents would in fact be
in an authentic PD? There are a number of interesting
possibilities intimated by McClennen himself. These appeal
to preferences that have as their objects different
outcomes
.
Assume that a number of agents expect to find
themselves (together) in a PD at some future time and are
now at the first nodes in their decision trees. When faced
with the problem of coordinating with each other, they may
have preferences for the implementation of plans whose
consequences are judged to be best. Such agents treat
their preferences "among feasible sets of actions as
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sensitive to more than just their preferences for the
corresponding outcomes of those actions." (CM and RC, 15)
On the other hand, they may have preferences for outcomes
"abstractly considered" - outcomes of actions that could
result at a particular point in time if those actions were
performed at that time. Such preferences are shaped by a
concern for outcomes that still remain realizable in the
future and are not, unlike the former preferences,
sensitive to any decisions that have been made in the past.
Clearly we have here two different sorts of preference, the
first sort having as object the implementation of plans,
and the second, having as object "outcomes abstractly
considered." Call the first sort "p preferences" and the
second sort "o preferences."
In the passages just cited, McClennen suggests that
resolute agents like resolute Butch and resolute Sundance,
facing a coordinating problem, choose "an alternative that
is maximally preferred." What sort of preference is being
referred to here, a p preference or an o preference?
Alternatively, is it p preferences or o preferences that
such resolute agents take "as controlling for preferences
over actions and, hence, for choice"?
Suppose it is o preferences. Suppose, that is, that
Butch and Sundance act in conformity with their o
preferences. Then if they are in an authentic PD they will
end up not cooperating. As a result they fare no better
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than they would if they were sophisticated choosers.
Suppose, alternatively, that the relevant preferences are p
preferences. Suppose, that is, that they discipline their
preferences "to conform to a plan whose consequences [they]
judge to be superior." (CM and RC, 20) On the possibility
that interests us here, the best plan in some sense of
'best' calls for resolute agents to cooperate. So assume
that Butch and Sundance, acting to satisfy maximally their
p preferences, do the cooperative thing. Then NCPD will
not be satisfied. It won't be satisfied because Butch and
Sundance have as "controlling" or as maximally preferred ex
post preferences to cooperate and not ex post preferences
to do the noncooperative thing. They have "non-standardly
ranked" PD preferences. Since both are rational, I am
assuming that their ex post preferences to cooperate are
stronger than their ex post preferences to defect. I am
not supposing the converse is true and that they simply
fail to act on their strongest preferences at the time of
decision. If they were to fail in this way, they would not
be rational. Since NCPD specifies a condition that is
necessary if agents are to be in an authentic PD, these
resolute agents won't be in such a PD.
There is a third possibility. Why not suppose that
agents have both p preferences and o preferences? Having o
preferences ensures that they are in an authentic PD. But
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when it comes time for action, these agents act on their p
preferences
.
I believe McClennen would not endorse this position,
as the last two passages cited strongly intimate. Further
evidence that he would reject this third option is provided
by the following passage:
the suggestion that a rational agent will, at a
certain point in a decision tree, choose other than
what she prefers at that point plays hob with the
whole notion of revealed preference: if the agent
chooses A rather than B, then there is a perfectly
appropriate sense in which what the agent really
prefers (the preference revealed by choice) is A
rather than B. (PD and RC, 102-103)
If I am right about the preference problem, then a
heavy explanatory burden is placed on a theory of
rationality, R, according to which R-rational agents can
escape an authentic PD. Presumably, if such agents are
able to escape this type of dilemma, and not something that
resembles but is not an authentic PD, they must have non-
standardly ranked PD preferences. If they have non-
standardly ranked PD preferences, an explanation is owed of
how these agents would be in an authentic PD in the first
place. Such an explanation is not impossible to come by.
In fact there is a way to interpret resolute choice that
provides just what is needed:
Maximizing conceptions of rationality such as SM are
often held in conjunction with the thesis that the contents
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of individuals' preferences are beyond rational assessment.
This is, for example, Professor Gauthier's conviction . 7
Since this "non-constraining" thesis and a theory of the
maximizing variety are logically independent, the one may
be held without the other. Suppose one renounces the non-
constraining thesis. Then one might try to defend a notion
of "rational preferences" or "context sensitive
preferences." it might, for instance, be urged that not
all preferences are rational and that what preferences it
is rational to have partly depends on the situation one is
in. Whatever this notion of rational preference amounts
to, if it is to contribute to a resolution of an authentic
PD, it must minimally entail both that an ex ante
preference for cooperation is rational as is an ex post
preference to act cooperatively. Now one could identify
rationality with the maximization of one's rational
preferences. This alternative to SM - "ASM" - might be
some such theory according to which an act is rational if
and only if none of its alternatives maximizes the
satisfaction of its agent's rational preferences to a
greater extent than it does. ASM could then be used to
demonstrate the rationality of cooperation in one-shot PDs.
The connection between ASM and resolute choice might not
unreasonably be claimed to be this: Not all preferences,
according to this way of conceptualizing matters, including
- presumably - "standard" ex post PD preferences to act
249
noncooperatively, are rational. But an ex ante PD
preference for cooperation and an ex post PD preference to
act cooperatively are rational. Agents who resolve to act
cooperatively and then act on that resolve when the time
comes can be understood to be acting on their rational
preferences. The solution conceives agents as having
standard ex arite and standard ex post PD preferences. ASM-
rational agents act, however, in conformity with the subset
of these preferences that are rational, and not in
conformity with the preferences that are strongest. The
strongest preferences an agent has at a time need not be
those that are rational at that time. The solution would
therefore be one to an authentic PD.
It is premature, of course, to pass judgment on
whether such a solution would be acceptable. What is
significant is that a solution along these lines stresses
that if rational agents - 'rational' in some sense of the
term - are to escape an authentic PD, it must not be the
case that the strongest preferences these agents have at a
time of choice are those that are "controlling for choice."
This is something, however, that McClennen does not seem to
accept. He seems commited to the view that at each choice
point in time, rational agents choose alternatives that are
maximally preferred.
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In conclusion, contrary to what McClennen appears to
believe, SM does not violate Crit. In hard cases in which
each agent is transparent to all agents and knows that
every agent is rational, SFMs do no worse than resolute
choosers. In situations of this kind, it is
straightforwardly rational to do the "cooperative" thing.
In really hard authentic PD situations, SFMs again do no
worse, nor do they do any better, than resolute choosers
who have non-standard ex post PD preferences. The reason
this time being that such resolute choosers would not in
fact be in authentic PDs.
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Notes
1. See Edward F. McClennen, "Prisoner's Dilemma and
Resolute Choice," in Paradoxes of Rationality and
Cooperation eds., R. Campbell and L. Sowden (1985),
Vancouver: The University of British Columbia Press, 94-
104; Edward F. McClennen, "Dynamic Choice and Rationality,"
forthcoming; and Edward F. McClennen, "Constrained
Maximization and Resolute Choice," forthcoming in Social
Philosophy and Policy . Page references to these works
appear in parentheses in the text, beginning from the first
to the third, as follows: (PD and RC, page number); (DC
and R, page number)
; (CM and RC, page number)
.
2. In pages 3 and 4 in "Dynamic Choice and Rationality,"
McClennen tells us that
A plan specifies what is to be done at each
subsequent choice point in the decision tree that
might be reached, given previous choices specified
in the plan, and various contingent events.
3. There may be a problem with this definition, as
Professor Feldman indicates: Suppose my sequence of action
is like this: al—>a2—>a3—>outcome o. Suppose these are
all true: If I were to do al, I would get outcome o. If I
were to do a2, I would get o. If I were to do a3, I would
get o. Suppose the value of o for me is 10 points. Then
the expected utility of the plan prescribing the above
sequence of actions is 30 points. This seems wrong.
To evade this problem, let's sitipulate - arbitrarily
I realize - that no such sequences of action occur in s's
decision tree.
4. David Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (1986), Oxford:
Clarendon Press, p. 14.
5. See Morals By Agreement . p. 145 and p. 151.
6. A potential worry here is this: Some best plans,
unlike feasible plans, seem to require that agents act in
ways that they cannot. Plan ac, for example, requires that
Ulysses ignore the Sirens. How can rationality require
that one do what one is incapable of? McClennen responds
in this way:
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[R]esolute choice enjoys two advantages not enjoyed
by sophisticated choice. First, while
precommitment is typically costly, resolute choice
has the attractive property that it can achieve
whatever precommitment can achieve without the
costs in question. Second, the specific use to
which resolute approach has here been put turns on
the idea of disciplining future choice to
holistically oriented evaluation of the whole
sequence of choices to be made. In contrast the
sophisticated approach involves tailoring our
choice of a whole plan to projected independent
determined choices at subsequent stages. The
former, it seems to me, is the more promising view:
it invites us to think of ourselves as more than
merely (passive) predictors of our own future
choices, as capable of disciplining future choice,
when to do so can be shown to be in our interest.
In such cases, a retreat to a sophisticated
approach seems very much like an admission of
weakness of will. While the inability to carry
through in certain situations may be a fact about
human nature, it is unclear why a theory of how to
behave in the face of such an inability (namely, to
adopt a sophisticated approach) should be taken as
other than a theory of how best to proceed under
conditions of imperfect rationality. ["Dynamic
Choice and Rationality," p. 17]
7. Morals By Agreement, pp. 25, 26, 34.
8. Richard Brandt, for example, argues for something like
this. See Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the
Right (1979), Oxford: Clarendon Press, especially Chapter
6. Derek Parfit has an interesting discussion on whether
desires can be "intrinsically rational" or "rationally
required" in section 46 in Derek parfit, Reasons And




1 . 1 Doom
I am the source of sad news: Butch and Sundance read
Chapter 8. Each ends up spending ten years in jail.
1 . 2 The Contractarian 's Dilemma
I want to conclude with some general comments on why I
think the contractarian approach to "justifying" morality
is unlikely to succeed. When I speak about the
"contractarian approach," I have in mind primarily
contractarian theories of the type advanced by Gauthier.
So let's review the essential features of that approach.
On Gauthier's scheme a morality is to be justified in
relation to the actual (considered) preferences of rational
agents. The task is to show that no matter what the
preferences of these persons, they have reason to be moral:
Each, concerned with furthering her own good, would do best
for herself by conforming to the morality that is the
outcome of a rational bargain among them. Rational
bargaining specifies the terms of rational agreement - it
specifies the content of a particular morality. Gauthier
must demonstrate that compliance with this morality, the
morality that is the "product" of rational bargaining, is
advantageous to all parties concerned. Toward this end,
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the strategy is to show that these persons would comply
with the interest-constraining reguirements of the agreed-
upon morality as, roughly, it is in their long-term
interest to do so.
This type of contractarian approach is particularly
engaging because, if successful, it promises to accomplish
two very noteworthy goals: (i) It generates morality "as a
rational constraint from the non-moral premises of rational
choice." (M by A, 4) ( i i ) It shows that the apparent
conflict between considerations of morality and those of
rational self-interest is merely apparent. There is no
real clash here because on this approach moral principles
are a subset of rational principles of choice: "To choose
rationally, one must choose morally." (M by A, 4)
If we keep these two goals in mind, I think it is easy
to see why this type of contractarianism will probably
founder. Gauthier begins his project by assuming that the
agents in relation to whom a morality is to be justified
are SM-rational. This is essential if "goal (i)" is to be
accomplished: SM as a "weak and widely accepted" precept
of rational choice makes no pretense to being a moral one.
Furthermore, it is presupposed at the outset, or it must be
so, that SM is not a defective standard of rationality. If
it were, there would be little reason to be interested in
the outcome of a bargain among SM-rational agents.
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Moreover, since CM and SM are extensionally equivalent in
' non-strategic" contexts of choice, any defect in SM would
also infect CM. It's evident, though, that Gauthier
believes CM to be beyond reproach.
The major hurdle, however, that such SM-rational
persons face, as Gauthier tells us, is not rational
bargaining, but rational compliance with the injunctions of
the morality that is the outcome of rational bargaining.
The problem of compliance arises because these injunctions,
being moral ones, are interest-constraining. The PD serves
as a nice device to show that it is not SM-rational to
comply with the prescriptions of the agreed-upon morality:
MMRC requires that you do the cooperative thing in a (real)
PD, SM proscribes such action.
Gauthier endeavors to solve the compliance problem by
"reinterpret [ ing] the utility-maximizing conception of
practical rationality" (M by A, 182): It's certainly CM-
rational to comply with the requirements of MMRC (under
specified conditions) provided your fellow interactors are
trustworthy constrained maximizers. But this way of
resolving the compliance problem introduces a complexity.
There are now two rival standards of reason, SM and its
competitor. I suggested earlier that if you are a SFM, you
will not be moved by this solution to the problem of
compliance, not unless you have been given reason to
believe that CM is superior to SM. Gauthier tries to
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supply such a reason by arguing that as a SFM it would be
rational for you to change your very conception of
rationality - you would do best for yourself if you were to
become a constrained maximizer. Perhaps we can take the
choice argument as indicative of some sort of evaluative
test for assessing theories of rationality. I expressed
reservations about the choice argument. But the worry with
Gauthier's brand of contractarianism that I am now
interested in formulating arises, I think, even if we
suppose the choice argument sound. In fact, I think
Gauthier countenances a dilemma:
Either there is a sound argument, or an acceptable
evaluative test, that establishes the superiority of CM to
SM, or there is not. Suppose there is. Then CM is better
than SM - it '
s
the legitimate standard of reason. But CM
is a moral principle, it's interest-constraining. I think
it's precisely because CM has this feature that compliance
with the interest-constraining requirements of MMRC is CM-
rational . On the supposition that CM is better than SM, or
that CM is really the standard of rationality, Gauthier can
sustain the claim that moral principles are a subset of
rational principles of choice. But the cost, of course, of
arguing in this way should be obvious: The contractarian
argument would loose much of its interest since it would
fail to accomplish "goal (i) ;
"
it would fail to derive
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morality from the non-moral premises of a theory of
rational choice: SM but not CM is such a non-moral theory.
Assume there were some alternative to SM - a principle
of rationality, R, that had these features: R requires
compliance with the prescriptions of MMRC , R is not a moral
principle, and R is superior to SM by the lights of some
cogent evaluative test. 1 Wouldn't Gauthier then be able to
evade the first horn? The answer, unhappily, is "No." If
R were not a moral principle, then "goal (ii)" that
Gauthier's contractarian theory strives to achieve would
have to be abandoned. It would not be true that to choose
rationally one must choose morally.
Suppose, then, that there is no evaluative test, or if
you want, suppose the choice argument fails. Then once
again Gauthier's contractarianism collapses: It may be CM-
rational to comply with the interest-constraining
prescriptions of MMRC, but as a SFM, you will have been
provided with no reason whatsoever to adhere to these
interest-thwarting requirements.
1 . 3 Conclusion
"Should I be moral?" Glaucon, or Hobbes' Fool, or the
moral sceptic, might ask. If we take these people to be
asking "Is it rational to be moral?" or "Is it prudentially
obligatory to do what's morally obligatory?" the answer is
clear. It is not. The PD, I think, is inescapable.
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Notes
1. I'm not sure a theory of this sort is possible,
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